THE HINDUTVA PROJECT

The India Power Atlas

Money, Institutions and the Contest for Power in India



First edition

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Money, Institutions and the Contest for Power in India

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Contents

Preface 7

Summary of Findings 9

A Note on Terms 11

List of Figures and Tables 13

PART I **Framework** 55

1 The Question 56

2 The Architecture of the Atlas 58

3 Measurement and the Composite Reading 61

4 Data, Coding and Limitations 63

PART II **Demography and Identity** 65

5 Religious Demography and Electoral Geography 67

6 Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus 74

7 The Committed Core Electorate 86

PART III **Society and Organisation** 95

8 Party and Movement Cadres 97

9 Public Opinion on Contested Questions 108

10 Religious Leadership and Institutions 122

11 The NGO and Advocacy Sector 130

12 Street Mobilisation and Veto Power 138

PART IV **Economy and Money** 148

13 Large Business Owners 149

14 Private Funding for Ideological Causes 158

15 Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations 166

PART V **Knowledge and Expertise** 179

16 Universities and Think Tanks 180

17 Expert Authority within the State 197

18 Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation 204

PART VI **Media and Narrative** 213

19 Television News 215

20 Interpersonal Political Communication 220

21 Digital Platforms 230

22 Newspapers and the Elite Press 240

23 Celebrities and Influencers 249

24 Cinema and Streaming 255

PART VII **Elections** 263

25 Vote Share 264

26 The Conversion of Votes into Seats 276

27 Leadership Popularity 283

28 Party Finance 293

PART VIII **The State** 300

29 Executive Office 302

30 Public Expenditure 309

31 Police and Central Agencies 317

32 The Civil Services 324

33 Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies 333

34 Parliament 341

35 The Judiciary 349

36 Internal Security 362

PART IX **External Actors** 381

37 Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies 383

38 Global Technology Platforms 403

39 The United States 418

40 China 429

41 Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks 438

42 Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States 461

43 Transnational Christian Organisations 473
44 The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad 481

PART X **The Underlying Studies** **490**
45 The Flow of Money: An Overview 492
46 Power Index, Dynamics and Scenarios 503
47 Foreign and Diaspora Money 513
48 Domestic Giving, CSR and the Religious Economy 518
49 Political Money and Government Advertising 522
50 Social Media and Information Infrastructure 531
51 Whole-of-Population Discourse 541
52 News Media, Entertainment and Culture 550
53 Knowledge, Education and Expertise 556
54 Control of State Institutions 568
55 Economic Power, Welfare and Patronage 575
56 Religion, Demography, Identity and Memory 582
57 Law, Labour, Science and Corporate Bodies 588
58 International Opinion, Foreign Influence and Elite Networks 596
59 Calibration and Classification 606

PART XI **Synthesis** **619**
60 The Composite Reading 620
61 Durable and Office-Dependent Power 623
62 Limits and Further Research 625
Appendix A: Codebook of Arenas and Indicators 626
Appendix B: The Evidence Base 634
Appendix C: Sources 636
Appendix D: Data and Replication 642

Preface

This book is the scholarly edition of the India Power Atlas, a research programme that measures the distribution of political, social, economic and institutional power in contemporary India. Its question is narrow and, we hope, precise: across the arenas in which power over India is exercised, what share is held by actors aligned with Hindutva, the Hindu-nationalist political tradition, and what share is held by everyone else?

The Atlas does not ask whether that distribution is good or bad. It asks what the distribution is, how it was measured, and how far the measurement can be trusted. Each of its 40 arenas is presented in a chapter of its own, with the indicators used, their weights, the resulting reading and the exhibits of evidence on which it rests: shares by side, the largest actors, money-flow diagrams and time series. Part X reproduces the figures of the 15 underlying studies, from the master map of money flows to the calibration of the classification. A reader who rejects a weight or a coding decision can see exactly where it enters and what it changes.

Disclosure. The Atlas is published by **The Hindutva Project**, an organisation that is itself a participant in the politics it describes. We state this at the outset so that readers can weigh the work accordingly. The interactive edition, which allows every weight and assumption to be changed and the results recomputed, is available at thehindutvarebellion.org. The data behind every chapter can be downloaded from the same site; Appendix D explains how.

The readings in this edition are the Atlas's baseline readings as of 2 Nov 2026 (Atlas rev 9.40). They will change as the evidence

changes. Corrections and challenges to any figure are welcome and will be acknowledged in later editions.

Summary of Findings

On the Atlas's baseline measurement, actors aligned with Hindutva hold 45.7 of every 100 points of power over India. Other actors, domestic and foreign, hold 54.3.

The composite combines 32 domestic arenas, grouped into seven domains, with 8 assessments of external actors. Domestically the reading is 48.6; against external actors it is 32.7. Of the 40 arenas, 10 show an aligned majority (a reading of 60 or more), 9 are contested (45 to 60) and 21 show an opposed majority (below 45).

Three findings stand out.

1. **Power is concentrated in office.** The highest readings are in the instruments of the State: executive office (89.5), police and central agencies (84.7) and public expenditure (81.1). These depend on holding government. Recomputed for a counterfactual in which the BJP holds no office at the Union or in any state, the composite falls from 45.7 to 36.7. About 9.0 points are therefore contingent on electoral success.
2. **Knowledge and elite institutions read low.** The lowest domestic readings are expert authority within the State (7.2), universities and think tanks (15.7), the committed core electorate (15.9) and newspapers and the elite press (21.7). The domain of knowledge as a whole reads 16.2.
3. **Mass audiences and elites diverge.** Television news (58.2), cinema and streaming (56.3) and interpersonal communication (53.7) are contested or better, while the elite press and the institutions that train and brief officials, judges and journalists read well below 45.

Each figure is a point estimate under stated rules. Chapter 4 sets out the main sources of uncertainty, and Chapter 61 separates durable from office-dependent power.

A Note on Terms

Hindutva-aligned. An actor, organisation, outlet, flow of money or unit of content whose activity, on the documented record, strengthens the Hindu-nationalist coalition: the organisations of the Sangh parivar, the BJP and its allies, and aligned religious, cultural, media, intellectual and diaspora actors. The term describes coalitional alignment, not motive or value.

Opposed. An actor whose activity strengthens the coalition that contests Hindutva, whatever its own framework: secular-liberal, Marxist, anti-caste, minority-rights, regionalist or internationalist. Opposed actors are not a single organisation and frequently disagree with one another; the Atlas counts them together only because each arena is measured as a two-sided contest.

Neutral, mixed and transactional. Units that pass the Atlas's neutrality tests are recorded but excluded from the two-sided share. Units with genuinely mixed alignment are reported separately. Transactional money, given to whichever party holds office, is counted as office-dependent.

Reading. A number from 0 to 100: the Hindutva-aligned share of power in an arena, a domain or the whole. A reading of 50 means the two sides are evenly matched. Throughout the book, readings are given to one decimal place; this is a convention of presentation, not a claim of precision.

RW and LW. The underlying studies reproduced in Part X label the two blocs RW (the Hindutva-aligned bloc) and LW (the coalition that contests it). The labels denote India's two competing socio-political blocs, not Western economic left and right. The stud-

ies also report GOV (pure public goods with no ideological content), cross-cutting, neutral and unclassified units separately.

Office-dependent power. The part of a reading that exists only because the BJP and its allies currently hold government. It is estimated by recomputing the Atlas with the BJP out of office everywhere.

List of Figures and Tables

The book contains 788 figures and 54 tables.

Chapter 2 The Architecture of the Atlas

Tab. 2.1 Domains, arenas, number of indicators and weights 58

Chapter 5 Religious Demography and Electoral Geography

Tab. 5.1 Indicators of arena 1.1 68

Fig. 5.1 Readings of arena 1.1 by indicator 68

Fig. 5.2 Over time: Census share (Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 3 more) (% of population) 69

Fig. 5.3 Seat arithmetic: Lok Sabha seats where Muslims are under 20% 69

Fig. 5.4 India by faith, % of people (Census 2011) 69

Fig. 5.5 Each community, % of people 69

Fig. 5.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (people) 70

Fig. 5.7 The 15 biggest of 280 (people) 70

Fig. 5.8 Over time: Census population (Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 3 more) (million) 70

Fig. 5.9 Over time: Faith-base reading H/, Faith-base reading H/ 2026 projection · 0-100 71

Fig. 5.10 Over time: Pew 2015 projection: Hindu, Pew 2015 projection: Muslim, Pew 2025 estimate: Hindu and 3 more · % of population 71

Fig. 5.11 Over time: Pew 2025 estimate: Muslims in India, RGI Technical Group projected total population · million 72

Fig. 5.12 Over time: TFR (NFHS) (Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 3 more) · children per woman 72

Chapter 6 Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus

Tab. 6.1 Indicators of arena 1.2 74

Fig. 6.1 Readings of arena 1.2 by indicator 75

Fig. 6.2 NDA vote vs all other votes among Hindus by caste group, 2024 (%) 76

Fig. 6.3 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 21 (% NDA vote) 76

Fig. 6.4 The 6 biggest of 6 (respondents (NES 2024 jati code count)) 77

Fig. 6.5 The 6 biggest of 6 (respondents (NES 2014 group n)) 77

Fig. 6.6 Over time: NDA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted, NDA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted) · % NDA vote 77

Fig. 6.7 Over time: INDIA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted, INDIA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted) · % INDIA vote 78

Fig. 6.8 Over time: INDIA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted · % UPA vote 78

Fig. 6.9 Over time: NDA % of all Hindu votes, Lokniti published, BJP % of all Hindu votes, Lokniti published · % vote 79

Fig. 6.10 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 24 (% NDA vote among Hindu voters (estimated)) 80

Fig. 6.11 Over time: Cohesion OLD (100 minus caste gap) · 0-100 81

Fig. 6.12 Over time: Cohesion NEW: % of Hindus in caste groups where..., Cohesion ALT: % of Hindus in caste groups where... · % of Hindus 81

Fig. 6.13 Over time: Cohesion ALT (minimum NDA % across Hindu caste groups) · % NDA vote 81

Fig. 6.14 Over time: Two-way NDA/ among Hindus, Two-way NDA/ among Hindus) · 0-100 82

Fig. 6.15 Over time: State component: Hindu-population-weighted NDA ..., State component: simple mean across states, State NDA % among Hindu voters: Uttar Pradesh and 3 more · % NDA vote 83

Fig. 6.16 Over time: State component coverage (Hindus in the states used) · % of Hindus 83

Fig. 6.17 Regional identity: India-first and the Hindu NDA vote in the South and Bengal 83

Chapter 7 The Committed Core Electorate

Tab. 7.1 Indicators of arena 1.3 87

Fig. 7.1 Readings of arena 1.3 by indicator 87

Fig. 7.2 BJP vote share in Lok Sabha elections, % 88

Fig. 7.3 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 88 (% of valid votes) 88

Fig. 7.4 Over time: BJP Lok Sabha vote share · % of valid votes 89

Fig. 7.5 Over time: BJP Lok Sabha seats · seats 89

Fig. 7.6 Each counted row (% of valid votes) 89

Fig. 7.7 Each counted row (% of respondents) 90

Fig. 7.8 Each counted row (% of voters) 90

Fig. 7.9 Over time: BJP voters who would have changed vote without … · % of BJP voters 90

Fig. 7.10 Over time: BJP vote not dependent on Modi · % of valid votes 90

Fig. 7.11 Over time: Core reading, current formula 0.5*floor2009 + 0… · 0-100 91

Fig. 7.12 Each counted row (% of respondents) 91

Fig. 7.13 Each counted row (% of partisans) 91

Fig. 7.14 Over time: BJP share of party identifiers, INC share of party identifiers · % of partisans 92

Fig. 7.15 Over time: BJP identifiers, % of all respondents · % of respondents 92

Fig. 7.16 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 232 (% of valid votes) 93

Chapter 8 Party and Movement Cadres

Tab. 8.1 Indicators of arena 2.1 97

Fig. 8.1 Readings of arena 2.1 by indicator 98
Fig. 8.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members) 99
Fig. 8.3 The 15 biggest of 17 (members) 99
Fig. 8.4 The 2 biggest of 2 (schools) 99
Fig. 8.5 The 2 biggest of 2 (party members) 99
Fig. 8.6 Over time: BJP primary members, CPI party members, TDP members and 3 more · members 100
Fig. 8.7 Over time: BJP active members · active members 100
Fig. 8.8 Over time: INC members · digital members 100
Fig. 8.9 Over time: INC members incl. paper · digital + paper members 101
Fig. 8.10 Cadre intensity: organised units that meet on a fixed cycle 101
Fig. 8.11 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (posts won by ABVP (of 4)) 101
Fig. 8.12 The 2 biggest of 2 (posts won by ABVP (of 4)) 102
Fig. 8.13 Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (DUSU, JNUSU, UoHSU and 1 more) · posts of 4 102
Fig. 8.14 Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (JNUSU) · posts of 8 102
Fig. 8.15 Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (UoHSU) · posts of 6 103
Fig. 8.16 Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (UoHSU) · posts of 10 103
Fig. 8.17 Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (UoHSU) · posts of 5 103
Fig. 8.18 Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (PUCSC) · posts of 2 104
Fig. 8.19 Over time: RSS daily shakhas · daily shakhas 104
Fig. 8.20 Over time: RSS sthan · sthan 104
Fig. 8.21 Over time: RSS weekly milans · weekly milans 105
Fig. 8.22 Over time: RSS monthly mandalis · monthly mandalis 105

Fig. 8.23 Over time: CTUO provisional 2011 claims (AICCTU, AITUC, AIUTUC and 3 more) · members 105

Fig. 8.24 Over time: Vidya Bharati formal schools · schools 106

Chapter 9 Public Opinion on Contested Questions

Tab. 9.1 Indicators of arena 2.2 108

Fig. 9.1 Readings of arena 2.2 by indicator 109

Fig. 9.2 Each counted row (% Hindutva share of decided) 110

Fig. 9.3 Over time: UCC support, CAA support · % support 110

Fig. 9.4 Over time: CAA support · % "helps persecuted minorities" 111

Fig. 9.5 Over time: CAA support · % approve 111

Fig. 9.6 Over time: NRC support · % implement nationwide 111

Fig. 9.7 Over time: NRC support · % "good step" 112

Fig. 9.8 Over time: Art 370 (should be revoked/repealed) · % should be revoked 112

Fig. 9.9 Over time: Art 370 (should be revoked/repealed) · % should have been repealed 112

Fig. 9.10 Over time: Art 370 (want it reinstated) · % want Art 370 reinstated 113

Fig. 9.11 Over time: Caste census support · % in favour 113

Fig. 9.12 Over time: Same-sex marriage support/acceptance · % accepted 113

Fig. 9.13 Over time: Same-sex marriage support/acceptance · % favour legal SSM 114

Fig. 9.14 Over time: Homosexuality never justifiable · % never justifiable 114

Fig. 9.15 Over time: Op Sindoor a strong response · % strong 114

Fig. 9.16 Each counted row (% Hindutva share of decided) 115

Fig. 9.17 Over time: India belongs only to Hindus · % only Hindus 115

Fig. 9.18 Over time: Minorities should adopt majority customs, Govt must protect minorities even if majority d… · 116

% fully agree

Fig. 9.19 Over time: Minorities should adopt majority customs · % fully disagree 116

Fig. 9.20 Over time: Vote BJP for Hindutva-aligned · % main reason 116

Fig. 9.21 Over time: Communal harmony improved under NDA · % improved 117

Fig. 9.22 Over time: Communal harmony deteriorated under NDA · % deteriorated 117

Fig. 9.23 Over time: Will of majority community should prevail, Special treatment for minorities needed · % fully agree 118

Fig. 9.24 Over time: Strong leader who need not bother about electio… · % agree 118

Fig. 9.25 Over time: Strong leader without parliament/elections good · % very/fairly good 118

Fig. 9.26 Over time: Ram temple named biggest govt achievement, Ram Mandir most-liked central govt work · % single pick 119

Fig. 9.27 Over time: Satisfied with govt response to Pahalgam · % completely satisfied 119

Fig. 9.28 Over time: Would not like other-religion neighbours · % mentioned 119

Fig. 9.29 Over time: Religion very important in life · % very important 120

Chapter 10 Religious Leadership and Institutions

Tab. 10.1 Indicators of arena 2.3 122

Fig. 10.1 Readings of arena 2.3 by indicator 123

Fig. 10.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 124

Fig. 10.3 The 15 biggest of 119 (million followers) 124

Fig. 10.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (views, 12 months Oct 2025-Sep 2026 (m)) 124

Fig. 10.5 The 15 biggest of 193 (views, 12 months Oct 2025-Sep 2026 (m)) 125
Fig. 10.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 125
Fig. 10.7 The 15 biggest of 28 (₹ crore a year) 126
Fig. 10.8 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 127
Fig. 10.9 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 127
Fig. 10.10 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 128
Fig. 10.11 By country of origin (₹ crore) 128
Fig. 10.12 Organised institutions: places of worship (Census 2011, by district faith shares) and madrasas 128

Chapter 11 The NGO and Advocacy Sector

Tab. 11.1 Indicators of arena 2.4 131
Fig. 11.1 Readings of arena 2.4 by indicator 131
Fig. 11.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 132
Fig. 11.3 The 15 biggest of 523 (₹ crore a year) 132
Fig. 11.4 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 133
Fig. 11.5 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 133
Fig. 11.6 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 134
Fig. 11.7 By country of origin (₹ crore) 134
Fig. 11.8 The 4 biggest of 4 (organisations) 135
Fig. 11.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 135
Fig. 11.10 The 15 biggest of 31 (₹ crore a year) 136

Chapter 12 Street Mobilisation and Veto Power

Tab. 12.1 Indicators of arena 2.5 138
Fig. 12.1 Readings of arena 2.5 by indicator 139

Fig. 12.2 Veto points won 2019-26: the State, companies, studios, platforms and venues made to back down 139

Fig. 12.3 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (veto score 0-3) 139

Fig. 12.4 The 15 biggest of 97 (veto score 0-3) 140

Fig. 12.5 Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 1985-1999 140

Fig. 12.6 Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 1985-1999 141

Fig. 12.7 Over time: H share of H+R veto points, Concession rate, all sides · % 141

Fig. 12.8 Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 2000-2013 141

Fig. 12.9 Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 2000-2013 142

Fig. 12.10 Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 2014-2019 142

Fig. 12.11 Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 2014-2019 142

Fig. 12.12 Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 2020-2026 143

Fig. 12.13 Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 2020-2026 143

Tab. 12.2 Violence 144

Chapter 13 Large Business Owners

Tab. 13.1 Indicators of arena 3.1 149

Fig. 13.1 Readings of arena 3.1 by indicator 150

Fig. 13.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows ($ billion) 151

Fig. 13.3 The 15 biggest of 99 ($ billion) 151

Fig. 13.4 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 152
Fig. 13.5 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 152
Fig. 13.6 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 153
Fig. 13.7 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (weekly reach, thousand AMA (BARC 2025 genre...) 153
Fig. 13.8 The 8 biggest of 8 (weekly reach, thousand AMA (BARC 2025 genre...) 153
Fig. 13.9 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 154
Fig. 13.10 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 154
Fig. 13.11 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 155
Fig. 13.12 Prosperity felt: voters better off, and happy with jobs, incomes and prices 155

Chapter 14 Private Funding for Ideological Causes

Tab. 14.1 Indicators of arena 3.2 159
Fig. 14.1 Readings of arena 3.2 by indicator 159
Fig. 14.2 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 160
Fig. 14.3 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 160
Fig. 14.4 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 161
Fig. 14.5 By country of origin (₹ crore) 161
Fig. 14.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 161
Fig. 14.7 The 15 biggest of 227 (₹ crore a year) 162
Fig. 14.8 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 163
Fig. 14.9 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 163
Fig. 14.10 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 164

Fig. 14.11 By country of origin (₹ crore) 164

Chapter 15 Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations

Tab. 15.1 Indicators of arena 3.3 166
Fig. 15.1 Readings of arena 3.3 by indicator 167
Fig. 15.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 167
Fig. 15.3 The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore) 167
Fig. 15.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 167
Fig. 15.5 The 7 biggest of 7 (₹ crore) 168
Tab. 15.2 Co-operatives (facts without a number) 168
Fig. 15.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members) 169
Fig. 15.7 The 13 biggest of 13 (members) 169
Tab. 15.3 Union membership (facts without a number) 170
Fig. 15.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total)) 170
Fig. 15.9 The 3 biggest of 3 (members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total)) 171
Fig. 15.10 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (votes) 171
Fig. 15.11 The 3 biggest of 3 (votes) 171
Tab. 15.4 Shop-floor polls (facts without a number) 172
Fig. 15.12 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members) 173
Fig. 15.13 The 3 biggest of 3 (members) 173
Tab. 15.5 Farmer fronts (facts without a number) 174
Tab. 15.6 Strikes and bandhs (facts without a number) 176
Fig. 15.14 Co-operatives: who controls the largest co-ops and co-op banks, by size (elected boards) 176
Fig. 15.15 Union members: BMS share of verified central trade-union membership 177

Fig. 15.16 Shop floor: union recognition polls and bargaining seats in railways, coal, steel and transport 177

Fig. 15.17 Farmer fronts: claimed members, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh vs the Kisan Sabha and farm-workers' union 177

Chapter 16 Universities and Think Tanks

Tab. 16.1 Indicators of arena 4.1 181

Fig. 16.1 Readings of arena 4.1 by indicator 182

Fig. 16.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (index points (all think tanks = 100)) 182

Fig. 16.3 The 15 biggest of 70 (index points (all think tanks = 100)) 183

Fig. 16.4 Think tanks by reach: news articles 2017-26 + Wikipedia pages linking to them 184

Fig. 16.5 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 184

Fig. 16.6 The 15 biggest of 31 (₹ crore a year) 185

Fig. 16.7 Over time: think tank income (Observer Research Foundation, Centre for Policy Research, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation and 3 more) (₹ crore) 186

Fig. 16.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (university (VC post)) 186

Fig. 16.9 The 15 biggest of 147 (university (VC post)) 187

Fig. 16.10 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (signatories) 187

Fig. 16.11 The 15 biggest of 31 (signatories) 188

Fig. 16.12 Academics' open letters by year 189

Fig. 16.13 Over time: academic open letters · letters 189

Fig. 16.14 Over time: academic open letters · signatories 189

Fig. 16.15 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of posts) 190

Fig. 16.16 The 15 biggest of 114 (number of posts) 190

Fig. 16.17 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 191

Fig. 16.18 The 15 biggest of 27 (₹ crore) 191

Fig. 16.19 Over time: ICHR grant money, all themes, ICHR grant money, government-agenda themes, ICSSR grant money, all themes and 1 more · ₹ crore 191

Fig. 16.20 Over time: ICHR agenda-theme share of grant money, ICSSR agenda-theme share of grant money · % 192

Fig. 16.21 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 192

Fig. 16.22 The 15 biggest of 17 (₹ crore) 192

Fig. 16.23 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 193

Fig. 16.24 The 15 biggest of 50 (₹ crore a year) 194

Chapter 17 Expert Authority within the State

Tab. 17.1 Indicators of arena 4.2 197

Fig. 17.1 Readings of arena 4.2 by indicator 198

Fig. 17.2 Think tanks and institutes cited by courts and Parliament (judgments + Parliament documents) 199

Fig. 17.3 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (venue-weighted citations 2014-26 (SC landmark…) 199

Fig. 17.4 The 15 biggest of 193 (venue-weighted citations 2014-26 (SC landmark…) 200

Fig. 17.5 Over time: named expert actors cited, venue-weighted · weighted citations 200

Fig. 17.6 Over time: H share of named expert-actor citations) · % 201

Fig. 17.7 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 201

Fig. 17.8 The 15 biggest of 22 (₹ crore) 202

Chapter 18 Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation

Tab. 18.1 Indicators of arena 4.3 204

Fig. 18.1 Readings of arena 4.3 by indicator 205

Fig. 18.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (pupils) 206
Fig. 18.3 The 15 biggest of 20 (pupils) 206
Fig. 18.4 Pupils in ideological school networks, millions 207
Fig. 18.5 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (school (EWISR ranked)) 207
Fig. 18.6 The 15 biggest of 191 (school (EWISR ranked)) 208
Fig. 18.7 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (coded change) 208
Fig. 18.8 The 15 biggest of 261 (coded change) 209
Fig. 18.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (audited item) 209
Fig. 18.10 The 15 biggest of 108 (audited item) 210
Fig. 18.11 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 210
Fig. 18.12 The 9 biggest of 9 (₹ crore) 210
Fig. 18.13 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (provider booklist pages listing it (of 17)) 211
Fig. 18.14 The 10 biggest of 10 (provider booklist pages listing it (of 17)) 211

Chapter 19 Television News

Tab. 19.1 Indicators of arena 5.1 215
Fig. 19.1 Readings of arena 5.1 by indicator 216
Fig. 19.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (weekly reach, thousands) 217
Fig. 19.3 The 15 biggest of 103 (weekly reach, thousands) 217
Fig. 19.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million views, 12 months) 217
Fig. 19.5 The 15 biggest of 149 (million views, 12 months) 218

Chapter 20 Interpersonal Political Communication

Tab. 20.1 Indicators of arena 5.2 220
Fig. 20.1 Readings of arena 5.2 by indicator 221

Fig. 20.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week) 222
Fig. 20.3 The 6 biggest of 6 (million trusted person-hours a week) 222
Fig. 20.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week) 222
Fig. 20.5 The 15 biggest of 23 (million trusted person-hours a week) 223
Fig. 20.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week) 224
Fig. 20.7 The 14 biggest of 14 (million trusted person-hours a week) 225
Fig. 20.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week) 226
Fig. 20.9 The 12 biggest of 12 (million trusted person-hours a week) 226
Fig. 20.10 The 22 channels with the most trusted exposure: lean of their political content 227

Chapter 21 Digital Platforms

Tab. 21.1 Indicators of arena 5.3 230
Fig. 21.1 Readings of arena 5.3 by indicator 232
Fig. 21.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million views, 12 months) 233
Fig. 21.3 The 15 biggest of 300 (million views, 12 months) 233
Fig. 21.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 233
Fig. 21.5 The 15 biggest of 220 (million followers) 234
Fig. 21.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of answers) 234
Fig. 21.7 The 15 biggest of 205 (number of answers) 235
Fig. 21.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 235
Fig. 21.9 The 15 biggest of 193 (million followers) 236

Fig. 21.10 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 236
Fig. 21.11 The 15 biggest of 222 (million followers) 236
Fig. 21.12 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 237
Fig. 21.13 The 15 biggest of 413 (million followers) 237
Fig. 21.14 Google News: who ranks for contested India searches (600 results, English and Hindi) 238
Fig. 21.15 Wikipedia: how 30 contested India pages are framed, by pageviews 238

Chapter 22 Newspapers and the Elite Press

Tab. 22.1 Indicators of arena 5.4 240
Fig. 22.1 Readings of arena 5.4 by indicator 241
Fig. 22.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (readers, thousands) 241
Fig. 22.3 The 15 biggest of 82 (readers, thousands) 241
Fig. 22.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (readers, thousands) 241
Fig. 22.5 The 15 biggest of 18 (readers, thousands) 242
Fig. 22.6 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 45 (elite credibility score 0-100 (0.45 trust +...) 242
Tab. 22.2 Impact stories 243

Chapter 23 Celebrities and Influencers

Tab. 23.1 Indicators of arena 5.5 249
Fig. 23.1 Readings of arena 5.5 by indicator 250
Tab. 23.2 Acts 251
Fig. 23.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 253
Fig. 23.3 The 15 biggest of 134 (million followers) 253

Chapter 24 Cinema and Streaming

Tab. 24.1 Indicators of arena 5.6 256

Fig. 24.1 Readings of arena 5.6 by indicator 256
Fig. 24.2 Cinema by industry, 2014-26: share of politically framed box office 257
Fig. 24.3 Cinema over time, all industries 257
Fig. 24.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore gross) 257
Fig. 24.5 The 15 biggest of 96 (₹ crore gross) 258
Fig. 24.6 Over time: cinema gross, FRAME sample (₹ crore) 258
Fig. 24.7 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore gross) 258
Fig. 24.8 The 15 biggest of 353 (₹ crore gross) 259
Fig. 24.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million viewers (Ormax)) 259
Fig. 24.10 The 15 biggest of 168 (million viewers (Ormax)) 260
Fig. 24.11 Over time: streaming originals Ormax viewership (m views) 260
Fig. 24.12 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (awards) 260
Fig. 24.13 The 15 biggest of 18 (awards) 261

Chapter 25 Vote Share

Tab. 25.1 Indicators of arena 6.1 264
Fig. 25.1 Readings of arena 6.1 by indicator 265
Fig. 25.2 NDA Lok Sabha seats under a uniform swing (points to NDA) 266
Fig. 25.3 Each counted row (vote %) 266
Fig. 25.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats) 266
Fig. 25.5 The 3 biggest of 3 (seats) 266
Fig. 25.6 Over time: LS seats AAP, LS seats AIADMK, LS seats AITC and 3 more (seats of 543) 267
Fig. 25.7 State elections 2024-26: NDA vs INDIA vote (%) 268
Fig. 25.8 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 93 (vote %) 269

Fig. 25.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats) 269
Fig. 25.10 The 15 biggest of 89 (seats) 270
Fig. 25.11 The 15 biggest of 36 (thousand persons) 270
Fig. 25.12 Bypolls 2024-26 (seats won) 271
Fig. 25.13 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats won) 271
Fig. 25.14 The 15 biggest of 119 (seats won) 271
Fig. 25.15 Over time: Bypoll NDA net gain, Bypoll NDA seats won, Bypoll seats contested · seats 272
Fig. 25.16 Over time: Bypoll seats held by NDA before poll share, Bypoll seats won INDIA share, Bypoll seats won NDA share and 1 more · % 272
Fig. 25.17 Over time: LS vote AAP, LS vote AIADMK, LS vote AITC and 3 more · % of valid votes incl NOTA 273
Fig. 25.18 Over time: State assemblies NDA seat share · % of 4123 seats 273
Fig. 25.19 Over time: State elections NDA share of NDA+INDIA vote, State elections held in year: pop-weighted INDI..., State elections held in year: pop-weighted NDA ... and 3 more · % 274
Fig. 25.20 Women voters: the NDA's share of all women's votes 274

Chapter 26 The Conversion of Votes into Seats

Tab. 26.1 Indicators of arena 6.2 276
Fig. 26.1 Readings of arena 6.2 by indicator 277
Fig. 26.2 Seats by state in this scenario 278
Fig. 26.3 NDA Lok Sabha seats under a uniform swing (points to NDA) 278
Fig. 26.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats) 279
Fig. 26.5 The 15 biggest of 215 (seats) 279
Fig. 26.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats) 279

Fig. 26.7 The 15 biggest of 45 (seats) 280
Fig. 26.8 Each counted row (% seats NDA) 280
Fig. 26.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 280
Fig. 26.10 The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore) 281

Chapter 27 Leadership Popularity

Tab. 27.1 Indicators of arena 6.3 283
Fig. 27.1 Readings of arena 6.3 by indicator 284
Fig. 27.2 Best person to be the next PM, % of respondents 285
Fig. 27.3 Each counted row (% respondents) 285
Fig. 27.4 Over time: MOTN best PM (Modi, Rahul Gandhi, Vijay and 3 more) · % respondents 286
Fig. 27.5 Over time: MOTN best PM (Modi minus Rahul) · percentage points 286
Fig. 27.6 Each counted row (% respondents) 286
Fig. 27.7 Over time: MOTN Modi performance good/outstanding, MOTN Modi performance poor (% respondents) 287
Fig. 27.8 Over time: Lokniti PM choice (Modi, Rahul Gandhi) (% respondents) 287
Fig. 27.9 Over time: MOTN projected Lok Sabha vote share (NDA, INDIA) · % vote 288
Fig. 27.10 Over time: MOTN best CM nationally (Yogi Adityanath, Arvind Kejriwal, Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy and 1 more) · % respondents 288
Fig. 27.11 Over time: Lokniti satisfied with central govt · % somewhat/fully satisfied 289
Fig. 27.12 Over time: Lokniti dissatisfied with central govt · % 289
Fig. 27.13 Over time: Lokniti satisfied with central govt, Morning Consult Modi approve · % approve 289
Fig. 27.14 Over time: Morning Consult Modi disapprove · % disapprove 290

Fig. 27.15 Over time: Pew Modi favourable · % favourable 290
Fig. 27.16 Over time: Pew Modi unfavourable · % unfavourable 290

Chapter 28 Party Finance

Tab. 28.1 Indicators of arena 6.4 293
Fig. 28.1 Readings of arena 6.4 by indicator 294
Fig. 28.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 295
Fig. 28.3 The 15 biggest of 45 (₹ crore) 295
Fig. 28.4 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 296
Fig. 28.5 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 296
Fig. 28.6 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 297
Fig. 28.7 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 297
Fig. 28.8 The 15 biggest of 42 (₹ crore) 297
Fig. 28.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 298
Fig. 28.10 The 12 biggest of 12 (₹ crore) 298

Chapter 29 Executive Office

Tab. 29.1 Indicators of arena 7.1 302
Fig. 29.1 Readings of arena 7.1 by indicator 303
Fig. 29.2 The 10 biggest of 10 (ministers) 304
Fig. 29.3 Indians by who governs their state, % of people 304
Fig. 29.4 States by population, % of Indians 305
Fig. 29.5 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 35 (% of India population 2026) 306
Fig. 29.6 The 15 biggest of 36 (offices) 307

Chapter 30 Public Expenditure

Tab. 30.1 Indicators of arena 7.2 309

Fig. 30.1 Readings of arena 7.2 by indicator 310
Fig. 30.2 Public spending 2026-27 by who controls it, ₹ lakh crore 310
Fig. 30.3 Indians by who governs their state, % of people 311
Fig. 30.4 State spending 2026-27, ₹ lakh crore 311
Fig. 30.5 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 311
Fig. 30.6 The 15 biggest of 32 (₹ crore) 312
Fig. 30.7 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 312
Fig. 30.8 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 312
Fig. 30.9 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 313
Fig. 30.10 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 313
Fig. 30.11 The 15 biggest of 75 (₹ crore) 314
Fig. 30.12 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 314
Fig. 30.13 The 15 biggest of 29 (₹ crore) 315

Chapter 31 Police and Central Agencies

Tab. 31.1 Indicators of arena 7.3 317
Fig. 31.1 Readings of arena 7.3 by indicator 318
Fig. 31.2 Indians by who governs their state, % of people 318
Fig. 31.3 States by population, % of Indians 319
Fig. 31.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (persons (thousand)) 319
Fig. 31.5 The 15 biggest of 36 (persons (thousand)) 320
Fig. 31.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (personnel) 320
Fig. 31.7 The 15 biggest of 46 (personnel) 321
Fig. 31.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 321
Fig. 31.9 The 15 biggest of 43 (₹ crore) 322

Chapter 32 The Civil Services

Tab. 32.1 Indicators of arena 7.4 324
Fig. 32.1 Readings of arena 7.4 by indicator 325
Fig. 32.2 Indians by who governs their state, % of people 325
Fig. 32.3 States by population, % of Indians 326
Fig. 32.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (officers in position) 326
Fig. 32.5 The 15 biggest of 50 (officers in position) 327
Fig. 32.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of appointments) 327
Fig. 32.7 The 15 biggest of 67 (number of appointments) 328
Fig. 32.8 The 15 biggest of 23 (number of records) 329
Fig. 32.9 The 3 biggest of 3 (transfers in career) 329
Fig. 32.10 The 10 biggest of 10 (letters) 330
Fig. 32.11 The 4 biggest of 4 (signatories) 330
Fig. 32.12 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (officer) 330
Fig. 32.13 The 15 biggest of 55 (officer) 331

Chapter 33 Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies

Tab. 33.1 Indicators of arena 7.5 333
Fig. 33.1 Readings of arena 7.5 by indicator 334
Fig. 33.2 Who controls the appointed Union bodies, % of bodies by year 335
Tab. 33.2 The most powerful bodies (tier 1-2 first) 336
Fig. 33.3 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of bodies) 337
Fig. 33.4 The 15 biggest of 102 (number of bodies) 337
Fig. 33.5 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of bodies) 338
Fig. 33.6 The 15 biggest of 100 (number of bodies) 338
Fig. 33.7 Trust in the vote: elections seen as free and fair, and the court record on “vote chori” 338

Chapter 34 Parliament

Tab. 34.1 Indicators of arena 7.6 341
Fig. 34.1 Readings of arena 7.6 by indicator 342
Fig. 34.2 Lok Sabha now (Oct 2026): seats by party 343
Fig. 34.3 For reference: Lok Sabha seats won in the 2024 election 344
Fig. 34.4 NDA Lok Sabha seats under a uniform swing (points to NDA) 344
Fig. 34.5 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats) 344
Fig. 34.6 The 15 biggest of 47 (seats) 345
Fig. 34.7 Rajya Sabha strength now 345
Fig. 34.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats) 345
Fig. 34.9 The 15 biggest of 39 (seats) 346
Fig. 34.10 Each counted row (% ayes of ayes+noes) 346

Chapter 35 The Judiciary

Tab. 35.1 Indicators of arena 7.7 349
Fig. 35.1 Readings of arena 7.7 by indicator 350
Fig. 35.2 High-significance rulings (4-5 of 5) by issue 350
Tab. 35.2 The most significant rulings (5 of 5) 351
Fig. 35.3 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 212 (rulings weighted by significance (1-5)) 352
Fig. 35.4 Rulings on contested issues by year: whose position prevailed 352
Tab. 35.3 Judges 354

Chapter 36 Internal Security

Tab. 36.1 Indicators of arena 7.8 362
Fig. 36.1 Readings of arena 7.8 by indicator 363
Fig. 36.2 Over time: Maoist districts (LWE activity districts, LWE affected districts, Most affected districts and 1 more) · districts 364

Fig. 36.3 Over time: Maoist districts (Police stations LWE violence, Police stations LWE violence first half) · police stations 365

Fig. 36.4 Over time: Maoist ground (Fortified police stations) · stations 365

Fig. 36.5 Over time: Maoist ground (New security camps cumulative) · camps 365

Fig. 36.6 Over time: Maoist ground (LWE influence area) · sq km 366

Fig. 36.7 Over time: North-East ground (AFSPA Manipur police stations excluded) · police stations 366

Fig. 36.8 Over time: North-East ground (Accord cadres Tripura, Accord cadres Assam) · cadres 366

Fig. 36.9 Over time: North-East ground (AFSPA Arunachal districts full, AFSPA Assam districts full) · districts 367

Fig. 36.10 Over time: Maoist violence, SATP (Maoists killed, Civilians killed, Security forces killed) · deaths 367

Fig. 36.11 Over time: Maoist violence, SATP (Exchange ratio maoists per security forces) · ratio 368

Fig. 36.12 Over time: Maoist violence, MHA (Maoists killed, Deaths civilians security forces, Civilians killed and 1 more) · deaths 368

Fig. 36.13 Over time: Maoist violence, MHA (Exchange ratio maoists per security forces) · ratio 368

Fig. 36.14 Over time: Maoist violence, MHA (LWE violent incidents total) · incidents 369

Fig. 36.15 Over time: Maoist violence (LWE violent incidents) 369

Fig. 36.16 Over time: North-East violence (North-East incidents decline vs 2014) · percent 369

Fig. 36.17 Over time: North-East violence (North-East militants killed, North-East militants arrested, North-East militants surrendered and 2 more) · persons 370

Fig. 36.18 Over time: North-East violence (North-East arms recovered) · weapons 370

Fig. 36.19 Over time: North-East violence (North-East insurgency incidents) · incidents 371

Fig. 36.20 Over time: North-East violence (Manipur militants killed, Manipur militants arrested, Manipur security forces civilians killed) · persons 371

Fig. 36.21 Over time: North-East violence (Manipur insurgency incidents) · incidents 371

Fig. 36.22 Over time: North-East violence, SATP (Manipur insurgency fatalities) · persons 372

Fig. 36.23 Over time: North-East violence (Rest of North-East insurgency incidents, Assam insurgency incidents) · incidents 372

Fig. 36.24 Over time: Punjab: Terrorists killed, Punjab, SATP: Terror arrests, Punjab: Civilians killed and 1 more (persons) 373

Fig. 36.25 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (organisations) 373

Fig. 36.26 The 15 biggest of 20 (organisations) 374

Fig. 36.27 Over time: Maoist ranks (Maoists arrested, Maoists surrendered, Maoists neutralised) (persons) 375

Fig. 36.28 Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam), MHA (Terrorists killed, Security forces killed, Civilians killed) · persons 375

Fig. 36.29 Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam), MHA (Terrorist incidents) · incidents 376

Fig. 36.30 Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam) (Terrorists killed, Security forces killed, Civilians killed and 3 more) (persons) 376

Fig. 36.31 Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam) (Encounters CT operations) · operations 377

Fig. 36.32 Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam) (Terrorist initiated incidents, Organised stone pelting, Stone pelting incidents) · incidents 377

Fig. 36.33 Over time: Bans and prosecutions (NIA conviction rate) · percent 377

Fig. 36.34 Over time: Bans and prosecutions, NCRB: UAPA arrests, Hinterland terror: Hinterland civilians killed, ... 378

Hinterland terror: Hinterland security forces k… · persons

Fig. 36.35 Over time: Hinterland terror (Hinterland terror attacks) · attacks 378

Fig. 36.36 Ground held: the peak insurgent footprint now free of violence 378

Fig. 36.37 Who pays in blood, 2024-26: insurgents killed vs security forces and civilians killed 378

Fig. 36.38 Armed organisations: settled since 2019 vs still armed 378

Fig. 36.39 Maoist ranks: cadres arrested or surrendered since 2024 vs still under arms 379

Chapter 37 Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies

Tab. 37.1 Indicators of arena 8.1 384

Fig. 37.1 Readings of arena 8.1 by indicator 384

Fig. 37.2 How the index makers score India (all on a 0-100 scale) 385

Fig. 37.3 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (citations (of 545)) 385

Fig. 37.4 The 12 biggest of 12 (citations (of 545)) 386

Fig. 37.5 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (submissions (of 72)) 386

Fig. 37.6 The 13 biggest of 13 (submissions (of 72)) 387

Fig. 37.7 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (submissions (of 70)) 387

Fig. 37.8 The 12 biggest of 12 (submissions (of 70)) 388

Fig. 37.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (mentions (of 269)) 388

Fig. 37.10 The 14 biggest of 14 (mentions (of 269)) 389

Fig. 37.11 The 15 biggest of 234 (communication (count)) 389

Fig. 37.12 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (endnote citations in OHCHR summary) 390

Fig. 37.13 The 15 biggest of 138 (endnote citations in OHCHR summary) 390

Fig. 37.14 Over time: CIVICUS civic-space rating · 1 closed .. 5 open 391
Fig. 37.15 Over time: EIU democracy score · score 0-10 391
Fig. 37.16 Over time: Freedom House: Kashmir, Freedom House: Freedom in the World, Freedom House: Freedom on the Net and 1 more · score 0-100 391
Fig. 37.17 Over time: Global Hunger Index score · score 392
Fig. 37.18 Over time: ghi_score_as_published · score as published in each year's report 392
Fig. 37.19 Over time: Hostile acts recorded · events 392
Fig. 37.20 Over time: RSF press-freedom rank · rank 393
Fig. 37.21 Over time: Scholars at Risk incidents · count 393
Fig. 37.22 Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A · URLs/accounts blocked by MeitY under s.69A 393
Fig. 37.23 Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A · URLs blocked 394
Fig. 37.24 Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A · blocking orders 394
Fig. 37.25 Over time: UN special-procedure letters · letters 394
Fig. 37.26 Over time: Share India replied to · % replied by GoI 395
Fig. 37.27 Over time: USCIRF status for India · 2 = CPC recommended, 1 = Tier 2, 0 = none 395
Fig. 37.28 Over time: V-Dem academic freedom, V-Dem electoral democracy, V-Dem liberal democracy and 1 more · index 0-1 395
Fig. 37.29 Over time: V-Dem academic-freedom coders · coders 396
Fig. 37.30 Western foundations: money to Opposed-coded work in India, 2015-26, ₹ crore 396
Fig. 37.31 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 396
Fig. 37.32 The 15 biggest of 45 (₹ crore) 397
Fig. 37.33 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 397

Fig. 37.34 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 398
Fig. 37.35 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 398
Fig. 37.36 By country of origin (₹ crore) 398
Fig. 37.37 The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore) 399
Fig. 37.38 The 2 biggest of 2 (associations) 399
Fig. 37.39 The 10 biggest of 10 (USD million) 400
Fig. 37.40 Each counted row (percent (avg CY2017-24)) 400
Fig. 37.41 The 3 biggest of 3 (/100) 400
Fig. 37.42 Each counted row (percent) 401
Fig. 37.43 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 401

Chapter 38 Global Technology Platforms

Tab. 38.1 Indicators of arena 8.2 403
Fig. 38.1 Readings of arena 8.2 by indicator 404
Fig. 38.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million) 405
Fig. 38.3 The 9 biggest of 9 (million) 405
Fig. 38.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 405
Fig. 38.5 The 3 biggest of 3 (₹ crore) 405
Fig. 38.6 Each counted row (% (derived)) 405
Fig. 38.7 Each counted row (% of market) 406
Fig. 38.8 Each counted row (% of UPI volume) 406
Fig. 38.9 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (hours/user/month) 406
Fig. 38.10 The 6 biggest of 6 (hours/user/month) 406
Fig. 38.11 Over time: PhonePe's share of UPI, Google Pay's share of UPI · % of UPI volume 406
Fig. 38.12 Over time: Facebook users in India, Instagram users in India, YouTube users in India · million 407
Fig. 38.13 Over time: Indian apps' share of downloads, Gemini's share of AI-app time · % 407

Tab. 38.2 IT exports jobs and tax at stake 408
Fig. 38.14 The 2 biggest of 2 (accounts) 411
Fig. 38.15 The 2 biggest of 2 (case (1 = State won)) 411
Fig. 38.16 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (act) 411
Fig. 38.17 The 15 biggest of 54 (act) 411
Fig. 38.18 Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A 412
Fig. 38.19 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of answers) 412
Fig. 38.20 The 15 biggest of 205 (number of answers) 412
Fig. 38.21 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 412
Fig. 38.22 The 12 biggest of 12 (₹ crore) 413
Fig. 38.23 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 413
Fig. 38.24 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 414
Fig. 38.25 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 414
Fig. 38.26 By country of origin (₹ crore) 414
Fig. 38.27 The 12 biggest of 12 (lever outcome (1 held, 0.5 partial, 0 lost)) 415
Fig. 38.28 The 2 biggest of 2 (₹ crore) 415
Fig. 38.29 Over time: meta_items_restricted_india · items restricted on local-law grounds 415
Fig. 38.30 Over time: google_govt_removal_requests_india · requests 416
Fig. 38.31 Over time: google_items_removed_india · items removed 416
Fig. 38.32 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 416

Chapter 39 The United States

Tab. 39.1 Indicators of arena 8.3 418
Fig. 39.1 Readings of arena 8.3 by indicator 419
Fig. 39.2 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100) 420

Fig. 39.3 Over time: H-1B petitions approved for Indians · approved petitions 420
Fig. 39.4 Over time: Indians' share of H-1B approvals · % of approved H-1B petitions 421
Fig. 39.5 Over time: USA's share of India's exports · % of India total exports 421
Fig. 39.6 Over time: India's exports to USA, India's imports from USA, Trade balance with USA · $ billion 421
Fig. 39.7 Over time: USA's share of India's imports · % of India total imports 422
Fig. 39.8 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 422
Fig. 39.9 The 12 biggest of 12 (₹ crore) 423
Fig. 39.10 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ (LDA filings mentioning India; amount...) 423
Fig. 39.11 The 15 biggest of 38 (US$ (LDA filings mentioning India; amount...) 424
Fig. 39.12 Over time: FARA (Government of India and BJP, other India principals) (US$) 424
Fig. 39.13 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 425
Fig. 39.14 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 425
Fig. 39.15 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 426
Fig. 39.16 Over time: Hostile acts recorded (events) 426
Fig. 39.17 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 426

Chapter 40 China

Tab. 40.1 Indicators of arena 8.4 429
Fig. 40.1 Readings of arena 8.4 by indicator 430
Fig. 40.2 The 15 biggest of 53 (US$ million) 431
Fig. 40.3 Each counted row (percent) 432
Fig. 40.4 Each counted row (percent (approx)) 432

Fig. 40.5 The 7 biggest of 7 (event (1 = occurred; date in notes)) 432
Fig. 40.6 The 4 biggest of 4 (USD mn) 433
Fig. 40.7 Each counted row (%) 433
Fig. 40.8 Over time: China's share of India's exports · % of India total exports 433
Fig. 40.9 Over time: India's exports to China, India's imports from China, Trade balance with China · $ billion 434
Fig. 40.10 Over time: China's share of India's imports · % of India total imports 434
Fig. 40.11 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100) 435
Fig. 40.12 The 5 biggest of 5 (places renamed) 435
Fig. 40.13 Over time: Hostile acts recorded (events) 436
Fig. 40.14 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 436

Chapter 41 Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks

Tab. 41.1 Indicators of arena 8.5 439
Fig. 41.1 Readings of arena 8.5 by indicator 440
Fig. 41.2 Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters) 441
Fig. 41.3 The 6 biggest of 6 (seats) 441
Fig. 41.4 Each counted row (% of Muslim voters) 441
Fig. 41.5 The 15 biggest of 44 (US$ million) 442
Fig. 41.6 Each counted row (percent) 442
Fig. 41.7 Each counted row (%) 443
Fig. 41.8 The 13 biggest of 13 (USD mn) 443
Fig. 41.9 The 6 biggest of 6 (persons) 444
Fig. 41.10 Each counted row (% of value) 444
Fig. 41.11 The 2 biggest of 2 (₹ crore) 444
Fig. 41.12 The 3 biggest of 3 ($ billion) 444
Fig. 41.13 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 445

Fig. 41.14 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 445
Fig. 41.15 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 446
Fig. 41.16 By country of origin (₹ crore) 446
Fig. 41.17 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100) 447
Fig. 41.18 The 5 biggest of 5 (persons) 447
Fig. 41.19 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event) 447
Fig. 41.20 The 2 biggest of 2 (event) 448
Fig. 41.21 Each counted row (% of the pair) 448
Fig. 41.22 Over time: Pakistan (Ceasefire violations on the LoC and IB) · CFVs 448
Fig. 41.23 Over time: Pakistan (J&K encounters) · encounters 448
Fig. 41.24 Over time: Pakistan (Security forces killed in J&K, Civilians killed in J&K, All fatalities in J&K and 1 more) · persons 449
Fig. 41.25 Over time: Pakistan (Terrorist-initiated incidents in J&K, Major terror incidents in J&K) · incidents 449
Fig. 41.26 Each counted row (0-10) 449
Fig. 41.27 Over time: Pakistan (Pakistan's share of India's exports) · % of India total exports 450
Fig. 41.28 Over time: Pakistan (India's exports to Pakistan, India's imports from Pakistan, Trade balance with Pakistan) · $ billion 450
Fig. 41.29 Over time: Pakistan (Pakistan's share of India's imports) · % of India total imports 450
Fig. 41.30 Each counted row (%) 451
Fig. 41.31 Each counted row (0-10) 451
Fig. 41.32 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers) 451
Fig. 41.33 The 15 biggest of 413 (million followers) 452
Fig. 41.34 Each counted row (score /100) 452
Fig. 41.35 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million) 453

Fig. 41.36 The 6 biggest of 6 (US$ million) 453
Fig. 41.37 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event (1 = occurred; date in notes)) 454
Fig. 41.38 The 4 biggest of 4 (event (1 = occurred; date in notes)) 454
Fig. 41.39 The 2 biggest of 2 (USD mn) 454
Fig. 41.40 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event (count)) 454
Fig. 41.41 The 14 biggest of 14 (event (count)) 455
Fig. 41.42 Over time: Hostile acts recorded, Pakistan: Hostile acts recorded · events 456
Fig. 41.43 Over time: OIC statements on India · OIC statements/resolutions on India recorded 457
Fig. 41.44 Over time: Saudi Arabia's share of India's exports, UAE's share of India's exports · % of India total exports 457
Fig. 41.45 Over time: India's exports to Saudi Arabia, India's imports from Saudi Arabia, Trade balance with Saudi Arabia and 3 more · $ billion 458
Fig. 41.46 Over time: Saudi Arabia's share of India's imports, UAE's share of India's imports · % of India total imports 458
Fig. 41.47 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 458
Fig. 41.48 Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland) 459

Chapter 42 Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States

Tab. 42.1 Indicators of arena 8.6 461
Fig. 42.1 Readings of arena 8.6 by indicator 462
Fig. 42.2 Each counted row: the 15 highest of 27 (score /100) 463
Fig. 42.3 Over time: Russia's share of India's exports · % of India total exports 464
Fig. 42.4 Over time: India's exports to Russia, India's imports from Russia, Trade balance with Russia · $ billion 464
Fig. 42.5 Over time: Russia's share of India's imports · % of India total imports 464

Fig. 42.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million) 465
Fig. 42.7 The 15 biggest of 26 (US$ million) 465
Fig. 42.8 Each counted row (percent) 466
Fig. 42.9 The 15 biggest of 20 (USD mn) 466
Fig. 42.10 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 466
Fig. 42.11 The 6 biggest of 6 (₹ crore) 467
Fig. 42.12 Each counted row (%) 467
Fig. 42.13 The 15 biggest of 19 (exclusion (count)) 468
Fig. 42.14 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 469
Fig. 42.15 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 469
Fig. 42.16 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 470
Fig. 42.17 By country of origin (₹ crore) 470
Fig. 42.18 Over time: Hostile acts recorded, Europe: Hostile acts recorded (events) 470
Fig. 42.19 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 471

Chapter 43 Transnational Christian Organisations

Tab. 43.1 Indicators of arena 8.7 473
Fig. 43.1 Readings of arena 8.7 by indicator 474
Fig. 43.2 Each counted row (%) 475
Fig. 43.3 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore) 475
Fig. 43.4 The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore) 475
Fig. 43.5 The 9 biggest of 9 (₹ crore) 476
Fig. 43.6 The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where 476
Fig. 43.7 The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore) 477
Fig. 43.8 The biggest recipients (₹ crore) 477

Fig. 43.9 By country of origin (₹ crore) 477

Fig. 43.10 Over time: Open Doors World Watch List rank · rank 478

Fig. 43.11 Over time: USCIRF status for India · 2 = CPC recommended, 1 = Tier 2, 0 = none 478

Fig. 43.12 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 479

Chapter 44 The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad

Tab. 44.1 Indicators of arena 8.8 482

Fig. 44.1 Readings of arena 8.8 by indicator 483

Fig. 44.2 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year) 483

Fig. 44.3 The 15 biggest of 38 (₹ crore a year) 484

Fig. 44.4 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million) 484

Fig. 44.5 The 15 biggest of 408 (US$ million) 485

Fig. 44.6 Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (decisions won) 485

Fig. 44.7 The 15 biggest of 50 (decisions won) 486

Fig. 44.8 Over time: Pew: favourable view of India, Pew: unfavourable view of India (score or %) 487

Fig. 44.9 Over time: Lowy Institute Asia Power Index: overall compre..., Lowy Institute Asia Power Index: diplomatic inf..., Lowy Institute Asia Power Index: cultural influ... and 1 more (score or %) 487

Fig. 44.10 Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100) 488

Fig. 44.11 Organisations abroad: Hindu and pro-India vs opposing (revenue, ₹ cr a year) 488

Fig. 44.12 Lobbying and political money (FARA, LDA, PACs, 2020-26) 488

Fig. 44.13 Resolutions and laws won abroad (caste, Hinduphobia, CAA, Khalistan), 2019-26 488

Chapter 45 The Flow of Money: An Overview

Fig. 45.1 RW leads non-state money, mass exposure and Union institutions; the state moves the most money 493

Fig. 45.2 Political, welfare and religious money dominate; most of it reaches GOV or unattributed recipients 494

Fig. 45.3 Political, welfare and religious money dominate; most of it reaches GOV or unattributed recipients (influence-adjusted) 494

Fig. 45.4 Each domain draws on a few source types; bloc money concentrates in religion, politics and education 495

Fig. 45.5 Each domain draws on a few source types; bloc money concentrates in religion, politics and education (influence-adjusted) 496

Fig. 45.6 GOV and unattributed money fill most of the map; LW and RW money is fragmented across many recipients 496

Fig. 45.7 Non-state money: LW is 24% of LW+RW raw and 34% after evidence-derived multipliers (Lens 1); state and market money lean further RW 497

Fig. 45.8 RW leads 8 of 11 layers (<45% LW); LW leads 1; near parity: L5 Legitimacy, L6 Identity 497

Fig. 45.9 The 2015 jump is coverage, not change: religious-giving series (M2) begin; political money (M3) swung RW after 2014 498

Fig. 45.10 GOV money is service delivery and institutions; RW money is mostly religious upkeep, party and ads; LW money is spread wider 498

Fig. 45.11 Religion, state promotion, knowledge and corporate money lean RW; education, ESG, law and media money lean LW 499

Fig. 45.12 RW-mapped parties ran 7 of these states in 2013 and 22 in 2026 500

Fig. 45.13 Heatmap: state × layer balance 501

Fig. 45.14 Money networks are hub-and-spoke: governments and aggregate private giving feed most large recipients 502

Fig. 45.15 Influence per rupee is set by function, not bloc: the diagonals are the multipliers 502

Chapter 46 Power Index, Dynamics and Scenarios

Fig. 46.1 Natural experiments: FCRA cancellations (synthesis) 503
Fig. 46.2 Natural experiments: electoral bonds strike-down 504
Fig. 46.3 Natural experiments: changes of government 504
Fig. 46.4 Natural experiments: election cycle 505
Fig. 46.5 Natural experiments: platform events 505
Fig. 46.6 Power Vector Matrix explorer 506
Fig. 46.7 India Power Index: top 50 with sub-index breakdown 507
Fig. 46.8 Aggregate balance per layer over time with bands 508
Fig. 46.9 Causal loop diagrams 509
Fig. 46.10 Chokepoint map 510
Fig. 46.11 Resilience / vulnerability radar per side 510
Fig. 46.12 Scenario fan charts 511
Fig. 46.13 Scenario layer balance in 2036 511
Fig. 46.14 State-by-state small multiples of layer balance 512

Chapter 47 Foreign and Diaspora Money

Fig. 47.1 FCRA totals 513
Fig. 47.2 FCRA top recipients 514
Fig. 47.3 T67 portfolios 514
Fig. 47.4 ODA by channel 515
Fig. 47.5 Religious funders 515
Fig. 47.6 Diaspora funders 516
Fig. 47.7 FARA 516
Fig. 47.8 T10 517

Chapter 48 Domestic Giving, CSR and the Religious Economy

Fig. 48.1 Fig H1 518
Fig. 48.2 Fig H2 519
Fig. 48.3 Fig K1 519
Fig. 48.4 Fig M1 520

Fig. 48.5 Fig J1 520
Fig. 48.6 Fig S1 521

Chapter 49 Political Money and Government Advertising

Fig. 49.1 Party income 522
Fig. 49.2 Bonds Sankey 523
Fig. 49.3 Trusts 524
Fig. 49.4 Election spend 524
Fig. 49.5 Digital ads 525
Fig. 49.6 Per-capita govt ads 526
Fig. 49.7 Election spikes 527
Fig. 49.8 Out-of-state 528
Fig. 49.9 Funds 529
Fig. 49.10 T66 votes 530

Chapter 50 Social Media and Information Infrastructure

Fig. 50.1 Indian users by platform, latest best-graded figure 531
Fig. 50.2 Social-media money Sankey 532
Fig. 50.3 Creator universe 533
Fig. 50.4 X amplification network 534
Fig. 50.5 Discourse share over time 535
Fig. 50.6 V25 536
Fig. 50.7 V35 536
Fig. 50.8 V36 537
Fig. 50.9 Documented actions against named accounts by initiator and target alignment 537
Fig. 50.10 Fact-check direction by checker 538
Fig. 50.11 Shutdown events per year and rate per governed state-year 539
Fig. 50.12 Natural experiments 539
Fig. 50.13 Left: share of the largest and top-2 firms in four infrastructure markets. Right: share of AI answers framed toward each bloc pole, by model 540

Chapter 51 Whole-of-Population Discourse

Fig. 51.1 V28 541
Fig. 51.2 V29 542
Fig. 51.3 V34 543
Fig. 51.4 T33 national 544
Fig. 51.5 drivers 544
Fig. 51.6 T34 545
Fig. 51.7 V31 546
Fig. 51.8 V33 547
Fig. 51.9 V32 548
Fig. 51.10 V30 549

Chapter 52 News Media, Entertainment and Culture

Fig. 52.1 D4 outlet framing 551
Fig. 52.2 Debates 552
Fig. 52.3 T16 553
Fig. 52.4 V15 553
Fig. 52.5 Films 554
Fig. 52.6 V17 555

Chapter 53 Knowledge, Education and Expertise

Fig. 53.1 Union grants to UGC + central universities doubled in a decade; private liberal-arts universities run at a fraction of a large central university 556
Fig. 53.2 Council money fell 35% in 2016-21, then rose to a record ₹309 cr in 2024-25; ICHR, IGNCA and ICSSR heads were replaced within three years of 2014 558
Fig. 53.3 Awards tagged "Indian knowledge traditions" rose from 3.6% to 9.9% of ICSSR awards; caste and gender shares slipped 559
Fig. 53.4 Income does not track Parliamentary reach, and the bodies led by ruling-party office-bearers publish no income 560

Fig. 53.5 Faith-linked school networks rival the central government school systems: Catholic schools and Vidya Bharati each teach about 33 lakh children, roughly 2.5x Kendriya Vidyalayas 561

Fig. 53.6 International scholarships mostly place notable alumni in academia and media; the direct routes into government run through mirror-image think-tank and advisory pipelines 562

Fig. 53.7 Notable scholarship alumni flow mostly into academia; half of all government placements come from two mirror-image advisory pipelines 564

Fig. 53.8 Consultancies serve governments of every bloc; most documented money is Union (NDA-era) contracts 564

Fig. 53.9 The same firms and strategists work for governments and parties of every bloc 565

Fig. 53.10 The Economic Survey's authorities are the state itself and multilaterals; Indian think tanks get 0–6% of named mentions 566

Fig. 53.11 The Supreme Court names state expert bodies and multilaterals; science academies and index-makers get zero verified mentions 567

Chapter 54 Control of State Institutions

Fig. 54.1 V37 569

Fig. 54.2 F_D23 governors 570

Fig. 54.3 V38 570

Fig. 54.4 V39 571

Fig. 54.5 V40 572

Fig. 54.6 D25 trend 573

Fig. 54.7 V41 573

Fig. 54.8 F_D26 574

Chapter 55 Economic Power, Welfare and Patronage

Fig. 55.1 V42a 575

Fig. 55.2 V42b 576

Fig. 55.3 F45 577
Fig. 55.4 V43 578
Fig. 55.5 F46 579
Fig. 55.6 F47 579
Fig. 55.7 F48 580
Fig. 55.8 F36 581
Fig. 55.9 F37 581

Chapter 56 Religion, Demography, Identity and Memory

Fig. 56.1 Religious institutions 582
Fig. 56.2 District religion maps 583
Fig. 56.3 Religion growth 2001-11 583
Fig. 56.4 TFR by religion 584
Fig. 56.5 Delimitation seat change 585
Fig. 56.6 Anti-conversion laws 586
Fig. 56.7 Language reach 586
Fig. 56.8 V46 memory timeline 587

Chapter 57 Law, Labour, Science and Corporate Bodies

Fig. 57.1 Litigation direction 588
Fig. 57.2 US foundation money 589
Fig. 57.3 D10 green finance and exclusions 590
Fig. 57.4 CTUO membership 591
Fig. 57.5 Campus unions 591
Fig. 57.6 D12 health money by label 592
Fig. 57.7 RSS shakhas 593
Fig. 57.8 Lobbying and chambers 594
Fig. 57.9 Raw vs adjusted 594

Chapter 58 International Opinion, Foreign Influence and Elite Networks

Fig. 58.1 Adjudicated labels by unit group 596
Fig. 58.2 UPR stakeholder evidence and recommendations 597

Fig. 58.3 UN Special Procedures communications and India's reply rate 598
Fig. 58.4 UK APPG registered benefits 598
Fig. 58.5 Lens-1 sourcing of foreign reports 599
Fig. 58.6 India's normalised index trends 599
Fig. 58.7 Indian sources behind each index 600
Fig. 58.8 Lens-1 sourcing of foreign reports (reused) 601
Fig. 58.9 Citer stance by language and actor type 602
Fig. 58.10 Information operations by origin, target and side 602
Fig. 58.11 India's soft-power budget series 603
Fig. 58.12 Foreign influence flow map 603
Fig. 58.13 V44: group share in elite institutions vs population share 603
Fig. 58.14 Dynastic share by party 603
Fig. 58.15 V45: elite network graph 604
Fig. 58.16 Declared criminal cases by party and bloc 604
Fig. 58.17 NCRB rioting series 604
Fig. 58.18 Riot case outcomes 604
Fig. 58.19 Terror-financing pipeline 605

Chapter 59 Calibration and Classification

Fig. 59.1 Lens 1 family accuracy by coder 607
Fig. 59.2 Lens 2 accuracy under frozen v1.0 and the proposed rules 608
Fig. 59.3 Pre-registered vs evidence-derived weights 609
Fig. 59.4 Alpha before and after the ruling 610
Fig. 59.5 Lens 4 held-out accuracy 611
Fig. 59.6 13% of headline money rests on major estimates, concentrated in politics and religion 612
Fig. 59.7 Lens 1 and the Ensemble agree on 72% of units; disagreements are bloc ↔ UNC, almost never LW ↔ RW (6 units) 613
Fig. 59.8 Ideological space map (PCA of α–μ) 614

Fig. 59.9 Dimension profiles (parallel coordinates) 615

Fig. 59.10 6 of the 30 largest recipients are contested: mostly aggregates whose bloc rests on Lens 1 defaults alone 616

Fig. 59.11 Classification sensitivity tornado S0–S7 617

Fig. 59.12 Most domains are clear-cut; in D1, D2, D8, D22 most units sit near 0.475 (thin evidence, not mixture) 617

Fig. 59.13 Party bloc transitions follow alliance switches, in both directions 618

Fig. 59.14 13 funders with a non-bloc own label fund LW-labelled portfolios; 6 LW-labelled funders fund mostly non-bloc work 618

Chapter 60 The Composite Reading

Fig. 60.1 Readings by domain 620

Tab. 60.1 All arenas, ordered by reading 620

Chapter 61 Durable and Office-Dependent Power

Fig. 61.1 The composite with and without office 624

PART I

Framework

Part I sets out the question, the architecture of domains and arenas, the method of measurement, and the data and its limitations.

1	The Question
2	The Architecture of the Atlas
3	Measurement and the Composite Reading
4	Data, Coding and Limitations

Chapter 1

The Question

Accounts of Indian politics since 2014 commonly describe a dominant-party system: the BJP has won three consecutive general elections, governs most of the population directly or through allies, and has reshaped the agenda of public debate. Critics describe the same period as one of majoritarian consolidation; supporters describe it as the overdue correction of an older elite consensus. Both accounts share an assumption that is rarely tested: that electoral dominance has translated into dominance across Indian society, economy and institutions.

This book tests that assumption. It treats power not as a single quantity held by whoever wins elections, but as the sum of positions in many separate arenas: the population and its loyalties, organised society, money, the production of knowledge, the media, elections, the instruments of the State, and the external actors who play a part in Indian affairs. In each arena it asks the same question, measured the same way: what share of the arena is held by Hindutva-aligned actors?

1.1 Definition

Power, for the purposes of the Atlas, is the capacity to shape outcomes in an arena: to win votes, command budgets, set agendas, decide cases, fund institutions or move opinion. The Atlas does not measure power directly. It measures observable indicators of that capacity (votes, seats, rupees, audiences, citations, appointments, rulings) and assigns each indicator to the side whose capacity it represents.

The two-sided framing is a simplification. Indian politics contains many actors with their own interests, and the opposition to Hindutva is a coalition rather than a camp. The simplification is adopted because it permits a single, comparable measure across very different arenas, and because the contest between Hindutva-aligned actors and their opponents is the principal axis of national politics in the period studied. Where the binary does violence to the evidence, chapters say so and the affected units are reported separately.

1.2 What the book does not do

The Atlas does not assess the merits of either side's positions, the legality or morality of particular actions, or the intentions of individuals. It does not classify people by religion, caste or name; individuals enter only through their public roles and documented public acts. Its findings are descriptive. Readers will draw their own conclusions about what, if anything, should follow from them.

Chapter 2

The Architecture of the Atlas

The Atlas divides the contest into **eight domains** and **40 arenas**. The domains are ordered from the foundation upward: from who the people are, through organised society, money, knowledge and media, to elections, the State and, finally, external actors. The ordering reflects a working hypothesis about how power is converted: population into organisation, organisation and money into narrative, narrative into votes, votes into office. The hypothesis organises the presentation; it is not imposed on the measurement.

Each arena has a **weight** from 1 to 5, reflecting its judged importance to control over national outcomes. Domestic weights sum to 88. Each external actor is weighted by its reach into India multiplied by the divergence of its positions from those of Hindutva-aligned actors, divided by 20, which places it on the same 0–5 scale; external weights sum to 19.7. Table 2.1 lists every domain, its arenas and their weights.

Table 2.1. Domains, arenas, number of indicators and weights

Arena	Title	Indicators	Weight
II. Demography and Identity			**12.0**
1.1	Religious Demography and Electoral Geography	2	3
1.2	Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus	3	4
1.3	The Committed Core Electorate	4	5
III. Society and Organisation			**15.0**
2.1	Party and Movement Cadres	3	3

Arena	Title	Indicators	Weight
2.2	Public Opinion on Contested Questions	3	3
2.3	Religious Leadership and Institutions	4	3
2.4	The NGO and Advocacy Sector	5	3
2.5	Street Mobilisation and Veto Power	3	3
IV. Economy and Money			**6.0**
3.1	Large Business Owners	4	2
3.2	Private Funding for Ideological Causes	2	3
3.3	Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations	4	1
V. Knowledge and Expertise			**7.0**
4.1	Universities and Think Tanks	7	3
4.2	Expert Authority within the State	3	3
4.3	Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation	5	1
VI. Media and Narrative			**15.0**
5.1	Television News	2	3
5.2	Interpersonal Political Communication	4	3
5.3	Digital Platforms	7	3
5.4	Newspapers and the Elite Press	3	3
5.5	Celebrities and Influencers	4	1
5.6	Cinema and Streaming	3	2
VII. Elections			**14.0**
6.1	Vote Share	3	4
6.2	The Conversion of Votes into Seats	5	4
6.3	Leadership Popularity	4	3
6.4	Party Finance	3	3
VIII. The State			**19.0**
7.1	Executive Office	3	5
7.2	Public Expenditure	3	3
7.3	Police and Central Agencies	2	1

Arena	Title	Indicators	Weight
7.4	The Civil Services	1	1
7.5	Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies	2	1
7.6	Parliament	3	4
7.7	The Judiciary	3	3
7.8	Internal Security	4	1
IX. External Actors			**19.7**
8.1	Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies	4	4.23
8.2	Global Technology Platforms	6	2.65
8.3	The United States	4	3.60
8.4	China	3	3.60
8.5	Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks	10	2.35
8.6	Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States	5	0.82
8.7	Transnational Christian Organisations	4	0.45
8.8	The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad	5	2
Total			**107.7**

Weights are the most consequential judgements in the Atlas, and the least verifiable. They were set before the readings were computed and are reported in full so that readers may substitute their own. The interactive edition allows any weight to be changed.

Chapter 3

Measurement and the Composite Reading

Every arena is measured by between two and twelve **indicators**. Each indicator yields a reading from 0 to 100: the Hindutva-aligned share of the indicator, computed as

$$h = 100 \times A \div (A + O)$$

where A is the quantity held by Hindutva-aligned units and O the quantity held by opposed units. Neutral, mixed and unclassified units are excluded from both terms. Where an indicator is not a quantity that can be split (an approval rating, a survey item), its reading is the published share directly.

An arena's reading is the weighted mean of its indicators, using the indicator weights given in each chapter (these sum to 1 within an arena). A domain's reading is the weighted mean of its arenas, using the arena weights. The **composite reading** is the weighted mean of all 40 arenas:

$$P = \Sigma_i \, w_i \, h_i \div \Sigma_i \, w_i$$

With domestic weights summing to 88 and external weights to 19.7, the composite is

$$P = (88 \times 48.6 + 19.7 \times 32.7) \div 107.7 = 45.7$$

3.1 Classification of arenas

For presentation, arenas are classified as showing an **aligned majority** (a reading of 60 or more), as **contested** (45 to below 60) or as showing an **opposed majority** (below 45). The thresholds are asymmetric around 50 by design: a narrow lead in an arena is treated as contested, not as held.

3.2 Office-dependent power

Several indicators, chiefly in the domain of the State and in party finance, depend on which party holds office. The Atlas therefore reports a second composite, computed for a counterfactual in which the BJP holds no office at the Union or in any state, with transactional money reassigned accordingly. The difference between the two composites is the **office-dependent** share of Hindutva-aligned power. On the baseline, it is 9.0 points (45.7 against 36.7).

Chapter 4

Data, Coding and Limitations

The Atlas rests on 16,303 research rows, each a coded observation with its source, and 10,089 money flows. Rows include, for example, a constituency result, a television channel's audience and audited content lean, a university's vice-chancellor and the circumstances of the appointment, a court ruling and its outcome, or a grant from a foundation to an Indian organisation. Every row is assigned to a side under a written classification codebook and graded for the quality of its source.

4.1 Source grades

Sources are graded from A to E. Grade A denotes official, filed or audited sources (statutes, gazettes, Election Commission and registrar filings, court judgments, answers in Parliament, annual reports, FCRA records); B, peer-reviewed or systematic investigation; C, reputable reporting with documents; D, a single or partisan source, of either side; and E, unverified or anonymous material. Wikipedia is not treated as a source, only as a route to the sources it cites. Of the graded rows, 15,768 of 23,578 (67%) are grade A. Grade distributions are reported in each chapter.

4.2 Coding

Alignment is coded from the documented public record: statements, affiliations, funding, editorial output and votes. It is never inferred from an individual's religion, caste or name. Content is coded on samples drawn and audited under the codebook. Where

evidence is insufficient, units are recorded as unclassified and excluded from the two-sided share rather than forced to a side.

4.3 Limitations


- **Weights** are judgements. They are fixed in advance and published, but other reasonable weights would yield other composites.
- **The binary** compresses a multi-party, multi-ideology politics into two sides, and coalitional alignment can diverge from value content.
- **Coverage** is uneven. Some arenas rest on near-complete official data (seats, budgets); others on samples (television content, digital audiences) or on estimates (private cause funding).
- **Time**: readings describe the position at a date. Several arenas, notably the State, would change abruptly with a change of government.
- **Publisher**: the Atlas is published by an interested party. Its safeguards are disclosure, the publication of every coding rule and data row, and the invitation to challenge them.

PART II

Demography and Identity

This part concerns the composition of the population and the political loyalties that rest on it. It is the slowest-moving layer of the Atlas: religious demography changes over decades, and the cross-caste coalitions and committed electorates built on it change over electoral cycles. Every domain above draws on it, since votes, cadres, donors and audiences are all recruited from the same population.

The domain reads **41.2**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



5 Religious Demography and Electoral Geography

6 Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus

7 The Committed Core Electorate

Chapter 5

Religious Demography and Electoral Geography

Arena 1.1 · weight 3 · reading **81.9** · aligned majority

5.1 Scope

The size of the religious communities India is made of.[1]

The arena is measured by projected 2026 shares of each faith (Hindu and Jain against Muslim, Christian and Buddhist), and how many Lok Sabha seats the Hindu base can decide (seats where Muslims are under 20%). State-by-state Census detail behind it.

Principal evidence: Census 2011: Hindu 79.8% + Jain 0.4% vs Muslim 14.2% + Christian 2.3% + Buddhist 0.7%; Sikh 1.7% kept apart. A base, not a loyalty: only part of it votes for Hindutva. Hindu share fell from 84.1% in 1951.

5.2 Significance

Sets the ceiling of every mobilisation; decides the arithmetic in the 96 Lok Sabha seats where Muslims are 20%+; drives the demographic-change debate.

5.3 Indicators and weights

Table 5.1 lists the 2 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 5.1. Indicators of arena 1.1

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Projected 2026 faith base (Pew path for Hindus and Muslims; Jain, Christian and Buddhist held at Census 2011)[2]	0.60	81.6
Seat arithmetic: Lok Sabha seats where Muslims are under 20%	0.40	82.3
Arena reading	**1.00**	**81.9**

5.4 Reading

The arena reads **81.9**, 31.9 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 2.28 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 5.1. Readings of arena 1.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

5.5 Measures and exhibits


The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Projected 2026 faith base (Pew path for Hindus and Muslims; Jain, Christian and Buddhist held at Census 2011)

Reading **81.6%**

Hindu 78.38, Jain 0.37 vs Muslim 16.00, Christian 2.3, Buddhist 0.7 (base_series.csv)

Figure 5.2. Over time: Census share (Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 3 more) (% of population)




Measure 2. Seat arithmetic: Lok Sabha seats where Muslims are under 20%

Reading **82.3%**

Seats under 20% Muslim 447 vs Seats 20%+ Muslim 96

Figure 5.3. Seat arithmetic: Lok Sabha seats where Muslims are under 20%



Measure 3. Census 2011 by faith (reference)

Reading **82.3%**

Figure 5.4. India by faith, % of people (Census 2011)




Figure 5.5. Each community, % of people




Figure 5.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (people)




Figure 5.7. The 15 biggest of 280 (people)





Figure 5.8. Over time: Census population (Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 3 more) (million)



Measure 4. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 5.9. Over time: Faith-base reading H/, Faith-base reading H/ 2026 projection · 0-100




Figure 5.10. Over time: Pew 2015 projection: Hindu, Pew 2015 projection: Muslim, Pew 2025 estimate: Hindu and 3 more · % of population




Figure 5.11. Over time: Pew 2025 estimate: Muslims in India, RGI Technical Group projected total population · million





Figure 5.12. Over time: TFR (NFHS) (Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 3 more) · children per woman



5.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 280 coded units and 96 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 70 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 105 opposed and 105 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 280 grade A.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Census 2011 C-01; Pew 2021.
2. Hindu 78.38, Jain 0.37 vs Muslim 16.00, Christian 2.3, Buddhist 0.7 (base_series.csv).

Chapter 6

Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus

Arena 1.2 · weight 4 · reading **42.4** · opposed majority

6.1 Scope

Whether Hindus vote as one bloc across castes.[1]

The arena is measured by the NDA's share of all Hindu votes in each caste group (NES 2024), its share of the Hindu vote in each state's latest assembly election, and cohesion: how many Hindus live in caste groups where the NDA wins a majority.

6.2 Significance

Seat results in UP, Bihar, Maharashtra and Karnataka; the caste-census and reservation fights are aimed at this fault line.

6.3 Indicators and weights

Table 6.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 6.1. Indicators of arena 1.2

Indicator	Weight	Reading
National: NDA share of ALL Hindu votes, by caste group (NES 2024)	0.50	49.4
States: NDA share of the Hindu vote in the latest assembly election (Hindu-population weighted)[2]	0.30	48.7


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Cohesion: share of Hindus in caste groups where the NDA wins a majority	0.20	19.7
Arena reading	**1.00**	**42.4**

6.4 Reading

The arena reads **42.4**, 7.6 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 4 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.58 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for national: NDA share of ALL Hindu votes, by caste group (NES 2024) (49.4), the lowest for cohesion: share of Hindus in caste groups where the NDA wins a majority (19.7).

Figure 6.1. Readings of arena 1.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

6.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. National: NDA share of ALL Hindu votes, by caste group (NES 2024)

Reading **49.4%**

Figure 6.2. NDA vote vs all other votes among Hindus by caste group, 2024 (%)

Lokniti-CSDS NES 2024




Figure 6.3. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 21 (% NDA vote)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 6.4. The 6 biggest of 6 (respondents (NES 2024 jati code count))




Figure 6.5. The 6 biggest of 6 (respondents (NES 2014 group n))




Figure 6.6. Over time: NDA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted, NDA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted) · % NDA vote




Figure 6.7. Over time: INDIA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted, INDIA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted) · % INDIA vote




Figure 6.8. Over time: INDIA % of ALL Hindu votes, caste-weighted · % UPA vote





Figure 6.9. Over time: NDA % of all Hindu votes, Lokniti published, BJP % of all Hindu votes, Lokniti published · % vote



Measure 2. States: NDA share of the Hindu vote in the latest assembly election (Hindu-population weighted)

Reading **48.7%**

Ecological estimate from ECI results and Census religion shares, 31 states; runs 2-4 points below the survey checks (unity_units.csv)

Figure 6.10. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 24 (% NDA vote among Hindu voters (estimated))

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 3. Cohesion: share of Hindus in caste groups where the NDA wins a majority

Reading **19.7%**

Share of Hindus living in caste groups where the NDA wins an outright majority of the vote.

Figure 6.11. Over time: Cohesion OLD (100 minus caste gap) · 0-100




Figure 6.12. Over time: Cohesion NEW: % of Hindus in caste groups where..., Cohesion ALT: % of Hindus in caste groups where... · % of Hindus





Figure 6.13. Over time: Cohesion ALT (minimum NDA % across Hindu caste groups) · % NDA vote



Measure 4. Regional identity: India-first and the Hindu NDA vote in the South and Bengal

Reading **39.1%**

India first 39 vs State first 61

Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 6.14. Over time: Two-way NDA/ among Hindus, Two-way NDA/ among Hindus) · 0-100




Figure 6.15. Over time: State component: Hindu-population-weighted NDA …, State component: simple mean across states, State NDA % among Hindu voters: Uttar Pradesh and 3 more · % NDA vote




Figure 6.16. Over time: State component coverage (Hindus in the states used) · % of Hindus





Figure 6.17. Regional identity: India-first and the Hindu NDA vote in the South and Bengal



6.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 150 coded units and 64 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 137 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 0 opposed and 13 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 93 grade B, 53 grade C, 2 grade D, 2 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Lokniti-CSDS NES 2024.
2. Ecological estimate from ECI results and Census religion shares, 31 states; runs 2-4 points below the survey checks (unity_units.csv).

Chapter 7

The Committed Core Electorate

Arena 1.3 · weight 5 · reading **15.9** · opposed majority

7.1 Scope

The share of the electorate that continues to vote for the BJP when economic conditions, governance and leadership are unfavourable.[1]

The arena is measured by the BJP's worst-year floor (2009), its vote that does not depend on Modi, the share who identify with the BJP (NES 2024), and the floor across states since 2000; then stress-tested for a decade out of power and a new generation (−23%).

Principal evidence: BJP's floor vote since 1991: 18.8% in 2009 (ECI), when the party was out of power with no winning leader. High end: 2024 BJP vote (36.6%) minus the 25% of BJP voters who say they would not have voted BJP without Modi (Lokniti) = 27%. The rest of the electorate is the contest the core must win over.

7.2 Significance

Sets the floor under every election, and what would remain after the loss of a leader or of office. Because this loyalty is not institutionalised by the State, it must be renewed in each generation.

7.3 Indicators and weights

Table 7.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 7.1. Indicators of arena 1.3

Indicator	Weight	Reading
BJP floor vote, Lok Sabha 2009 (% of voters)[2]	0.30	18.8
BJP vote that does not depend on Modi	0.20	27.4
BJP party identification (NES 2024, % feel close)[3]	0.30	19.2
Population-weighted state floor 2000-26 (elections where the BJP contested at least half the seats)[4]	0.20	18.5
Arena reading	**1.00**	**15.9**

7.4 Reading

The arena reads **15.9**, 34.1 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 5 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.74 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 7.1. Readings of arena 1.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

7.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. BJP floor vote, Lok Sabha 2009 (% of voters)

Reading **18.8%**

ECI

Figure 7.2. BJP vote share in Lok Sabha elections, %

The floor (2009, out of power, no winning leader) is the conservative core. ECI via Wikipedia (C).




Figure 7.3. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 88 (% of valid votes)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 7.4. Over time: BJP Lok Sabha vote share · % of valid votes





Figure 7.5. Over time: BJP Lok Sabha seats · seats



Measure 2. BJP vote that does not depend on Modi

Reading **27.5%**

BJP vote 2024 (36.6%) × (1 − 25% who voted for Modi, not the party).

Figure 7.6. Each counted row (% of valid votes)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 7.7. Each counted row (% of respondents)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 7.8. Each counted row (% of voters)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 7.9. Over time: BJP voters who would have changed vote without … · % of BJP voters




Figure 7.10. Over time: BJP vote not dependent on Modi · % of valid votes





Figure 7.11. Over time: Core reading, current formula 0.5*floor2009 + 0… · 0-100



Measure 3. BJP party identification (NES 2024, % feel close)

Reading **19.2%**

Lokniti NES 2024 (core_units.csv)

Figure 7.12. Each counted row (% of respondents)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 7.13. Each counted row (% of partisans)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 7.14. Over time: BJP share of party identifiers, INC share of party identifiers · % of partisans





Figure 7.15. Over time: BJP identifiers, % of all respondents · % of respondents




Measure 4. Population-weighted state floor 2000-26 (elections where the BJP contested at least half the seats)

Reading **18.5%**

core_units.csv, State floor aggregate; non-contests and seat-sharing years dropped (owner, round 2 D4; audit DATA14-043; was 16.74)

Figure 7.16. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 232 (% of valid votes)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



7.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 339 coded units and 40 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 339 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 0 opposed and 0 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 36 grade A, 8 grade B, 295 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. ECI 2009, 2024; Lokniti NES 2024.
2. ECI.
3. Lokniti NES 2024 (core_units.csv).
4. core_units.csv, State floor aggregate; non-contests and seat-sharing years dropped (owner, round 2 D4; audit DATA14-043; was 16.74).

PART III

Society and Organisation

This part measures organised society: the cadres of parties and movements, public opinion on contested questions, religious leadership and institutions, the NGO and advocacy sector, and the capacity to mobilise crowds and win concessions from the State or from private institutions. Power in this domain is realised mostly through the domains above it, as when cadres become turnout or advocacy becomes litigation.

The domain reads **47.6**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



8	Party and Movement Cadres
9	Public Opinion on Contested Questions
10	Religious Leadership and Institutions
11	The NGO and Advocacy Sector
12	Street Mobilisation and Veto Power

Chapter 8

Party and Movement Cadres

Arena 2.1 · weight 3 · reading **51.3** · contested

8.1 Scope

Organised, disciplined manpower.[1]

The arena is measured by political cadres only: active members of parties, Sangh cadre organisations, student wings, Left fronts and Muslim political-religious bodies (party drives cut to their active core); cadre intensity (organised units that meet on a fixed cycle, RSS shakhas against CPI(M) branches); and who wins campus elections. Trade unions and farmer fronts sit outside this arena.

8.2 Significance

Booth management and turnout, campus and union elections, relief work, street presence, campaigns.

8.3 Indicators and weights

Table 8.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 8.1. Indicators of arena 2.1


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Active political cadres, adjusted (millions)[2]	0.55	51.0
Cadre intensity: organised units that meet on a fixed cycle[3]	0.30	65.1
Campus elections 2026-27 (ABVP share of central-panel posts, 9 campuses)[4]	0.15	24.8
Arena reading	**1.00**	**51.3**

8.4 Reading

The arena reads **51.3**, 1.3 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.43 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for cadre intensity: organised units that meet on a fixed cycle (65.1), the lowest for campus elections 2026-27 (ABVP share of central-panel posts, 9 campuses) (24.8).

Figure 8.1. Readings of arena 2.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

8.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Active political cadres, adjusted (millions)

Reading **51.0%**

Political cadres only (parties, Sangh cadre organisations, student wings, Left fronts, Muslim political-religious bodies; no trade unions or farmer fronts). Party drives × 14.3% (the BJP's own active-to-primary ratio), audited counts at face value, other claims × 50%; the cadre-growth lever applies.

Figure 8.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members)




Figure 8.3. The 15 biggest of 17 (members)




Figure 8.4. The 2 biggest of 2 (schools)



Figure 8.5. The 2 biggest of 2 (party members)



Figure 8.6. Over time: BJP primary members, CPI party members, TDP members and 3 more · members




Figure 8.7. Over time: BJP active members · active members




Figure 8.8. Over time: INC members · digital members





Figure 8.9. Over time: INC members incl. paper · digital + paper members




Measure 2. Cadre intensity: organised units that meet on a fixed cycle

Reading **65.1%**

RSS daily shakhas 1,01,151 (31 Oct 2026), weekly milans 32,606, monthly mandalis 13,211; Rashtra Sevika Samiti shakhas 4,886 1,51,854 vs CPI(M) branches 81,513 (monthly norm); no other party publishes a unit count 81,513

Figure 8.10. Cadre intensity: organised units that meet on a fixed cycle



Measure 3. Campus elections 2026-27 (ABVP share of central-panel posts, 9 campuses)

Reading **24.8%**

DU 75, JNU 0, HCU 16.7, Panjab 25, Patna 40, Gauhati 66.7, Kerala 0, Calicut 0, Kannur 0; each campus counted equally; NDA-ally wings (Gauhati ACP) are swing and left out (owner, round 2 D5)

Figure 8.11. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (posts won by ABVP (of 4))




Figure 8.12. The 2 biggest of 2 (posts won by ABVP (of 4))



Figure 8.13. Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (DUSU, JNUSU, UoHSU and 1 more) · posts of 4




Figure 8.14. Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (JNUSU) · posts of 8




Figure 8.15. Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (UoHSU) · posts of 6




Figure 8.16. Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (UoHSU) · posts of 10




Figure 8.17. Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (UoHSU) · posts of 5





Figure 8.18. Over time: ABVP central-panel posts won (PUCSC) · posts of 2



Measure 4. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 8.19. Over time: RSS daily shakhas · daily shakhas




Figure 8.20. Over time: RSS sthan · sthan




Figure 8.21. Over time: RSS weekly milans · weekly milans




Figure 8.22. Over time: RSS monthly mandalis · monthly mandalis




Figure 8.23. Over time: CTUO provisional 2011 claims (AICCTU, AITUC, AIUTUC and 3 more) · members





Figure 8.24. Over time: Vidya Bharati formal schools · schools



8.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 76 coded units and 185 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 28 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 47 opposed and 1 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 22 grade A, 4 grade B, 16 grade C, 28 grade D, 6 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. RSS Prativedan 2026; party reports.
2. Parties, Sangh cadre organisations, student wings, Left youth and women fronts, Muslim political-religious mass bodies and Bhim Army only; trade unions, farmer fronts, cooperatives and service/education networks are not political cadres (rev 9.4). Party drives × 14.3% (BJP active/primary ratio), audited at face value, other self-claims × 50% (cadres_units.csv).
3. RSS daily shakhas 1,01,151: announced by Sunil Ambekar, Akhil Bharatiya Prachar Pramukh, on 31 Oct 2026 at the press briefing before the Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal in Indore (IANS; Organiser), with RSS work at 1,10,849 locations; weekly milans, monthly mandalis and Samiti shakhas from the Sarkaryavah Prativedan 2025-26 (no newer count given); CPI(M) 24th Congress Report on Organisation 2025. Counts units, not meetings: weighting by meeting frequency (daily vs monthly) would read about 97.
4. DU 75, JNU 0, HCU 16.7, Panjab 25, Patna 40, Gauhati 66.7, Kerala 0, Calicut 0, Kannur 0; each campus counted equally; NDA-ally wings (Gauhati ACP) are swing and left out (owner, round 2 D5).

Chapter 9

Public Opinion on Contested Questions

Arena 2.2 · weight 3 · reading **50.7** · contested

9.1 Scope

What people believe on the core questions.[1]

The arena is measured by 16 representative survey items on policy (UCC, CAA, Art. 370, conversion laws, security …) and identity (Hindu India, majority will …), weighted by sample and recency, plus salience.

9.2 Significance

What a party can say and do without losing votes; public acceptance of laws; a slow-moving layer of power.

9.3 Indicators and weights

Table 9.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 9.1. Indicators of arena 2.2

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Policy positions (9 all-adult items, sample- and recency-weighted)[2]	0.40	59.8
Identity positions (7 items)[3]	0.40	39.3
Intensity and salience[4]	0.20	55.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Arena reading	1.00	50.7

9.4 Reading

The arena reads **50.7**, 0.7 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.41 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for policy positions (9 all-adult items, sample- and recency-weighted) (59.8), the lowest for identity positions (7 items) (39.3).

Figure 9.1. Readings of arena 2.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

9.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Policy positions (9 all-adult items, sample- and recency-weighted)

Reading **59.8%**

UCC, CAA, NRC, Art. 370, love-jihad laws, Op Sindoor, caste census, same-sex marriage, hijab; n recorded for all 9 items; UCC,

NRC and love-jihad are support-only (no oppose figure published) (beliefs_units.csv)

Figure 9.2. Each counted row (% Hindutva share of decided)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 9.3. Over time: UCC support, CAA support · % support




Figure 9.4. Over time: CAA support · % "helps persecuted minorities"




Figure 9.5. Over time: CAA support · % approve




Figure 9.6. Over time: NRC support · % implement nationwide




Figure 9.7. Over time: NRC support · % "good step"




Figure 9.8. Over time: Art 370 (should be revoked/repealed) · % should be revoked




Figure 9.9. Over time: Art 370 (should be revoked/repealed) · % should have been repealed




Figure 9.10. Over time: Art 370 (want it reinstated) · % want Art 370 reinstated




Figure 9.11. Over time: Caste census support · % in favour



Figure 9.12. Over time: Same-sex marriage support/acceptance · % accepted




Figure 9.13. Over time: Same-sex marriage support/acceptance · % favour legal SSM




Figure 9.14. Over time: Homosexuality never justifiable · % never justifiable





Figure 9.15. Over time: Op Sindoor a strong response · % strong



Measure 2. Identity positions (7 items)

Reading **39.3%**

Hindu-only India 12.2, being Hindu key 57, majority will 56.2 … (beliefs_units.csv)

Figure 9.16. Each counted row (% Hindutva share of decided)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 9.17. Over time: India belongs only to Hindus · % only Hindus




Figure 9.18. Over time: Minorities should adopt majority customs, Govt must protect minorities even if majority d… · % fully agree




Figure 9.19. Over time: Minorities should adopt majority customs · % fully disagree





Figure 9.20. Over time: Vote BJP for Hindutva-aligned · % main reason



Measure 3. Intensity and salience

Reading **55.5%**

Salience items, not support (beliefs_units.csv)

Figure 9.21. Over time: Communal harmony improved under NDA · % improved





Figure 9.22. Over time: Communal harmony deteriorated under NDA · % deteriorated



Measure 4. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 9.23. Over time: Will of majority community should prevail, Special treatment for minorities needed · % fully agree




Figure 9.24. Over time: Strong leader who need not bother about electio… · % agree




Figure 9.25. Over time: Strong leader without parliament/elections good · % very/fairly good




Figure 9.26. Over time: Ram temple named biggest govt achievement, Ram Mandir most-liked central govt work · % single pick




Figure 9.27. Over time: Satisfied with govt response to Pahalgam · % completely satisfied




Figure 9.28. Over time: Would not like other-religion neighbours · % mentioned





Figure 9.29. Over time: Religion very important in life · % very important



9.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 55 coded units and 72 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 37 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 18 opposed and 0 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 39 grade B, 14 grade C, 1 grade D, 1 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. CVoter MOTN; Lokniti; Pew 2021.
2. UCC, CAA, NRC, Art. 370, love-jihad laws, Op Sindoor, caste census, same-sex marriage, hijab; n recorded for all 9 items; UCC, NRC and love-jihad are support-only (no oppose figure published) (beliefs_units.csv).
3. Hindu-only India 12.2, being Hindu key 57, majority will 56.2 … (beliefs_units.csv).
4. Salience items, not support (beliefs_units.csv).

Chapter 10

Religious Leadership and Institutions

Arena 2.3 · weight 3 · reading **68.8** · aligned majority

10.1 Scope

The authority of religious leaders and institutions of every faith.[1]

The arena is measured by YouTube subscribers and 12-month views of 193 religious leaders, ministries and institutions of every faith (Christian and Muslim included), organised institutions (temples and mathas against churches, mosques and madrasas) and the money of religious bodies.

10.2 Significance

Trust networks that move votes, money and volunteers; festivals and pilgrimages; conversion and reconversion.

10.3 Indicators and weights

Table 10.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 10.1. Indicators of arena 2.3


Indicator	Weight	Reading
YouTube subscribers of religious leaders, ministries and institutions (193 channels)[2]	0.20	54.1
YouTube views in the last 12 months, same channels[3]	0.20	63.3
Organised institutions (temples, mathas vs churches, mosques, madrasas)	0.30	82.3
Money of religious bodies (₹ cr a year)	0.30	68.6
Arena reading	**1.00**	**68.8**

10.4 Reading

The arena reads **68.8**, 18.8 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.92 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for organised institutions (temples, mathas vs churches, mosques, madrasas) (82.3), the lowest for YouTube subscribers of religious leaders, ministries and institutions (193 channels) (54.1).

Figure 10.1. Readings of arena 2.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

10.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. YouTube subscribers of religious leaders, ministries and institutions (193 channels)


Reading **54.1%**

H 197.5m vs R 167.7m: Christian ministries 39.6m, Indian Muslim 19.9m, foreign Muslim 38.9m, Acharya Prashant 69.3m (religious_youtube_units.csv)

Figure 10.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)



Figure 10.3. The 15 biggest of 119 (million followers)



Measure 2. YouTube views in the last 12 months, same channels


Reading **63.3%**

H 11,723m vs R 6,803m: Christian 2,798m, Indian Muslim 428m, foreign Muslim 393m, Acharya Prashant 3,185m

Figure 10.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (views, 12 months Oct 2025-Sep 2026 (m))



Figure 10.5. The 15 biggest of 193 (views, 12 months Oct 2025-Sep 2026 (m))



Measure 3. Organised institutions: places of worship (Census 2011, by district faith shares) and madrasas

Reading **82.3%**

Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist and Jain places of worship 25,16,860 vs Mosques, churches, other places of worship and madrasas 5,41,246

Measure 4. Money of religious bodies (₹ cr a year)

Reading **68.6%**

Figure 10.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)



Figure 10.7. The 15 biggest of 28 (₹ crore a year)





Figure 10.8. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

84 flows counted, ₹61,244 crore.



Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 10.9. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 10.10. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 10.11. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 10.12. Organised institutions: places of worship (Census 2011, by district faith shares) and madrasas



10.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 374 coded units and 87 money flows. Of the units and flows, 202 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 215 opposed and 44 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 47 grade A, 315 grade B, 82 grade C, 13 grade D, 4 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Platform counts; CBCI; WAMSI; HR&CE.
2. H 197.5m vs R 167.7m: Christian ministries 39.6m, Indian Muslim 19.9m, foreign Muslim 38.9m, Acharya Prashant 69.3m (religious_youtube_units.csv).
3. H 11,723m vs R 6,803m: Christian 2,798m, Indian Muslim 428m, foreign Muslim 393m, Acharya Prashant 3,185m.

Chapter 11

The NGO and Advocacy Sector

Arena 2.4 · weight 3 · reading **25.7** · opposed majority

11.1 Scope

The web of NGOs and associations that runs campaigns.[1]

The arena is measured by the organised web of NGOs and advocacy: money reaching organisations, network centrality, service footprint on the ground, litigation, UN submissions and global allies.

Principal evidence: Network out-strength of civil-society nodes and their global allies (church/mission, Muslim bodies, UN/USCIRF/foreign govts, index producers, litigant and rights NGOs, unions vs RSS/Sangh network, temple bodies), T58b.

11.2 Significance

Litigation, protests, UN submissions, fact-finding reports, media campaigns.

11.3 Indicators and weights

Table 11.1 lists the 5 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 11.1. Indicators of arena 2.4


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Money reaching organisations in India (₹ cr a year)	0.25	15.1
Network centrality (out-strength of civil-society nodes)[2]	0.30	30.1
Service footprint (units on the ground)[3]	0.10	69.5
Litigation output (landmark contested cases)[4]	0.15	22.3
UN and rights reporting (UPR submissions)[5]	0.10	0.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**25.7**

11.4 Reading

The arena reads **25.7**, 24.3 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.72 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for service footprint (units on the ground) (69.5), the lowest for UN and rights reporting (UPR submissions) (0.0).

Figure 11.1. Readings of arena 2.4 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

11.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Money reaching organisations in India (₹ cr a year)

Reading **15.1%**

Figure 11.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)




Figure 11.3. The 15 biggest of 523 (₹ crore a year)





Figure 11.4. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

954 flows counted, ₹17,627 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹446 cr · 2.5% Opposed ₹13,151 cr · 74.6% Transactional ₹1,253 cr · 7.1%

Neutral / not counted ₹2,776 cr · 15.8%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 11.5. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 11.6. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 11.7. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 2. Network centrality (out-strength of civil-society nodes)

Reading **30.2%**

Atlas network T58b


Measure 3. Service footprint (units on the ground)

Reading **69.5%**

Sewa Bharati 35,000 (claim “over 35,000”), VKA 22,175, Ekal 90,603 projects × 0.5 vs FCRA associations 14,466, Catholic schools 14,429,

CHAI 3,500

Figure 11.8. The 4 biggest of 4 (organisations)



Measure 4. Litigation output (landmark contested cases)

Reading **22.3%**

27 of 121 case participations (ecosystem_units.csv)

Measure 5. UN and rights reporting (UPR submissions)

Reading **0.0%**

0 of 139 camp-coded stakeholder submissions (141 UPR rows in ecosystem_units.csv; 2 neutral)

Measure 6. Global allies (diaspora and foreign advocacy revenue)

Reading **23.7%**

Moved to India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power.

Figure 11.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)





Figure 11.10. The 15 biggest of 31 (₹ crore a year)



11.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 868 coded units and 954 money flows. Of the units and flows, 68 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 1,526 opposed and 228 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 1,659 grade A, 28 grade B, 121 grade C, 10 grade D, 4 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. MHA FCRA; NGO Darpan; Atlas network T58b.
2. Atlas network T58b.
3. Sewa Bharati 35,000 (claim “over 35,000”), VKA 22,175, Ekal 90,603 projects × 0.5 vs FCRA associations 14,466, Catholic schools 14,429, CHAI 3,500.
4. 27 of 121 case participations (ecosystem_units.csv).
5. 0 of 139 camp-coded stakeholder submissions (141 UPR rows in ecosystem_units.csv; 2 neutral).

Chapter 12

Street Mobilisation and Veto Power

Arena 2.5 · weight 3 · reading **41.5** · opposed majority

12.1 Scope

The power to mobilise crowds and make the State, or a company, studio, platform or venue, back down.[1]

The arena is measured by 144 mass mobilisations 1985-2026 by every camp, scored 0-3 for how far the State, or a company, studio, platform, venue or publisher, backed down (withdrawn, delayed, renamed, cut, conceded); mass-contact drives such as the Ram Nidhi Samarpan and Bharat Jodo Yatra count toward capacity. The recent window 2019-26 carries most weight.

12.2 Significance

Laws repealed or stalled (farm laws, CAA rules delayed 51 months, Shah Bano), ministers resigning (NEET 2026), bans and suspensions conceded (Satanic Verses, Nupur Sharma), films renamed or cut and ads and shows withdrawn (Padmaavat, Laxmii, Annapoorani on Netflix, Tanishq), and governments' and companies' fear of the street.

12.3 Indicators and weights

Table 12.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 12.1. Indicators of arena 2.5

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Veto points won 2019-26: the State, companies, studios, platforms and venues made to back down[2]	0.60	41.9
Veto points won 1985-2026 (State and institution back-downs, 139 counted episodes)	0.20	36.8
Mobilisation capacity: top three episodes 2019-26 by states covered and duration, mass-contact drives included[3]	0.20	44.8
Arena reading	**1.00**	**41.5**

12.4 Reading

The arena reads **41.5**, 8.5 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.15 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 12.1. Readings of arena 2.5 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

12.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Veto points won 2019-26: the State, companies, studios, platforms and venues made to back down

Reading **41.9%**

Hindutva-side mobilisations 44 vs Opposed-side mobilisations 61

Figure 12.2. Veto points won 2019-26: the State, companies, studios, platforms and venues made to back down



Measure 2. Veto points won 1985-2026 (State and institution back-downs, 139 counted episodes)

Reading **36.8%**

Figure 12.3. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (veto score 0-3)




Figure 12.4. The 15 biggest of 97 (veto score 0-3)




Figure 12.5. Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 1985-1999



Figure 12.6. Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 1985-1999




Figure 12.7. Over time: H share of H+R veto points, Concession rate, all sides · %




Figure 12.8. Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 2000-2013




Figure 12.9. Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 2000-2013




Figure 12.10. Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 2014-2019




Figure 12.11. Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 2014-2019




Figure 12.12. Over time: Veto points, side H, Veto points, side R, Veto points, side N · veto points 2020-2026




Figure 12.13. Over time: Episodes, side H, Episodes ending in State concession, side H, Episodes with any State response, side H and 3 more · episodes 2020-2026




Table 12.2. Violence

21 rows

episode_id	event	year	state	deaths_official	finding_body	finding	case_status	status_date
babri_demolition_1992	Demolition of Babri Masjid and Bombay riots	1992-93	UP; Maharashtra	Bombay ~900 dead, >2,000 injured (Srikrishna Commission)	Liberhan Commission (report tabled Nov 2009); Srikrishna Commission (report Feb 1998)	Liberhan held 68 persons culpable; Srikrishna examined police conduct and named organisations in the Jan 1993 phase	Demolition: CBI special court acquitted all 32 accused 30 Sep 2020; Allahabad HC dismissed appeal Nov 2022. Bombay	2022-11
ram_shila_shilanyas_1989	Bhagalpur violence during Ram shila procession	1989	Bihar	>1,000 (HT)	Sinha-Hasan Commission (1995); N.N. Singh Commission (tabled 2015)	Commission reports on administrative failure	closed (HC acquittal of a convict 2017)	2017-06-29
gujarat_bandh_2002	Gujarat violence after Godhra	2002	Gujarat	1,044 (official); Godhra fire 59	Nanavati-Mehta Commission (final report Dec 2019); SC-appointed SIT (9 cases); SC Zakia Jafri judgment 24 Jun 2022	SC upheld SIT closure on larger conspiracy (2022)	Gulberg 24 convicted (2016), Naroda Gam all acquitted (Apr 2023); appeals pending	2023-04-21
kandhamal_2008	Kandhamal violence	2008	Odisha	39 (state affidavit)	SC (Archbishop Raphael Cheenath v State of Orissa) 2 Aug 2016	827 FIRs; 78 cases ended in conviction (493 persons); 284 acquitted	SC directions on compensation and reinvestigation	2016-08-02
muzaffarnagar_2013	Muzaffarnagar riots	2013	UP	>60; >40000 displaced	Justice Vishnu Sahai Commission (2015); UP SIT	findings NO DATA (only headlines fetched)	over 1,100 acquitted, 7 convicted (2021); UP sought to withdraw 77 cases	2021-09-07
jat_haryana_2016	Jat quota agitation	2016	Haryana	30 (Haryana govt: 9 had no role in violence)	Prakash Singh Committee (May 2016)	police and civil administration failures	NO DATA	2016-05
sterlite_2018	Thoothukudi police firing	2018	Tamil Nadu	13	Justice Aruna Jagadeesan Commission (2022)	indicted police officers	departmental action contested; prosecutions NO DATA	2022
caa_nrc_2019_20	Anti-CAA protest deaths (UP)	2019	UP	22 (UP govt to Allahabad HC)	Allahabad HC proceedings; NHRC spot inquiry	deaths largely in police firing (reported); 274 damage-recovery notices withdrawn after SC (Feb 2022)	no judicial inquiry ordered	2022-02

episode_id	event	year	state	deaths_official	finding_body	finding	case_status	status_date
caa_nrc_2019_20	Anti-CAA protest deaths (Assam)	2019	Assam	5 (Assam govt)	Assam CM in Assembly	1,026 arrested in 12 days (11 under UAPA); 88 police, 20 civilians injured	NO DATA	2022
caa_nrc_2019_20	Mangaluru police firing	2019	Karnataka	2	Magisterial inquiry	no fault found with police firing (state to HC Oct 2021)	closed	2021-10
delhi_riots_2020	North-east Delhi riots (Feb 2020)	2020	Delhi	53 (Delhi Police)	Delhi Police SITs; Delhi courts	757 FIRs; 2,647 arrested or detained (HM in Lok Sabha, Mar 2020); >80% of decided cases ended in acquittal or discharge	Larger-conspiracy FIR 59/2020 (UAPA): charges not framed; SC 5 Jan 2026 denied bail to 2, granted 5. Magistrate order	2026-01-05
bengaluru_djhalli_2020	DJ Halli / KG Halli riots	2020	Karnataka	3 (police firing)	NIA (UAPA); state police	chargesheets filed	HC bail to UAPA accused after 5 years (Jul 2026)	2026-07-08
farm_laws_2020_21	Lakhimpur Kheri	2021	UP	8	SIT; SC-monitored	SIT called it a pre-planned conspiracy (Dec 2021)	trial ongoing; main accused on SC bail	2026
nupur_sharma_2022	Prophet-remarks protests and follow-on killings	2022	UP; WB; Jharkhand; Rajasthan; Maharashtra	2 (Ranchi police firing); Kanhaiya Lal and Umesh Kolhe murders	NIA chargesheets (Dec 2022)	400+ arrests after 10 Jun 2022; Kanhaiya Lal: charges framed vs 9 (Feb 2024); Umesh Kolhe: charges not framed	trials pending	2026
ram_navami_2023	Ram Navami clashes (Howrah; Rishra)	2023	West Bengal	NO DATA	NIA (on Calcutta HC order)	NIA investigation	NIA arrested a TMC councillor (Rishra) Jun-Jul 2026	2026-07-01
nuh_2023	Nuh / Gurugram clashes	2023	Haryana	6	P&H HC (suo motu on demolitions)	HC halted demolitions	116 arrested, 44 FIRs by 2 Aug 2023	2023-08-07
manipur_kukizo_2023_25	Manipur ethnic violence	2023	Manipur	306 killed, 49 missing (state govt, Aug 2026)	MHA commission of inquiry (2023); CBI	commission pending (5th extension May 2026)	CBI cases pending	2026-05-16
sambhal_2024	Sambhal violence during survey	2024	UP	4	Justice D.K. Arora Judicial Commission (tabled UP Assembly 5 Aug 2026)	pre-planned conspiracy; 4 deaths not from police bullets; named Masjid committee office-bearers and an SP MP (who	cases pending; commission findings are not a verdict	2026-08-05
waqf_2025	Murshidabad violence during Waqf Act protests	2025	West Bengal	3	Calcutta HC fact-finding committee (27 Apr 2025); SIT	committee report to HC	13 given life terms for the father-son lynching (Dec 2025)	2025-12-23

episode_id	event	year	state	deaths_official	finding_body	finding	case_status	status_date
ladakh_2024_25	Leh police firing	2025	Ladakh	4	Judicial inquiry	findings not public	NSA detention of Sonam Wangchuk (Sep 2025) later ended	2026-09
neet_cjp_2026	Jantar Mantar march (20 Jul 2026)	2026	Delhi	0	Delhi Police statement; Delhi HC hearing	118 police hurt (police); ~150 protesters hospitalised (organisers)	FIRs; withdrawal promised in NDA-ruled states	2026-07

Measure 3. Mobilisation capacity: top three episodes 2019-26 by states covered and duration, mass-contact drives included
Reading **44.8%**

H: Ram Nidhi Samarpan 2021, akshat sampark 2024, Shaurya Jagran Yatra 2023; R: farm protests, Bharat Jodo Yatra, CAA-NRC (street_units.csv, rescore_r9.py)

12.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 144 coded units and 60 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 55 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 86 opposed and 3 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 5 grade A, 132 grade C, 7 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. Episodes from court records, commissions and news (street_units.csv).
2. Rev 9.4: institution back-downs added for both camps (S10 ADDITIONS_R9.md). Against the State alone: 9 vs 44 (17.0).
3. H: Ram Nidhi Samarpan 2021, akshat sampark 2024, Shaurya Jagran Yatra 2023; R: farm protests, Bharat Jodo Yatra, CAA-NRC (street_units.csv, rescore_r9.py).

PART IV

Economy and Money

This part follows money: the political and philanthropic commitments of India's largest business owners, private non-party funding for ideological causes, and the organised producers (trade unions, co-operatives and farmer organisations). Transactional money, given to whoever holds office, is treated as office-dependent and is separated from committed money throughout.

The domain reads **38.6**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



13	Large Business Owners
14	Private Funding for Ideological Causes
15	Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations

Chapter 13

Large Business Owners

Arena 3.1 · weight 2 · reading **38.3** · opposed majority

13.1 Scope

The commitment of India's biggest owners and the money they give.[1]

The arena is measured by the top 100 owners: their documented commitment by wealth, their money to parties (transactional at half), the news channels they own (by content audit), and the causes they fund.

13.2 Significance

Media ownership, ad budgets, election funding, lobbying. Transactional money is counted as borrowed power: it is expected to leave when the BJP leaves office.

13.3 Indicators and weights

Table 13.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 13.1. Indicators of arena 3.1

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Documented commitment of the top 100 (by wealth; transactional counts against)	0.30	9.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Party money of the top 100, transactional at 50% (FY2019-20 to FY2024-25)[2]	0.30	51.5
News TV owned by top-100 owners, by content audit	0.20	100.0
Owners' ideological-cause philanthropy	0.20	13.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**38.3**

13.4 Reading

The arena reads **38.3**, 11.7 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 2 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.71 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for news TV owned by top-100 owners, by content audit (100.0), the lowest for documented commitment of the top 100 (by wealth; transactional counts against) (9.5).

Figure 13.1. Readings of arena 3.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

13.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by

source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Documented commitment of the top 100 (by wealth; transactional counts against)

Reading **9.5%**

Figure 13.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows ($ billion)





Figure 13.3. The 15 biggest of 99 ($ billion)




Measure 2. Party money of the top 100, transactional at 50% (FY2019-20 to FY2024-25)

Reading **51.5%**

Stated rule: bonds and trusts to the BJP from committed owners in full, from transactional owners at 50%, against all non-NDA parties; NDA allies are swing; trusts cut to FY2019-20..FY2024-25 with the per-year ET allocations (owner, round 2 D3; audit DATA14-033; audit/applied_work/round2/d3_partymoney.py). BJP 2,491 vs other 2,345 cr; Tata group = all 15 Progressive Electoral Trust donors (DATA14-031)

Figure 13.4. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

295 flows counted, ₹8,183 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹5,694 cr · 69.6% Opposed ₹2,489 cr · 30.4%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 13.5. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)





Figure 13.6. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)



Measure 3. News TV owned by top-100 owners, by content audit

Reading **100.0%**

Figure 13.7. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (weekly reach, thousand AMA (BARC 2025 genre...)





Figure 13.8. The 8 biggest of 8 (weekly reach, thousand AMA (BARC 2025 genre...)




Measure 4. Owners' ideological-cause philanthropy

Reading **13.2%**

Figure 13.9. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

17 flows counted, ₹1,083 crore.



● Hindutva-aligned ₹143 cr · 13.2% ● Opposed ₹940 cr · 86.8%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 13.10. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)





Figure 13.11. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)




Measure 5. Prosperity felt: voters better off, and happy with jobs, incomes and prices

Reading **32.2%**

Feel better off 32 vs Do not 68

Measure 6. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 13.12. Prosperity felt: voters better off, and happy with jobs, incomes and prices



13.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 107 coded units and 458 money flows. Of the units and flows, 141 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 193 opposed and 231 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 415 grade A, 7 grade C, 3 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Forbes India 2026; SBI bond data; ADR.
2. Stated rule: bonds and trusts to the BJP from committed owners in full, from transactional owners at 50%, against all non-NDA parties; NDA allies are swing; trusts cut to FY2019-20..FY2024-25 with the per-year ET allocations (owner, round 2 D3; audit DATA14-033; audit/applied_work/round2/d3_partymoney.py). BJP 2,491 vs other 2,345 cr; Tata group = all 15 Progressive Electoral Trust donors (DATA14-031).

Chapter 14

Private Funding for Ideological Causes

Arena 3.2 · weight 3 · reading **42.3** · opposed majority

14.1 Scope

Private, non-party money that funds ideology.[1]

The arena is measured by every private, non-party rupee a year for camp-aligned schools, missions, NGOs, think tanks, cadre bodies and media, domestic and foreign; worship money is counted in religious leadership instead.

Principal evidence: Private money a year for causes, no government and no party money: Hindutva-camp ₹5.5k cr (Sangh schools and cadre bodies, think tanks, aligned media) vs opposing camp ₹22.0k cr (church and mosque networks, minority schools and hospitals, environment, gender and rights NGOs, advocacy) (rev 5 private universe). Hindu temple offerings with no political use (₹32.5k cr) are not counted, per the agreed rules.

14.2 Significance

Builds the institutions that outlast governments: schools, think tanks, NGOs, litigation.

14.3 Indicators and weights

Table 14.1 lists the 2 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-

aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 14.1. Indicators of arena 3.2


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Cause money, cleaned (₹ cr a year)	0.70	35.2
Ideology-producing money only (advocacy, think tanks, media, cadre bodies)	0.30	58.8
Arena reading	**1.00**	**42.3**

14.4 Reading

The arena reads **42.3**, 7.7 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.18 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for ideology-producing money only (advocacy, think tanks, media, cadre bodies) (58.8), the lowest for cause money, cleaned (₹ cr a year) (35.2).

Figure 14.1. Readings of arena 3.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

14.5 Measures and exhibits


The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Cause money, cleaned (₹ cr a year)

Reading **35.2%**

Figure 14.2. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

2056 flows counted, ₹15,316 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹5,384 cr · 35.2% · Opposed ₹9,915 cr · 64.7%

Neutral / not counted ₹17 cr · 0.1%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 14.3. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 14.4. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)




Figure 14.5. By country of origin (₹ crore)




Figure 14.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)





Figure 14.7. The 15 biggest of 227 (₹ crore a year)




Measure 2. Ideology-producing money only (advocacy, think tanks, media, cadre bodies)

Reading **58.8%**

Figure 14.8. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

167 flows counted, ₹4,127 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹2,417 cr · 58.6% Opposed ₹1,693 cr · 41.0%

Neutral / not counted ₹17 cr · 0.4%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 14.9. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 14.10. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 14.11. By country of origin (₹ crore)



14.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 443 coded units and 3,118 money flows. Of the units and flows, 557 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 2,546 opposed and 458 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 3,320 grade A, 90 grade B, 130 grade C, 2 grade D, 19 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Atlas M1/M2; MHA FCRA; CSR portal.

Chapter 15

Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations

Arena 3.3 · weight 1 · reading **28.2** · opposed majority

15.1 Scope

The organised producers: who leads the workers, the farmers and the co-operatives that move India's credit, milk, fertiliser and sugar.[1]

The arena is measured by co-operative control by size (turnover and deposits, elected boards), verified central trade-union membership, recognition polls and bargaining seats in the strategic sectors, and farmer-front membership. NDA allies are left out; unclassified bodies count against.

15.2 Significance

The strike and the bandh, wage boards, rural credit and the price and supply of milk, fertiliser and sugar; co-op boards are also the training ground and patronage base of state party machines.

15.3 Indicators and weights

Table 15.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 15.1. Indicators of arena 3.3


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Co-operatives: who controls the largest co-ops and co-op banks, by size (elected boards)[2]	0.35	46.5
Union members: BMS share of verified central trade-union membership[3]	0.25	25.0
Shop floor: union recognition polls and bargaining seats in railways, coal, steel and transport[4]	0.20	13.1
Farmer fronts: claimed members, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh vs the Kisan Sabha and farm-workers' union[5]	0.20	15.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**28.2**

15.4 Reading

The arena reads **28.2**, 21.8 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.26 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for co-operatives: who controls the largest co-ops and co-op banks, by size (elected boards) (46.5), the lowest for shop floor: union recognition polls and bargaining seats in railways, coal, steel and transport (13.1).

Figure 15.1. Readings of arena 3.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

15.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Co-operatives: who controls the largest co-ops and co-op banks, by size (elected boards)

Reading **46.5%**

BJP- and Sangh-led boards 46 vs Opposition-led or unclassified boards 54

Figure 15.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)




Figure 15.3. The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore)




Figure 15.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)




Figure 15.5. The 7 biggest of 7 (₹ crore)




Table 15.2. Co-operatives (facts without a number)

13 rows

organisation	measure	size_value	state	controller	side	notes
NCUI (National Cooperative Union of India) - President	board_control		All India	Dileep Sanghani (president since Nov 2020)	H	In 2020 he was the first NCUI president from the ruling BJP. Office-bearer election is pending after the July 2026
Tribhuvan Sahkari University (Anand)	board_control		Gujarat	Prof S.P. Singh (VC, appointed by GoI June 2026)	H	Institution of National Importance under the Tribhuvan Sahkari University Act 2025. Dr J.M. Vyas was officiating VC
NFCSF (National Federation of Cooperative Sugar Factories)	board_control		All India	Harshvardhan Patil (president)	R	Elected NFCSF president (Jan 2024) as a BJP leader; quit BJP for NCP(SP) Oct 2024 and lost Indapur. Still NFCSF
Baroda Dairy (Vadodara union)	board_control		Gujarat	Chairman chosen on BJP mandate (Dinesh Patel 2022; resigned Jan 2023)	H	Current chair not verified; BJP-internal factional contests
Andhra Pradesh State Co-operative Bank (APCOB)	board_control		Andhra Pradesh	Ganni Veeranjaneyulu (nominated chairman, May 2025; also Eluru DCCB)	S	Nominated, not elected, so office-dependent. Deposits not found.
Punjab State Co-operative Bank	board_control		Punjab	Jagdev Singh (chairman; board term to 28 Dec 2025)	R	Party not found. AAP govt; AAP leader Pawan Tinu chairs the separate PSCADB.
Odisha State Co-operative Bank	board_control		Odisha	T. Prasad Rao Dora (president)	R	Probably BJD-aligned (S), but this is undocumented. BJP state govt since 2024 is acting against him (RCS refund order).
MP Apex Bank (MP Rajya Sahakari Bank)	board_control		Madhya Pradesh	Mahendra Singh Yadav (Administrator, Apr 2026)	H	No elected board; MP co-op elections long pending
Haryana State Co-operative Apex Bank (HARCO)	board_control		Haryana	Chairman per bank website (Bharat Bhushan Juyal); Hukum Singh Bhati from Jan 2023	H	Party not documented
Tamil Nadu State Apex Co-operative Bank	board_control		Tamil Nadu	Special officer / state govt (TVK govt since May 2026)	S	Board status not verified. TN co-op boards are frequently superseded when govts change.
Gujarat State Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories	board_control		Gujarat	Ishwarsinh T. Patel (chairman)	H	About 15-16 south Gujarat co-op mills (count not verified)
Satish Marathe - Sahakar Bharati founder on RBI Central Board and NABARD board	sangh_body		All India	Satish Marathe	H	RBI board: appointed 2018, re-appointed 2022 for 4 years. Joined the NABARD board Aug 2025. Influences UCB regulation.
D.N. Thakur / Annasaheb Jolle / Deepak Chaurasia - SB nominees for NCUI top posts	sangh_body		All India	D.N. Thakur (SB patron, ex-president); Annasaheb Jolle (ex-BJP MP); Deepak Chaurasia (central govt nominee on NCUI GC)	H	Jolle won 15-0 in the western/southern state-federations constituency. Group-II winners (Aug 2026): Sanghani (IFFCO),

Measure 2. Union members: BMS share of verified central trade-union membership

Reading **25.0%**

BMS 25 vs The other central trade unions 75

Figure 15.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members)




Figure 15.7. The 13 biggest of 13 (members)




Table 15.3. Union membership (facts without a number)
15 rows

organisation	measure	value	unit	year	side	notes
All CTUOs	verification_status	Last completed verification = 31.12.2002, completed 2008	text	2021		PDF redirect-blocked; content seen via search-engine extract only. Annexure lists 2002 strength. Fresh verification
BMS	political_affiliation	RSS (Sangh Parivar); ILO table lists BJP	text	2009	H	BMS formally "non-political"; ILO table lists BJP, text says RSS/Sangh Parivar. UTUC(LS) renamed AIUTUC 2008. [carried
INTUC	political_affiliation	Indian National Congress	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
AITUC	political_affiliation	CPI	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
HMS	political_affiliation	Socialist (zones support various socialist parties)	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
CITU	political_affiliation	CPI(M)	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
UTUC (LS)/AIUTUC	political_affiliation	SUCI(C)	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
TUCC	political_affiliation	All India Forward Bloc	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
SEWA	political_affiliation	Not politically affiliated	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
AICCTU	political_affiliation	CPI(ML) Liberation	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
LPF	political_affiliation	DMK	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
UTUC	political_affiliation	RSP	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
NFITU-DHN	political_affiliation	RJD (per ILO 2009)	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
NFITU-KOL	political_affiliation	Not politically affiliated	text	2009	R	[carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
INTUC / BMS / AITUC / HMS / CITU	CTUO_2011_verification_claimed	INTUC 33.35m; BMS 17.15m; AITUC 14.25m; HMS 9.19m; CITU 5.79m	claimed members, reference date 31.12.2011	2011	R / H / R / R / R	The 2011-reference verification was never finalised (court cases). As of Jan 2023, 2002 is still the last completed

Measure 3. Shop floor: union recognition polls and bargaining seats in railways, coal, steel and transport

Reading **13.1%**

BMS unions 13 vs Other unions 87

Figure 15.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total))



Hindutva-aligned **4 members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total)** · 36.4% Opposed **7 members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total)** · 63.6%
Transactional **0 members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total)** · 0.0% Neutral / not counted **0 members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total)** · 0.0%

Figure 15.9. The 3 biggest of 3 (members of JBCCI-XI (union side, 18 total))



Figure 15.10. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (votes)




Figure 15.11. The 3 biggest of 3 (votes)



Table 15.4. Shop-floor polls (facts without a number)
22 rows

organisation	measure	value	unit	year	side	notes
South Eastern Railway Men's Union (SERMU)	rail_SBE_2024_zone_outcome	sole recognised union	outcome	2024	R	South Eastern Railway. No vote figures. DPRMS (Dakshin Purva Railway Mazdoor Sangh, Sangh-aligned per its slogans)
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 47.68%; NFIR 36.37%	% of votes polled, zone CR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 39.78%; NFIR 28.51%	% of votes polled, zone ECR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 40.77%; NFIR 35.52%	% of votes polled, zone ECoR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 45.65%; NFIR 35.52%	% of votes polled, zone ER	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 39.87%; NFIR 56.82%	% of votes polled, zone NCR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 45.49%; NFIR 11.96%	% of votes polled, zone NER	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 45.81%; NFIR 40.72%	% of votes polled, zone NWR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 44.81%; NFIR 53.1%	% of votes polled, zone NFR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 45.94%; NFIR 42.7%	% of votes polled, zone NR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 46.26%; NFIR 48.53%	% of votes polled, zone SCR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 31.7%; NFIR 50.18%	% of votes polled, zone SECR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 42.22%; NFIR 45.09%	% of votes polled, zone SER	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 45.26%; NFIR 31.58%	% of votes polled, zone SWR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 46.58%; NFIR 25.32%	% of votes polled, zone SR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 49.6%; NFIR 41.15%	% of votes polled, zone WCR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 41.33%; NFIR 45.63%	% of votes polled, zone WR	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF unions vs NFIR unions	rail_SBE_2013_zone_vote_share	AIRF 46.02%; NFIR 27.33%	% of votes polled, zone Metro Kolkata	2013	R	SBE 25-27 Apr 2013. BRMS figures not tabulated.
AIRF / NFIR	rail_SBE_2007_2013_zones_recognised	AIRF 16 (5 sole), NFIR 12; 2007: AIRF 16 (4 sole), NFIR 9	zones recognised	2013	R	

organisation	measure	value	unit	year	side	notes
Coal India / Ministry of Coal	coal_JBCCI_XII_status	not constituted	status as of 23 Sep 2026	2026		NCWA-XI expired 30 Jun 2026. BMS held gate meetings/conventions demanding JBCCI-XII (Industrial Punch, Hitavada Aug
Department of Posts	postal_membership_verification_status	in progress (online MVS)	status	2026		Applications were due 31 Aug 2026, with constitution amendments extended to 26 Oct 2026. Results are not yet out. AIPEU
BPEF	postal_referendum_share	<5	% votes in 2014 referendum (per NFPE)	2014	H	Rival-union claim. Unverified.

Measure 4. Farmer fronts: claimed members, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh vs the Kisan Sabha and farm-workers' union

Reading **15.2%**

Bharatiya Kisan Sangh 15 vs AIKS and AIAWU (CPI(M)) 85

Figure 15.12. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (members)




Figure 15.13. The 3 biggest of 3 (members)




Table 15.5. Farmer fronts (facts without a number)
18 rows

organisation	measure	value	unit	year	side	notes
Bharatiya Kisan Sangh	claimed_membership	quarter of a million; 11,000 villages; 301 districts	members	2000	H	RSS claim c.2000. [carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS)	leadership	K. Sai Reddy (president); Mohini Mohan Mishra (general secretary)	names	2025	H	Elected at the Palanpur adhiveshan in Feb 2025
Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS)	stance	Opposed GM mustard (DMH-11) approval; demanded revocation	stance	2022	H	Evidence that BKS is not a simple echo of the government. It has also opposed the 2020 farm bills in parts and Modi's
Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS)	stance	Welcomed the India-US interim trade framework with caveats; 'not comfortable' with GM soybean oil and GM-corn feed	stance	2026	H	Snippets only (paywall/403). Quote from Mohini Mohan Mishra. BKS did NOT join the 12 Feb 2026 strike. Business Standard
Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS)	stance	Red-flagged draft Seeds Bill 2025; identified 20 contentious points to send to the government	stance	2026	H	Criticised the bill through internal and lobbying channels, not through street protest
Samyukt Kisan Morcha (SKM)	leadership	Presidium: Ashok Dhawale (AIKS-CPI(M)); Joginder Singh Ugrahan (BKU Ugrahan); Rakesh Tikait (BKU); Rajan Kshirsagar	names	2026	R	Shows that leaders from the two communist parties sit with BKU factions
Samyukt Kisan Morcha (SKM) + central trade unions	protest_episode	nationwide district/state protests; Delhi action	protest	2025	R	26 Nov 2025: against the four labour codes and the Electricity (Amendment) Bill 2025, and for loan waiver. No
Samyukt Kisan Morcha (SKM)	protest_episode	Delhi protest vs FTAs incl. India-US; convoys stopped at Haryana border	protest	2026	R	21 Jul 2026, with Desh Bachao Morcha and BKU (Shaheed Bhagat Singh). No crowd figure. Memorandum to the President
Samyukt Kisan Morcha (SKM) + CTUs + AIAWU	protest_episode	hundreds of thousands	marchers	2026	R	10 Aug 2026 multi-state protests against the India-US deal. Left-leaning outlet; no figure is attributed to anyone
Samyukt Kisan Morcha (SKM)	protest_episode	Nationwide calls: district protests 23 Oct 2026; Delhi + nationwide 26 Nov 2026	planned protest	2026	R	Demands: legal MSP at C2+50%, against FTAs, Seed Bill 2025, electricity privatisation, labour codes, MGNREGA restoration
All India Kisan Sabha (Ajoy Bhavan)	leadership	Rajan Kshirsagar (president); R. Venkaiah (general secretary)	names	2026	R	No membership figure found. Atul Kumar Anjan was general secretary 1997-2024. Kshirsagar is on the SKM presidium
Bharatiya Khet Mazdoor Union (BKMU)	affiliation	CPI agricultural workers' wing	affiliation		R	No membership figure found. Founded in Moga in 1968
Bharatiya Kisan Union (Tikait)	leadership	Naresh Tikait (national president); Rakesh Tikait (spokesperson, SKM presidium)	names	2026	R	No membership figure found. A 2022 split created BKU (Arajnaitik) under Rajesh Chauhan
All India Kisan Congress	leadership	Sukhpal Singh Khaira (chairman since Jul 2022)	names	2022	R	No membership figure found. Bajrang Punia is working chairman (INC Sandesh, Oct 2024)
SKM (Non-Political) Tamil Nadu	leadership	P.R. Pandian (TN coordinator, SKM-NP); P. Ayyakannu (SKM TN unit president)	names	2025	R	Rail roko in Mar 2025; 20 arrested including Ayyakannu. Tamil Nadu farmer associations tie into the SKM factions
Shetkari Sanghatana (Sharad Joshi) - Anil Ghanwat faction	stance	Supported the three farm laws; Ghanwat sat on the SC-appointed committee; called repeal 'unfortunate'	stance	2021	S	Pro-market Joshi tradition. Swing camp. No membership figure. The Raghunathdada Patil faction's party links (reportedly

organisation	measure	value	unit	year	side	notes
Rayat Kranti Sanghatana	leadership	Sadabhau Khot (founder-president), BJP MLC Maharashtra	names	2025	S	Leader holds BJP office, so arguably H rather than S; flagged. Former Swabhimani number two; minister of state for
Bharatiya Kisan Union (Charuni)	protest_episode	Protest in Kaithal against the India-US trade deal	protest	2026	R	Effigy burning on 4 Jun 2026. Snippet only. .

Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Table 15.6. Strikes and bandhs (facts without a number)

12 rows

organisation	measure	value	unit	year	side	notes
General strike 26 Nov 2020	strike_reach	Complete shutdown: Kerala, Puducherry, Odisha, Assam, Telangana; TN 13 of 38 districts	states	2020		Sectors: banks, transport, steel, ports, telecom, power, mining, oil. [carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
General strike 28-29 Mar 2022	strike_reach	Banking hit; rail/road blockades in WB, Odisha, Kerala; limited elsewhere	text	2022		Search snippet only; no independent participant estimate found. [carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
Industrial strike + Grameen Bharat Bandh 16 Feb 2024	strike_participants	"lakhs"; 600+ districts	participants	2024		No crore figure claimed. "Almost a bandh" in Punjab (claim). Sectoral strike (coal, road transport, NMDC, BHEL), not
General strike 9 Jul 2025	strike_reach	Complete shutdown Kerala; Delhi and Mumbai largely unaffected; clashes/lathicharge in WB	text	2025		WB govt arranged to keep normal life. [carried from research9/blindspots/unions.csv]
General strike 12 Feb 2026	strike_reach	Kerala shut; TN, Odisha, WB joined; mixed in Karnataka; BMS said workers rejected bandh	text	2026		Search snippets only (403). Another snippet lists complete shutdowns in Kerala, Puducherry, Odisha, Assam, Telangana -
BMS	strike_stance	Will not participate in 12 Feb 2026 strike ("political motives")	text	2026	H	BMS welcomes Wage and Social Security Codes; objects to parts of IR and OSH codes. [carried from
NOBW; NOBO	bank_UFBU_exit	exited UFBU 6 Aug 2026	event	2026	H	UFBU went from 9 to 7 constituents. NOBW/NOBO reps were removed from the UFBU coordination group on 1 Aug 2026
BMS	general_strike_2026_02_12_BMS	did not participate	position	2026	H	BMS called the strike politically motivated and cited assurances from Labour Minister meetings on 13 and 21 Nov 2025.
CTU joint platform + independent federations	nationwide_action_2026_05_12	'hundreds of thousands' (report)	workers on streets	2026	R	'National Demands Day', 12 May 2026: demonstrations and dharnas, not a strike. Held in solidarity with NCR
Coal India	coal_strike_output_independent	output down ~56%; attendance 30%	official estimate on strike day	2020		466,000 t produced vs 1.05 Mt business-as-usual. This is likely the 2 Jul 2020 coal strike against commercial mining,
BMS	BMS_protest_2026	nationwide Protest Day 25 Feb 2026; demonstrations 17 Aug 2026	events	2026	H	BMS says it is 'strongly opposing the IR Code and the OSH&WC Code, which contain many anti-worker provisions' and
BMS	BMS_labour_codes_position	welcomed implementation (21 Nov 2025) with reservations on IR & OSH codes	position	2025	H	BMS called the codes a 'significant milestone' (Wage & SS codes). NFITU also welcomed them (AIR). The 10 CTUs protested

Figure 15.14. Co-operatives: who controls the largest co-ops and co-op banks, by size (elected boards)



Figure 15.15. Union members: BMS share of verified central trade-union membership



Figure 15.16. Shop floor: union recognition polls and bargaining seats in railways, coal, steel and transport



Figure 15.17. Farmer fronts: claimed members, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh vs the Kisan Sabha and farm-workers' union



15.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 235 coded units. Of the units and flows, 56 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 145 opposed and 34 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 66 grade A, 117 grade B, 52 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. MoLE CTUO verification 2002 (via ILO); Railway Board and press on the Dec 2024 recognition ballot; JBCCI-XI; PIB/NCD; RBI 2024-25; co-op annual reports; union and front statements (atlas/research10/unions_coops_farmers/).
2. Half turnover of the largest trading co-ops (IFFCO, Amul, NAFED, NCCF vs KRIBHCO, Nandini, Gokul, Milma: 78.6), half deposits of the state and largest urban co-op banks (14.3). Boards run by a government appointee and NDA allies are left out..
3. Ministry of Labour verification as of 31 Dec 2002 (results 2008), the last one completed: BMS 62.2 lakh of 2.49 crore. The 2011 round was never completed; its claims are not used..
4. Weighted by electorate: railways Dec 2024 secret ballot (BRMS 10.1% of votes), coal wage board JBCCI-XI (BMS 4 of 18 seats), SAIL plant polls 2024-26, Kerala KSRTC 2020..
5. All claims: BKS 42 lakh (2025-26), AIKS 1.58 crore (2026), AIAWU 75.6 lakh (2023). BKU factions, SKM (NP) and KMM publish no numbers, so the opposing side is understated..

PART V

Knowledge and Expertise

This part measures the production of ideas and expertise: universities and think tanks, the experts whom courts, Parliament and government cite, and the schools, textbooks and preparation industry through which the next administrative and professional elite is formed. It changes slowly in both directions.

The domain reads **16.2**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



16	Universities and Think Tanks
17	Expert Authority within the State
18	Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation

Chapter 16

Universities and Think Tanks

Arena 4.1 · weight 3 · reading **15.7** · opposed majority

16.1 Scope

Who produces ideas and trains the elite.[1]

The arena is measured by think tanks by citation reach, vice-chancellors of 147 universities, academics' open letters, research-council leadership, council grants, publishers, and foreign chairs and programmes.

Principal evidence: Think tanks and social-science institutes (28 Left, 13 Right) by court citations, Wikipedia links and news mentions (M7).

16.2 Significance

Textbooks, court briefs, policy papers, foreign-media sources, the worldview of future officers.

16.3 Indicators and weights

Table 16.1 lists the 7 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 16.1. Indicators of arena 4.1


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Think-tank citation reach (courts, Parliament, news, Wikipedia, OpenAlex)	0.30	7.0
Vice-chancellors (147 universities)	0.25	8.8
Academics' open letters (signatories)	0.15	10.0
Research-council leadership appointed 2014-26[2]	0.15	26.6
Council grants on agenda themes[3]	0.05	6.5
Publishers and journals (revenue)	0.05	37.6
Endowed chairs and foreign South Asia programmes (₹ a year; endowments at a 5% payout)[4]	0.05	73.3
Arena reading	**1.00**	**15.7**

16.4 Reading

The arena reads **15.7**, 34.3 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.44 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for endowed chairs and foreign South Asia programmes (₹ a year; endowments at a 5% payout) (73.3), the lowest for council grants on agenda themes (6.5).

Figure 16.1. Readings of arena 4.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

16.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Think-tank citation reach (courts, Parliament, news, Wikipedia, OpenAlex)

Reading **7.0%**

Figure 16.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (index points (all think tanks = 100))




Figure 16.3. The 15 biggest of 70 (index points (all think tanks = 100))




Figure 16.4. Think tanks by reach: news articles 2017-26 + Wikipedia pages linking to them

GDELT and Wikipedia counts (Atlas M7).




Figure 16.5. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)




Figure 16.6. The 15 biggest of 31 (₹ crore a year)





Figure 16.7. Over time: think tank income (Observer Research Foundation, Centre for Policy Research, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation and 3 more) (₹ crore)



Measure 2. Vice-chancellors (147 universities)

Reading **8.8%**

Figure 16.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (university (VC post))





Figure 16.9. The 15 biggest of 147 (university (VC post))



Measure 3. Academics' open letters (signatories)

Reading **10.0%**

Figure 16.10. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (signatories)




Figure 16.11. The 15 biggest of 31 (signatories)




Figure 16.12. Academics' open letters by year

36 letters 2015-26 (research round 7).




Figure 16.13. Over time: academic open letters · letters





Figure 16.14. Over time: academic open letters · signatories



Measure 4. Research-council leadership appointed 2014-26

Reading **26.6%**

17 of 64 posts with a documented Sangh link; the 16 IGNCA trustees counted one by one (owner, round 2 D6); Ram Bahadur Rai and Santishree Pandit recoded; the NMML "removed members" row is not a post

Figure 16.15. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of posts)





Figure 16.16. The 15 biggest of 114 (number of posts)



Measure 5. Council grants on agenda themes

Reading **6.5%**

ICSSR 5.6%, ICHR 36.4%, money-weighted (ICSSR 2018-25, ICHR 2013-24)

Figure 16.17. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 16.18. The 15 biggest of 27 (₹ crore)




Figure 16.19. Over time: ICHR grant money, all themes, ICHR grant money, government-agenda themes, ICSSR grant money, all themes and 1 more · ₹ crore





Figure 16.20. Over time: ICHR agenda-theme share of grant money, ICSSR agenda-theme share of grant money · %




Measure 6. Publishers and journals (revenue)

Reading **37.6%**

Figure 16.21. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 16.22. The 15 biggest of 17 (₹ crore)



Measure 7. Endowed chairs and foreign South Asia programmes (₹ a year; endowments at a 5% payout)

Reading **73.3%**

One-off endowments and gifts counted at a 5% yearly payout, yearly budgets as they are (owner, round 2 D1; audit DATA14-017)

Figure 16.23. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)





Figure 16.24. The 15 biggest of 50 (₹ crore a year)



16.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 701 coded units and 160 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 110 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 489 opposed

and 102 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 251 grade A, 46 grade B, 187 grade C, 75 grade D, 140 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Atlas M7; NIRF; letters.
2. 17 of 64 posts with a documented Sangh link; the 16 IGNCA trustees counted one by one (owner, round 2 D6); Ram Bahadur Rai and Santishree Pandit recoded; the NMML "removed members" row is not a post.
3. ICSSR 5.6%, ICHR 36.4%, money-weighted (ICSSR 2018-25, ICHR 2013-24).
4. One-off endowments and gifts counted at a 5% yearly payout, yearly budgets as they are (owner, round 2 D1; audit DATA14-017).

Chapter 17

Expert Authority within the State

Arena 4.2 · weight 3 · reading **7.2** · opposed majority

17.1 Scope

Whose experts the State believes.[1]

The arena is measured by who courts, Parliament and the government cite as experts (venue-weighted), the latest trend, and the State's own expert bodies.

Principal evidence: Who courts, Parliament and government reports cite as experts (1,729 citation records, M7). Government-given awards excluded (they are government-derived).

17.2 Significance

Judgments, committee reports, policy design.

17.3 Indicators and weights

Table 17.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 17.1. Indicators of arena 4.2


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Named expert actors, venue-weighted citations[2]	0.60	8.7
Recent trend: 2023-26 citations[3]	0.20	7.0
State expert bodies with a Hindutva-agenda mandate (budget share)[4]	0.20	3.0

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Arena reading	**1.00**	**7.2**

17.4 Reading

The arena reads **7.2**, 42.8 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.20 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 17.1. Readings of arena 4.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

17.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Named expert actors, venue-weighted citations

Reading **8.7%**

Supreme Court landmark ×5, SC ×3, HC and Parliament ×2, Economic Survey ×1; noise stripped (expert_units.csv)

Figure 17.2. Think tanks and institutes cited by courts and Parliament (judgments + Parliament documents)

Counts from Indian Kanoon and Sansad e-library (Atlas M7). Grey = coded mixed or contested.




Figure 17.3. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (venue-weighted citations 2014-26 (SC landmark...)





Figure 17.4. The 15 biggest of 193 (venue-weighted citations 2014-26 (SC landmark...)



Measure 2. Recent trend: 2023-26 citations

Reading **7.0%**

expert_series.csv

Figure 17.5. Over time: named expert actors cited, venue-weighted · weighted citations





Figure 17.6. Over time: H share of named expert-actor citations) · %



Measure 3. State expert bodies with a Hindutva-agenda mandate (budget share)


Reading **3.0%**

expert_units.csv, expert_body

Figure 17.7. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 17.8. The 15 biggest of 22 (₹ crore)



17.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 234 coded units and 15 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 13 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 54 opposed and 167 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 229 grade A, 3 grade B, 1 grade C, 1 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Atlas M7.
2. Supreme Court landmark ×5, SC ×3, HC and Parliament ×2, Economic Survey ×1; noise stripped (expert_units.csv).
3. expert_series.csv.
4. expert_units.csv, expert_body.

Chapter 18

Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation

Arena 4.3 · weight 1 · reading **44.7** · opposed majority

18.1 Scope

Who shapes children.[1]

The arena is measured by pupils in ideological school networks, elite schools by management, NCERT and state textbook changes, UPSC coaching content and Sainik-school allotments.

18.2 Significance

The values of the next generation and the elite pipeline.

18.3 Indicators and weights

Table 18.1 lists the 5 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 18.1. Indicators of arena 4.3

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Pupils in ideological school networks	0.35	41.2
Elite schools by management	0.25	28.8
Textbook changes 2014-26 (NCERT and states)	0.20	82.9
UPSC coaching influence (audited items and booklists)[2]	0.15	22.6
Sainik-school PPP allotments	0.05	62.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Arena reading	1.00	44.7

18.4 Reading

The arena reads **44.7**, 5.3 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.42 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for textbook changes 2014-26 (NCERT and states) (82.9), the lowest for UPSC coaching influence (audited items and booklists) (22.6).

Figure 18.1. Readings of arena 4.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

18.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Pupils in ideological school networks

Reading **41.2%**

Figure 18.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (pupils)



Figure 18.3. The 15 biggest of 20 (pupils)





Figure 18.4. Pupils in ideological school networks, millions

Latest reported year per network (Atlas M7).



Measure 2. Elite schools by management

Reading **28.8%**

Figure 18.5. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (school (EWISR ranked))





Figure 18.6. The 15 biggest of 191 (school (EWISR ranked))



Measure 3. Textbook changes 2014-26 (NCERT and states)

Reading **82.9%**

Figure 18.7. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (coded change)




Figure 18.8. The 15 biggest of 261 (coded change)



Measure 4. UPSC coaching influence (audited items and booklists)

Reading **22.6%**

Mean of audit 45.2 (14 H vs 17 R items) and booklist canon 0.0; 7 items with no critical content recoded neutral (owner, round 2 D7)

Figure 18.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (audited item)




Figure 18.10. The 15 biggest of 108 (audited item)




Figure 18.11. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)




Figure 18.12. The 9 biggest of 9 (₹ crore)




Figure 18.13. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (provider booklist pages listing it (of 17))





Figure 18.14. The 10 biggest of 10 (provider booklist pages listing it (of 17))



18.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 649 coded units. Of the units and flows, 173 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 118 opposed and 358 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 158 grade A, 47 grade B, 343 grade C, 52 grade D, 48 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. Atlas M7; UDISE+; EWISR 2025-26.
2. Mean of audit 45.2 (14 H vs 17 R items) and booklist canon 0.0; 7 items with no critical content recoded neutral (owner, round 2 D7).

PART VI

Media and Narrative

This part measures what the public sees, hears and trusts: television news, newspapers, digital platforms, cinema and streaming, celebrities and influencers, and interpersonal political talk. Each arena is weighted by audience, so that a channel watched by millions counts for more than one watched by thousands.

The domain reads **42.6**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



19 Television News

20 Interpersonal Political Communication

21 Digital Platforms

22 Newspapers and the Elite Press

23 Celebrities and Influencers

24 Cinema and Streaming

Chapter 19

Television News

Arena 5.1 · weight 3 · reading **58.2** · contested

19.1 Scope

What TV news shows, weighted by who watches.[1]

The arena is measured by National Hindi and English news channels and regional channels in every major language: 91 channels, each coded on its own headlines and weighted by audience, plus the YouTube audience of the same newsrooms (149 TV-brand channels).

19.2 Significance

The daily agenda of about 745m weekly TV viewers (all TV, BARC 2025; news is about 7% of viewing time); framing of crises and elections.

19.3 Indicators and weights

Table 19.1 lists the 2 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 19.1. Indicators of arena 5.1


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Broadcast audience by side, weighted by language (91 channels)	0.75	55.0
TV news brands on YouTube (149 channels, 12-month views)	0.25	67.8
Arena reading	**1.00**	**58.2**

19.4 Reading

The arena reads **58.2**, 8.2 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.62 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for TV news brands on YouTube (149 channels, 12-month views) (67.8), the lowest for broadcast audience by side, weighted by language (91 channels) (55.0).

Figure 19.1. Readings of arena 5.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

19.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Broadcast audience by side, weighted by language (91 channels)

Reading **55.0%**

Each language's Hindutva share of audience (91 channels), weighted by its share of TV-news viewing (BARC 2025 average-minute audience, via FICCI-EY 2026): regional 59.7%, Hindi 39.8%, English 0.5%.

Figure 19.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (weekly reach, thousands)





Figure 19.3. The 15 biggest of 103 (weekly reach, thousands)



Measure 2. TV news brands on YouTube (149 channels, 12-month views)

Reading **67.8%**

Figure 19.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million views, 12 months)





Figure 19.5. The 15 biggest of 149 (million views, 12 months)



19.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 105 coded units. Of the units and flows, 31 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 29 opposed and 45 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 21 grade C, 9 grade D, 75 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. BARC 2025; Atlas M6 audit.

Chapter 20

Interpersonal Political Communication

Arena 5.2 · weight 3 · reading **53.7** · contested

20.1 Scope

The political talk people trust most.[1]

The arena is measured by trusted political talk by channel: family, street and workplace, temple and congregation (explicitly political content only) and WhatsApp forwards.

Principal evidence: Trust-weighted hours of political content from all channels: temples, family, TV, street, phones (M5).

20.2 Significance

Turns what people hear into belief; WhatsApp forwards; rumour and reassurance.

20.3 Indicators and weights

Table 20.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 20.1. Indicators of arena 5.2

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Family talk[2]	0.33	52.7
Street and workplace talk[3]	0.17	52.7


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Temple and congregation (explicitly political content only)[4]	0.46	74.2
WhatsApp forwards[5]	0.04	65.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**53.7**

20.4 Reading

The arena reads **53.7**, 3.7 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.50 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for temple and congregation (explicitly political content only) (74.2), the lowest for family talk (52.7).

Figure 20.1. Readings of arena 5.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

20.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Family talk

Reading **52.7%**

Trust-hours 984m/week; lean imputed from the M5 generic talk vector (52.7) until the NES discussion-network item is pulled

Figure 20.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week)





Figure 20.3. The 6 biggest of 6 (million trusted person-hours a week)



Measure 2. Street and workplace talk

Reading **52.7%**

Trust-hours 510m/week

Figure 20.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week)





Figure 20.5. The 15 biggest of 23 (million trusted person-hours a week)



Measure 3. Temple and congregation (explicitly political content only)

Reading **74.2%**

Trust-hours 1,400m/week

Figure 20.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week)





Figure 20.7. The 14 biggest of 14 (million trusted person-hours a week)



Measure 4. WhatsApp forwards

Reading **65.2%**

Trust-hours 131m/week

Figure 20.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million trusted person-hours a week)






Figure 20.9. The 12 biggest of 12 (million trusted person-hours a week)




Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 20.10. The 22 channels with the most trusted exposure: lean of their political content

Reach × hours × trust per channel, all segments of the population (Atlas M5). Neutral and state content are left out of each bar.





20.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 696 coded units. Of the units and flows, 232 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 232 opposed and 232 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 30 grade A, 63 grade B, 561 grade C, 42 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Atlas M5.
2. Trust-hours 984m/week; lean imputed from the M5 generic talk vector (52.7) until the NES discussion-network item is pulled.
3. Trust-hours 510m/week.
4. Trust-hours 1,400m/week.
5. Trust-hours 131m/week.

Chapter 21

Digital Platforms

Arena 5.3 · weight 3 · reading **29.3** · opposed majority

21.1 Scope

The online battlefield.[1]

The arena is measured by views first: 12-month views of 324 independent YouTube channels and reel views of 220 Instagram accounts (about 50 crore Indians use Instagram) carry two thirds of the weight; how search and AI-answer platforms frame contested India questions; followers on YouTube, Instagram and X count for less.

21.2 Significance

Youth opinion, trends, mobilisation, TV pick-up.

21.3 Indicators and weights

Table 21.1 lists the 7 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 21.1. Indicators of arena 5.3

Indicator	Weight	Reading
YouTube long-form recent-video views (proxy; 324 independent channels; TV brands counted in TV news)	0.37	22.1
Instagram reel views (mean views per recent reel × accounts; 220 accounts (262 audited; TV-brand and government handles excluded))[2]	0.31	36.2


Indicator	Weight	Reading
AI assistants (5 models: 4 Claude, gpt-oss-20b; 205 answers on contested India questions)[3]	0.14	17.3
YouTube subscribers (324 independent channels; TV brands counted in TV news)[4]	0.06	27.1
Instagram followers (same 220 accounts)	0.06	60.3
X followers (193 accounts; TV-brand and government handles excluded)[5]	0.06	57.4
Followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh (X and Instagram)[6]	0.11	14.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**29.3**

21.4 Reading

The arena reads **29.3**, 20.7 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.81 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Instagram followers (same 220 accounts) (60.3), the lowest for followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh (X and Instagram) (14.0).

Figure 21.1. Readings of arena 5.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

21.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. YouTube long-form recent-video views (proxy; 324 independent channels; TV brands counted in TV news)

Reading **22.1%**

Figure 21.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million views, 12 months)





Figure 21.3. The 15 biggest of 300 (million views, 12 months)



Measure 2. Instagram reel views (mean views per recent reel × accounts; 220 accounts (262 audited; TV-brand and government handles excluded))

Reading **36.2%**

Reel views read from public reel embeds, 3-4 recent reels per account (S7 instagram_units.csv, reels_views_m)

Figure 21.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)





Figure 21.5. The 15 biggest of 220 (million followers)



Measure 3. AI assistants (5 models: 4 Claude, gpt-oss-20b; 205 answers on contested India questions)

Reading **17.3%**

Google search and Wikipedia ranking on the same questions are NOT YET MEASURED; AI answers stand in for the search layer until they are

Figure 21.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of answers)





Figure 21.7. The 15 biggest of 205 (number of answers)



Measure 4. YouTube subscribers (324 independent channels; TV brands counted in TV news)

Reading **27.1%**

subs_m in digital_units.csv notes; non-news channels only, as the views component, so the TV brands are not counted twice (owner, round 2 D12; audit D57-014; all 473 channels read 53.5)

Measure 6. X followers (193 accounts; TV-brand and government handles excluded)

Reading **57.4%**

News-channel handles left out as on Instagram (owner, round 2 D13; audit D57-038): H 395.2m vs R 292.9m; with them 56.6

Figure 21.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)




Figure 21.9. The 15 biggest of 193 (million followers)




Figure 21.10. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)





Figure 21.11. The 15 biggest of 222 (million followers)



Measure 7. Followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh (X and Instagram)

Reading **14.0%**

Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Direct: it lifts these accounts' reach. The analysis (Instagram reel) ↗

Figure 21.12. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)





Figure 21.13. The 15 biggest of 413 (million followers)



Measure 8. Google News: who ranks for contested India searches (600 results, English and Hindi)

Reading **33.4%**

Hindutva-leaning 33 vs Hostile or unclassified 67

Measure 9. Wikipedia: how 30 contested India pages are framed, by pageviews

Reading **11.5%**

Hindutva-framed 12 vs Hostile-framed 89

Measure 10. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 21.14. Google News: who ranks for contested India searches (600 results, English and Hindi)





Figure 21.15. Wikipedia: how 30 contested India pages are framed, by pageviews



21.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 1,162 coded units. Of the units and flows, 331 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 546 opposed and 285 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 205 grade A, 957 grade B.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. YouTube, X platform counts 30 Oct 2026.
2. Reel views read from public reel embeds, 3-4 recent reels per account (S7 instagram_units.csv, reels_views_m).
3. Google search and Wikipedia ranking on the same questions are NOT YET MEASURED; AI answers stand in for the search layer until they are.
4. subs_m in digital_units.csv notes; non-news channels only, as the views component, so the TV brands are not counted twice (owner, round 2 D12; audit D57-014; all 473 channels read 53.5).
5. News-channel handles left out as on Instagram (owner, round 2 D13; audit D57-038): H 395.2m vs R 292.9m; with them 56.6.
6. Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Direct: it lifts these accounts' reach..

Chapter 22

Newspapers and the Elite Press

Arena 5.4 · weight 3 · reading **21.7** · opposed majority

22.1 Scope

What newspapers print, weighted by readership.[1]

The arena is measured by readership of every major paper by side, English papers (the elite agenda) separately, and elite credibility: trust among English-reading Indians, elite reach and the investigations that forced the State to act (such as the Indian Express SIR story).

22.2 Significance

The elite agenda: judges, officials and diplomats read English papers; Hindi papers reach the heartland.

22.3 Indicators and weights

Table 22.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 22.1. Indicators of arena 5.4


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Readership: all papers by average issue readership	0.35	24.8
Readership: English papers (the elite agenda)	0.15	3.3
Elite credibility: brand trust, elite reach and impact investigations (45 outlets)	0.50	25.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**21.7**

22.4 Reading

The arena reads **21.7**, 28.3 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.60 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for elite credibility: brand trust, elite reach and impact investigations (45 outlets) (25.0), the lowest for readership: English papers (the elite agenda) (3.3).

Figure 22.1. Readings of arena 5.4 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

22.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Readership: all papers by average issue readership

Reading **24.8%**

Figure 22.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (readers, thousands)





Figure 22.3. The 15 biggest of 82 (readers, thousands)




Measure 2. Readership: English papers (the elite agenda)

Reading **3.3%**

Figure 22.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (readers, thousands)



Figure 22.5. The 15 biggest of 18 (readers, thousands)



Measure 3. Elite credibility: brand trust, elite reach and impact investigations (45 outlets)

Reading **25.0%**

Figure 22.6. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 45 (elite credibility score 0-100 (0.45 trust +...)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Table 22.2. Impact stories
25 rows

outlet	date	story	consequence	grade	side_strengthened	outlet_side	notes
The Indian Express	2026-09-23	SIR: '14 times in 10 months, two Election Commissioners objected on record' (Ritika Chopra). ECs Sandhu and Joshi	ECI denied on day 1, then on 26 Sep 2026 adopted mandatory full-commission meetings for new initiatives and IT modules,	C	R	R	Verified via Wikipedia (archived IE URL 23 Sep 2026), Daily Pioneer and The Federal (EC denial). Forced an
The Indian Express	2024-03-15	Electoral bonds: the bond data decoded (donors vs ED/IT/CBI action, top donor Future Gaming; firms donating after raids)	Became the opposition's 'extortion' campaign plank in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls; SC (18 Mar 2024) ordered SBI to	C	R	R	Series ran with The Reporters' Collective/Newslaundry/Scroll matching data; scheme had already been struck down on 15
The Indian Express	2016-04-04	Panama Papers, India (with ICIJ): 500+ Indians with offshore entities	Government formed the Multi-Agency Group (CBDT, ED, RBI, FIU) the same week; govt later told Parliament that ~Rs 20,000	C	N	R	Named people across camps; strengthened the State's black-money drive rather than either camp
The Indian Express	2017-11-05	Paradise Papers, India: Union minister Jayant Sinha (Omidyar link) and BJP MP R.K. Sinha among 714 Indians named	CBDT probe via the MAG; no action against the ministers; Jayant Sinha issued explanations	C	R	R	
The Indian Express	2021-10-03	Pandora Papers, India: 380 Indians including Sachin Tendulkar, Anil Ambani, Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw's spouse	CBDT announced a multi-agency probe the next day	C	N	R	
The Indian Express	2019-05-04	Ashok Lavasa's dissent: Election Commissioner objected to clean chits for PM Modi and Amit Shah on Model Code complaints	EC refused to record dissent in orders; Lavasa recused from MCC meetings; IT notices to Lavasa's family followed	C	R	R	The 2019 precursor of the 2026 SIR dissent story (same reporter)

outlet	date	story	consequence	grade	side_strengthened	outlet_side	notes
The Indian Express	2020-09-14	China Watching: Zhenhua Data, a Chinese firm linked to the state, monitoring 10,000+ Indians including the PM, CJI and	Government set up an expert committee under the National Cyber Security Coordinator; MEA raised it with China	C	N	R	National-security story; did not favour either camp
The Hindu	2019-02-08	Rafale: Ministry of Defence dissent note objecting to PMO 'parallel negotiations' (N. Ram)	Disrupted the Budget session; on 10 Apr 2019 the SC admitted the leaked documents in the review petition and rejected	C	R	R	Government told the SC the documents were 'stolen' and threatened the Official Secrets Act
The Wire (with Forbidden Stories and 16 partners)	2021-07-18	Pegasus Project: 300+ verified Indian numbers on a potential spyware target list (opposition leaders, journalists, a SC	Monsoon session of Parliament washed out; SC appointed the Justice R.V. Raveendran technical committee (27 Oct 2021),	C	R	R	
The Wire	2017-10-08	'The Golden Touch of Jay Amit Shah' (turnover of Jay Shah's firm)	Rs 100 crore civil and criminal defamation suits by Jay Shah; gag order from an Ahmedabad court; no regulatory action	C	R	R	Litigation rather than accountability
The Wire	2022-10-06	Meta 'XCheck' stories alleging special takedown privileges for BJP IT cell head Amit Malviya	Stories retracted on 23 Oct 2022 after experts and outlets (incl. OpIndia) exposed fabricated evidence; Delhi Police	C	H	R	Negative case: a credibility loss for an R outlet, which strengthened H
OpIndia	2022-10-11	Exposure of the forged evidence behind The Wire's Meta stories	Contributed to The Wire's retraction and apology	D	H	H	Credited jointly with independent researchers; partisan source

outlet	date	story	consequence	grade	side_strengthened	outlet_side	notes
The Caravan	2017-11-20	Questions over Judge B.H. Loya's death (he was hearing the Sohrabuddin case against Amit Shah)	PILs in the SC; dismissed in Apr 2018 (Tehseen Poonawalla v. UoI), with the SC calling them an attack on judicial	C	R	R	No institutional action; R-side narrative that endures
The Caravan	2019-01-16	'The D Companies': NSA Ajit Doval's son Vivek Doval's offshore hedge fund	Criminal defamation case by Vivek Doval; Jairam Ramesh apologised in Dec 2020; case against The Caravan continued	C	R	R	
The Reporters' Collective / HuffPost India (Nitin Sethi)	2019-11-18	Electoral bonds: RBI and EC objections overruled; PMO-cleared special sale windows	Cited in parliamentary debate and in petitions; SC struck the scheme down on 15 Feb 2024 (ADR v. Union of India)	C	R	R	
The Quint	2018-04-12	Lab test shows hidden alphanumeric serial numbers in electoral bonds (visible under UV light)	Finance Ministry admitted it was a 'security feature'; the numbers became the key to SBI's 2024 court-ordered matching	C	R	R	
The Reporters' Collective with Al Jazeera	2022-03-14	Facebook charged the BJP less for election ads; ghost advertisers	Sonia Gandhi raised it in Lok Sabha Zero Hour (16 Mar 2022); no regulatory action	C	R	R	
Dainik Bhaskar	2021-05-15	COVID second wave: death undercount (Gujarat death registrations) and bodies along the Ganga	Income Tax raids on the Bhaskar group across 30+ locations (22 Jul 2021); Bhaskar's Gujarat death-registration data was	C	R	R	Hindi-belt paper with an R-tagged content audit (research7); retaliatory State action is itself a credibility signal

outlet	date	story	consequence	grade	side_strengthened	outlet_side	notes
The Tribune	2018-01-03	Aadhaar data for sale: access to the UIDAI database for Rs 500 (Rachna Khaira)	UIDAI filed an FIR naming the reporter, then introduced Virtual ID and limited KYC within weeks; cited in the SC's	C	R	R	
Scroll	2020-06-05	Hunger in PM Modi's adopted village Domari during the lockdown (Supriya Sharma)	UP Police FIR under SC/ST Act and IPC against the executive editor; Allahabad HC refused to quash but protected her	C	R	R	
Economic and Political Weekly	2017-06-14	Adani Group: Rs 500 crore SEZ customs-duty benefit (Paranjoy Guha Thakurta)	Adani legal notice; the Sameeksha Trust ordered the articles taken down; the editor resigned (Jul 2017); The Wire	C	R	R	Suppression case
Hindustan Times	2017-07-01	HT 'Hate Tracker' database of hate crimes	Tracker taken offline after editor Bobby Ghosh's exit (Sep 2017), following a reported PM meeting with the proprietor	C	H	R	Suppression case: the R-side data product ended; Hindutva's agenda gained
Hindenburg Research (foreign)	2023-01-24	'Adani Group: the largest con in corporate history' (short-seller report)	Adani FPO withdrawn; ~US$100bn+ market cap loss; SC appointed an expert committee (Mar 2023) and directed SEBI's probe;	C	R	R	Foreign; listed for the Adani thread only
OCCRP with The Guardian and the Financial Times (foreign)	2023-08-31	Adani: hidden investors (Chang Chung-Ling, Nasser Ali Shaban Ahli) trading Adani shares	Opposition demanded a JPC; SEBI probe continued; the SC declined a fresh probe (Jan 2024)	C	R	R	Foreign
Panchjanya	2021-09-05	'Saakh aur Aaghat' cover story calling Infosys a possible tool of 'anti-national forces' over the income-tax portal	RSS distanced itself; industry backlash; no State action against Infosys	C	H	H	H-side agenda attempt that backfired

22.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 136 coded units. Of the units and flows, 16 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 85 opposed and 35 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 36 grade B, 78 grade C, 22 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. IRS; Atlas M6.

Chapter 23

Celebrities and Influencers

Arena 5.5 · weight 1 · reading **37.6** · opposed majority

23.1 Scope

Stars, comedians, sportspersons and lifestyle influencers.[1]

The arena is measured by documented public acts of stars, comedians, sportspersons and lifestyle influencers (including the 2026 NEET and CJP protests), weighted by strength and reach, and their followers.

23.2 Significance

Values and taste of audiences no party reaches; mobilisation in crises (farm protests, NEET).

23.3 Indicators and weights

Table 23.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 23.1. Indicators of arena 5.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Documented acts, strength-weighted (incl. NEET/CJP protests 2026)[2]	0.40	34.3
Acts weighted by the actor's followers[3]	0.30	48.6
Followers by net side	0.30	41.6
Followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh[4]	0.11	8.5
Arena reading	**1.00**	**37.6**

23.4 Reading

The arena reads **37.6**, 12.4 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.35 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for acts weighted by the actor's followers (48.6), the lowest for followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh (8.5).

Figure 23.1. Readings of arena 5.5 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

23.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Documented acts, strength-weighted (incl. NEET/CJP protests 2026)

Reading **34.3%**

influencers_acts.csv; user rulings applied (Priyanka Chopra, Alia Bhatt neutral; Elvish Yadav Hindutva; CarryMinati Opposed)

Table 23.2. Acts
287 rows

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
Virat Kohli	sportsperson	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02-03: #IndiaTogether post after Rihanna farm-protest tweet (conciliatory) [core]	2021	
Priyanka Chopra	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2014-10: accepted PM's Swachh Bharat nomination (one of nine original nominees) [govt]	2014	
Priyanka Chopra	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2020-12-07: tweet backing protesting farmers [core]	2020	
Alia Bhatt	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2024-01-22: attended Ram Mandir consecration, Ayodhya [core]	2024	
Alia Bhatt	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2019-12: shared Constitution preamble during anti-CAA/Jamia protests (ambiguous) [core]	2019	
Katrina Kaif	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2024-01-22: attended Ram Mandir consecration, Ayodhya [core]	2024	
Deepika Padukone	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2020-01-07: stood with JNU students after campus attack [core]	2020	
Salman Khan	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2014-10: accepted PM's Swachh Bharat nomination (original nine) [govt]	2014	
Anushka Sharma	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2017-05-30: face of Swachh Bharat 'Darwaza Band' govt sanitation ad campaign [govt]	2017	
Akshay Kumar	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2019-04-24: 'non-political' interview of PM Modi released during Lok Sabha campaign [core]	2019	
Akshay Kumar	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-01: donated to Ram Mandir construction fund and urged followers to join [core]	2021	
Akshay Kumar	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02-03: #IndiaTogether #IndiaAgainstPropaganda [core]	2021	
Sachin Tendulkar	sportsperson	carried-r7	1	act	H	2014-10: accepted PM's Swachh Bharat nomination [govt]	2014	
Sachin Tendulkar	sportsperson	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02-03: #IndiaTogether ('India's sovereignty cannot be compromised') [core]	2021	

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
Sachin Tendulkar	sportsperson	carried-r7	1	act	H	2024-01-22: attended Ram Mandir consecration, Ayodhya [core]	2024	
Shah Rukh Khan	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2015-11-02: 'extreme intolerance' remark [core]	2015	
Parineeti Chopra	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2019-12: called CAA discriminatory / backed Jamia students [core]	2019	
Madhuri Dixit	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2024-01-22: attended Ram Mandir consecration, Ayodhya [core]	2024	
Diljit Dosanjh	musician/film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2020-12-05: joined farmers at Singhu, asked govt to accept demands [core]	2020	
Aamir Khan	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2015-11-23: intolerance remark; dropped as Incredible India ambassador [core]	2015	
Swara Bhasker	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2019-12: anti-CAA rallies [core]	2019	
Swara Bhasker	film	carried-r7	1	act	R	2022-12: walked in Bharat Jodo Yatra [core]	2022	
Kangana Ranaut	film (BJP MP)	carried-r7	1	act	H	2019-07-26: signed letter of 62 vs 'selective outrage' [core]	2019	
Kangana Ranaut	film (BJP MP)	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02: attacked Rihanna/farm protest [core]	2021	
Kangana Ranaut	film (BJP MP)	carried-r7	1	act	H	2024-01-22: attended Ram Mandir consecration, Ayodhya [core]	2024	
Kangana Ranaut	film (BJP MP)	carried-r7	1	act	H	2024-06-04: elected BJP MP, Mandi [core]	2024	
Ajay Devgn	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02-03: #IndiaTogether vs 'false propaganda' [core]	2021	
Karan Johar	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02-03: #IndiaTogether post [core]	2021	
Suniel Shetty	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2021-02-03: #IndiaTogether [core]	2021	
Anupam Kher	film	carried-r7	1	act	H	2015-11: criticised Aamir intolerance remark; led 'March for India' counter-rally (Nov 2015) [core]	2015	

First 30 of 287 rows; all rows are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 2. Acts weighted by the actor's followers

Reading **48.6%**

influencers_acts.csv; same rulings


Measure 4. Followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh
Reading **8.5%**

Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Direct: it lifts these celebrities' and influencers' reach. The analysis (Instagram reel) ↗

Figure 23.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)



Figure 23.3. The 15 biggest of 134 (million followers)



23.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 283 coded units. Of the units and flows, 51 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 129 opposed and 103 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 68 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Platform counts; news records.
2. influencers_acts.csv; user rulings applied (Priyanka Chopra, Alia Bhatt neutral; Elvish Yadav Hindutva; CarryMinati opposing actors).
3. influencers_acts.csv; same rulings.
4. Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Direct: it lifts these celebrities' and influencers' reach..

Chapter 24

Cinema and Streaming

Arena 5.6 · weight 2 · reading **56.3** · contested

24.1 Scope

The political framing of what people watch.[1]

The arena is measured by box office of politically framed films 2024-26 and since 2014, streaming originals by viewership, and the National Film Awards.

Principal evidence: 349 top-grossing films 2014-26 in Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam (M6): of films with a political frame, 35% carry the Hindutva frame by count and 54% by box-office gross (2024-26: 70% by gross, driven by Hindi); southern industries are almost wholly the other way. Streaming (151 most-watched Indian originals, research H): of the politically framed titles, 4 carry the Hindutva frame and 8 the other (33% by count, 29% by viewership; thin evidence: framed titles are ~9% of viewing, and the Aashram franchise alone carries much of the other side's weight). Streaming counts 60%, cinema 40%. .

24.2 Significance

Long-run values, memory of history, the image of communities and the State.

24.3 Indicators and weights

Table 24.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-

aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 24.1. Indicators of arena 5.6


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Cinema 2024-26 (gross and title share)[2]	0.09	66.6
Cinema 2014-26[3]	0.03	49.3
Streaming (originals and films streamed; count and Ormax viewership)[4]	0.89	55.6
Arena reading	**1.00**	**56.3**

24.4 Reading

The arena reads **56.3**, 6.3 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 2 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.05 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for cinema 2024-26 (gross and title share) (66.6), the lowest for cinema 2014-26 (49.3).

Figure 24.1. Readings of arena 5.6 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

24.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by

source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Cinema 2024-26 (gross and title share)

Reading **66.6%**

gross 70.1, titles 63.0 (17 H vs 10 R titles, 101 films); from the cleaned film_units rows (owner, round 2 D17)

Figure 24.2. Cinema by industry, 2014-26: share of politically framed box office

Top-grossing films; only films with a political frame count (Atlas M6).




Figure 24.3. Cinema over time, all industries




Figure 24.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore gross)




Figure 24.5. The 15 biggest of 96 (₹ crore gross)





Figure 24.6. Over time: cinema gross, FRAME sample (₹ crore)



Measure 2. Cinema 2014-26

Reading **49.3%**

gross 54.3, titles 44.3 (35 H vs 44 R titles, 386 films); from the cleaned rows (owner, round 2 D17)

Figure 24.7. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore gross)





Figure 24.8. The 15 biggest of 353 (₹ crore gross)



Measure 3. Streaming (originals and films streamed; count and Ormax viewership)

Reading **55.6%**

211 titles: count 56.7, Ormax viewership 54.5 (Dhurandhar and Main Atal Hoon coded as in cinema, D57-004; IC 814 coded once, Hindutva by its M6 framing, owner round 2 D16). Blend set by audience (owner, 1 Nov 2026): half reach, half annual viewing hours. Reach: streaming 66.5 crore people (Ormax OTT Audience Report 2026) vs cinema 15.7 crore (Ormax Sizing the Cinema, 2023) = 80.9% streaming. Hours: cinema 83.2 crore tickets (Ormax Box Office 2025) x 2.5 h = 2.1 bn; streaming films and series taken as 10% of the 517 bn hours of online video (Ormax 2026; conservative) = 51.7 bn, 96.1% streaming. Streaming 88.5%, cinema 11.5% (recent and 2014-26 at 3:1)

Figure 24.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million viewers (Ormax))




Figure 24.10. The 15 biggest of 168 (million viewers (Ormax))





Figure 24.11. Over time: streaming originals Ormax viewership (m views)



Measure 4. National Film Awards, principal categories


Reading **75.0%**

6 H vs 2 R (71st and 72nd NFA principal categories); 0% of the blend (owner, 1 Nov 2026): reference only

Figure 24.12. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (awards)



Figure 24.13. The 15 biggest of 18 (awards)



24.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 633 coded units and 66 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 62 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 64 opposed and 507 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 170 grade B, 423 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. Ormax; Atlas M6; research H.
2. gross 70.1, titles 63.0 (17 H vs 10 R titles, 101 films); from the cleaned film_units rows (owner, round 2 D17).
3. gross 54.3, titles 44.3 (35 H vs 44 R titles, 386 films); from the cleaned rows (owner, round 2 D17).
4. 211 titles: count 56.7, Ormax viewership 54.5 (Dhurandhar and Main Atal Hoon coded as in cinema, D57-004; IC 814 coded once, Hindutva by its M6 framing, owner round 2 D16). Blend set by audience (owner, 1 Nov 2026): half reach, half annual viewing hours. Reach: streaming 66.5 crore people (Ormax OTT Audience Report 2026) vs cinema 15.7 crore (Ormax Sizing the Cinema, 2023) = 80.9% streaming. Hours: cinema 83.2 crore tickets (Ormax Box Office 2025) x 2.5 h = 2.1 bn; streaming films and series taken as 10% of the 517 bn hours of online video (Ormax 2026; conservative) = 51.7 bn, 96.1% streaming. Streaming 88.5%, cinema 11.5% (recent and 2014-26 at 3:1).

PART VII

Elections

This part covers electoral competition: vote share, the conversion of votes into seats under first past the post, the personal popularity of leaders, and party finance. It is decisive for control of the State, and it is renewed at every general and state election.

The domain reads **52.2**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



25	Vote Share
26	The Conversion of Votes into Seats
27	Leadership Popularity
28	Party Finance

Chapter 25

Vote Share

Arena 6.1 · weight 4 · reading **43.2** · opposed majority

25.1 Scope

The national and state mandate.[1]

The arena is measured by the NDA's share of all votes in Lok Sabha 2024 and in the latest assembly election of every state, and bypoll wins since 2024.

25.2 Significance

Legitimacy; who can form governments.

25.3 Indicators and weights

Table 25.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 25.1. Indicators of arena 6.1

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Lok Sabha 2024: NDA share of all votes	0.40	43.8
Latest assembly election in all 31 legislatures (population-weighted NDA share)	0.45	41.7
Bypolls 2024-26 (seats won)	0.15	45.4
Arena reading	**1.00**	**43.2**

25.4 Reading

The arena reads **43.2**, 6.8 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 4 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.60 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 25.1. Readings of arena 6.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

25.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Lok Sabha 2024: NDA share of all votes

Reading **43.8%**

NDA 43.8% of all votes; every non-NDA vote counts against.

Figure 25.2. NDA Lok Sabha seats under a uniform swing (points to NDA)

Each point re-runs all 543 seats; state swings set in Reshape Power are kept.




Figure 25.3. Each counted row (vote %)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 25.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats)





Figure 25.5. The 3 biggest of 3 (seats)



Figure 25.6. Over time: LS seats AAP, LS seats AIADMK, LS seats AITC and 3 more (seats of 543)



Measure 2. Latest assembly election in all 31 legislatures (population-weighted NDA share)

Reading **41.7%**

NDA 41.7%, INDIA 39.2%, others 19.1% across the latest election in every state, weighted by population.

Figure 25.7. State elections 2024-26: NDA vs INDIA vote (%)




Figure 25.8. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 93 (vote %)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 25.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats)



Figure 25.10. The 15 biggest of 89 (seats)





Figure 25.11. The 15 biggest of 36 (thousand persons)



Measure 3. Bypolls 2024-26 (seats won)

Reading **45.4%**

NDA wins 54 vs Other wins 65

Figure 25.12. Bypolls 2024-26 (seats won)




Figure 25.13. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats won)




Figure 25.14. The 15 biggest of 119 (seats won)




Figure 25.15. Over time: Bypoll NDA net gain, Bypoll NDA seats won, Bypoll seats contested · seats





Figure 25.16. Over time: Bypoll seats held by NDA before poll share, Bypoll seats won INDIA share, Bypoll seats won NDA share and 1 more · %



Measure 4. Women voters: the NDA's share of all women's votes

Reading **43.5%**

NDA 44 vs Everyone else 56

Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 25.17. Over time: LS vote AAP, LS vote AIADMK, LS vote AITC and 3 more · % of valid votes incl NOTA




Figure 25.18. Over time: State assemblies NDA seat share · % of 4123 seats



Figure 25.19. Over time: State elections NDA share of NDA+INDIA vote, State elections held in year: pop-weighted INDI..., State elections held in year: pop-weighted NDA ... and 3 more · %





Figure 25.20. Women voters: the NDA's share of all women's votes



25.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 525 coded units and 155 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 190 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 277 opposed and 58 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 36 grade A, 489 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. ECI.

Chapter 26

The Conversion of Votes into Seats

Arena 6.2 · weight 4 · reading **50.7** · contested

26.1 Scope

Turning votes into seats, seat by seat.[1]

The arena is measured by all 543 constituencies (seats won, seats held after a stress swing, battlegrounds), assembly seats held in every state, and big-city corporations.

26.2 Significance

The Lok Sabha majority and how fragile it is.

26.3 Indicators and weights

Table 26.1 lists the 5 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 26.1. Indicators of arena 6.2


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Seats won	0.25	54.0
Seats held after stress swing	0.40	41.3
Battleground seats won (margin < 5)	0.15	52.1
Assembly seats held now (31 legislatures)	0.15	60.2
Big-city corporations (budget-weighted)[2]	0.05	77.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**50.7**

26.4 Reading

The arena reads **50.7**, 0.7 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 4 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.88 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for big-city corporations (budget-weighted) (77.2), the lowest for seats held after stress swing (41.3).

Figure 26.1. Readings of arena 6.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

26.5 Measures and exhibits


The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Seats won

Reading **54.0%**

293 of 543 seats with the national and state swings applied.

Figure 26.2. Seats by state in this scenario




Measure 2. Seats held after stress swing

Reading **41.3%**

224 of 543 seats kept after a further 3-point swing against.

Figure 26.3. NDA Lok Sabha seats under a uniform swing (points to NDA)

Each point re-runs all 543 seats; state swings set in Reshape Power are kept.



Measure 3. Battleground seats won (margin < 5)

Reading **52.1%**

63 of 121 seats decided by under 5 points.


Measure 4. Assembly seats held now (31 legislatures)

Reading **60.2%**

Figure 26.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats)



Figure 26.5. The 15 biggest of 215 (seats)



Measure 5. Big-city corporations (budget-weighted)

Reading **77.2%**

BMC, Delhi MCD, Pune, Ahmedabad, Lucknow … (8 corporations, seats_units.csv); Kolkata left out until its Dec 2026 election (owner, round 2 D10)

Figure 26.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats)




Figure 26.7. The 15 biggest of 45 (seats)




Figure 26.8. Each counted row (% seats NDA)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.





Figure 26.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 26.10. The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore)



26.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 315 coded units. Of the units and flows, 127 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 179 opposed and 9 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 315 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. ECI GE2024 (543 seats).
2. BMC, Delhi MCD, Pune, Ahmedabad, Lucknow … (8 corporations, seats_units.csv); Kolkata left out until its Dec 2026 election (owner, round 2 D10).

Chapter 27

Leadership Popularity

Arena 6.3 · weight 3 · reading **60.0** · aligned majority

27.1 Scope

The personal pull of the leader.[1]

The arena is measured by Best-PM preference against every named rival, rating of the PM's performance, the NES 2024 PM choice and approval polls.

27.2 Significance

Campaign surges and coalition glue; tied to one face.

27.3 Indicators and weights

Table 27.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 27.1. Indicators of arena 6.3


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Best PM vs all named rivals (MOTN Aug 2026)[2]	0.45	53.4
PM performance good/outstanding vs poor (MOTN)[3]	0.20	65.4
Lokniti NES 2024 PM choice[4]	0.20	60.3
Morning Consult approval (Mar 2026)[5]	0.15	72.3
Arena reading	**1.00**	**60.0**

27.4 Reading

The arena reads **60.0**, 10.0 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.67 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Morning Consult approval (Mar 2026) (72.3), the lowest for best PM vs all named rivals (MOTN Aug 2026) (53.4).

Figure 27.1. Readings of arena 6.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

27.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Best PM vs all named rivals (MOTN Aug 2026)

Reading **53.4%**

Modi 48.7 vs Rahul 27.1, Vijay 9.2, Mamata 2.0, Akhilesh 1.7, Dipke 1.3, Kejriwal 1.2

Figure 27.2. Best person to be the next PM, % of respondents

India Today-CVoter Mood of the Nation and Lokniti, each edition.




Figure 27.3. Each counted row (% respondents)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 27.4. Over time: MOTN best PM (Modi, Rahul Gandhi, Vijay and 3 more) · % respondents





Figure 27.5. Over time: MOTN best PM (Modi minus Rahul) · percentage points



Measure 2. PM performance good/outstanding vs poor (MOTN)

Reading **65.4%**

51 vs 27

Figure 27.6. Each counted row (% respondents)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.





Figure 27.7. Over time: MOTN Modi performance good/outstanding, MOTN Modi performance poor (% respondents)




Measure 3. Lokniti NES 2024 PM choice

Reading **60.3%**

41 vs 27

Figure 27.8. Over time: Lokniti PM choice (Modi, Rahul Gandhi) (% respondents)



Measure 4. Morning Consult approval (Mar 2026)

Reading **72.3%**

68 approve vs 26 disapprove

Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 27.9. Over time: MOTN projected Lok Sabha vote share (NDA, INDIA) · % vote




Figure 27.10. Over time: MOTN best CM nationally (Yogi Adityanath, Arvind Kejriwal, Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy and 1 more) · % respondents




Figure 27.11. Over time: Lokniti satisfied with central govt · % somewhat/fully satisfied




Figure 27.12. Over time: Lokniti dissatisfied with central govt · %




Figure 27.13. Over time: Lokniti satisfied with central govt, Morning Consult Modi approve · % approve




Figure 27.14. Over time: Morning Consult Modi disapprove · % disapprove




Figure 27.15. Over time: Pew Modi favourable · % favourable





Figure 27.16. Over time: Pew Modi unfavourable · % unfavourable



27.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 23 coded units and 125 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 11 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 11 opposed

and 1 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 7 grade B, 16 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. India Today-CVoter; Lokniti.
2. Modi 48.7 vs Rahul 27.1, Vijay 9.2, Mamata 2.0, Akhilesh 1.7, Dipke 1.3, Kejriwal 1.2.
3. 51 vs 27.
4. 41 vs 27.
5. 68 approve vs 26 disapprove.

Chapter 28

Party Finance

Arena 6.4 · weight 3 · reading **58.4** · contested

28.1 Scope

Money to fight elections.[1]

The arena is measured by income of every party with filed accounts, spending (including the 2024 campaign) and reserves held by each side.

28.2 Significance

Campaigns, ads, logistics. Mostly counted as borrowed power: expected to leave when the BJP leaves office.

28.3 Indicators and weights

Table 28.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 28.1. Indicators of arena 6.4


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Income share of all parties, FY2023-25[2]	0.40	59.1
Spending (party expenditure and LS 2024 campaign)[3]	0.30	50.4
Reserves: party assets at 31 Mar 2025[4]	0.30	65.4
Arena reading	**1.00**	**58.4**

28.4 Reading

The arena reads **58.4**, 8.4 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.63 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for reserves: party assets at 31 Mar 2025 (65.4), the lowest for spending (party expenditure and LS 2024 campaign) (50.4).

Figure 28.1. Readings of arena 6.4 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

28.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Income share of all parties, FY2023-25

Reading **59.1%**

warchest_units.csv total_income; other opposition counts R

Figure 28.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 28.3. The 15 biggest of 45 (₹ crore)





Figure 28.4. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

1858 flows counted, ₹29,953 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹20,254 cr · 67.6% Opposed ₹9,699 cr · 32.4%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 28.5. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)





Figure 28.6. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)



Measure 2. Spending (party expenditure and LS 2024 campaign)


Reading **50.4%**

warchest_units.csv

Figure 28.7. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 28.8. The 15 biggest of 42 (₹ crore)



Measure 3. Reserves: party assets at 31 Mar 2025


Reading **65.4%**

BJP 12,171 + TDP 477 vs 6,695 cr

Figure 28.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 28.10. The 12 biggest of 12 (₹ crore)



28.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 909 coded units and 2,232 money flows. Of the units and flows, 1,046 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 2,095 opposed and 0 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 2,772 grade A, 315 grade B, 47 grade C, 4 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. ECI audit reports.
2. warchest_units.csv total_income; other opposition counts R.
3. warchest_units.csv.
4. BJP 12,171 + TDP 477 vs 6,695 cr.

PART VIII

The State

This part measures the instruments of the Indian State: executive office at the Union and in the states, public expenditure, the police and central agencies, the civil services, appointed bodies, Parliament, the judiciary and internal security. Most of it depends on office and would change hands with a change of government; the judiciary is the principal exception.

The domain reads **71.2**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



29	Executive Office
30	Public Expenditure
31	Police and Central Agencies
32	The Civil Services
33	Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies
34	Parliament
35	The Judiciary
36	Internal Security

Chapter 29

Executive Office

Arena 7.1 · weight 5 · reading **89.5** · aligned majority

29.1 Scope

Executive control.[1]

The arena is measured by the Union executive, state governments by population (NDA-ally chief ministers at 0.75) and governors and lieutenant governors.

29.2 Significance

Schemes, appointments, administration. Borrowed power that leaves when the BJP leaves office.

29.3 Indicators and weights

Table 29.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 29.1. Indicators of arena 7.1


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Union executive	0.45	100.0
State executives by population (NDA-ally CMs at 0.75)	0.45	76.7
Raj Bhavans: governors and LGs appointed by the Union	0.10	100.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**89.5**

29.4 Reading

The arena reads **89.5**, 39.5 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 5 of a total 107.7, it contributes 4.15 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Union executive (100.0), the lowest for state executives by population (NDA-ally CMs at 0.75) (76.7).

Figure 29.1. Readings of arena 7.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

29.5 Measures and exhibits


The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Union executive

Reading **100.0%**

Union held.

Figure 29.2. The 10 biggest of 10 (ministers)



Measure 2. State executives by population (NDA-ally CMs at 0.75)

Reading **76.7%**

BJP chief ministers at full weight, NDA-ally chief ministers at 0.75, Union territories follow the Union.

Figure 29.3. Indians by who governs their state, % of people




Figure 29.4. States by population, % of Indians





Figure 29.5. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 35 (% of India population 2026)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Measure 3. Raj Bhavans: governors and LGs appointed by the Union

Reading **100.0%**

Union held.

Figure 29.6. The 15 biggest of 36 (offices)



29.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 83 coded units. Of the units and flows, 74 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 9 opposed and 0 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 5 grade A, 78 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. ECI; state records.

Chapter 30

Public Expenditure

Arena 7.2 · weight 3 · reading **81.1** · aligned majority

30.1 Scope

Who spends India's public money.[1]

The arena is measured by combined Union and state spending controlled, cash transfers to citizens and state social-sector spending.

30.2 Significance

Welfare, freebies, contracts, ads. Borrowed power that leaves when the BJP leaves office.

30.3 Indicators and weights

Table 30.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 30.1. Indicators of arena 7.2

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Combined spending controlled, 2026-27	0.60	82.9
Cash to citizens (DBT and state cash schemes)	0.25	80.2
State social-sector spending in NDA-run states	0.15	75.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**81.1**

30.4 Reading

The arena reads **81.1**, 31.1 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 2.26 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 30.1. Readings of arena 7.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

30.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Combined spending controlled, 2026-27

Reading **82.9%**

Union net spending ₹42.53 lakh cr held + NDA states.

Figure 30.2. Public spending 2026-27 by who controls it, ₹ lakh crore




Figure 30.3. Indians by who governs their state, % of people




Figure 30.4. State spending 2026-27, ₹ lakh crore




Figure 30.5. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)




Figure 30.6. The 15 biggest of 32 (₹ crore)





Figure 30.7. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

58 flows counted, ₹23,26,607 crore.



Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 30.8. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)





Figure 30.9. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)



Measure 2. Cash to citizens (DBT and state cash schemes)


Reading **80.2%**

Union cash DBT ₹3.26 lakh cr + state cash schemes ₹3.76 lakh cr (NDA states 63%).

Figure 30.10. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 30.11. The 15 biggest of 75 (₹ crore)



Measure 3. State social-sector spending in NDA-run states


Reading **75.2%**

From PRS top-10 sector tables, moves with the NDA share of state population.

Figure 30.12. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 30.13. The 15 biggest of 29 (₹ crore)



30.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 495 coded units and 88 money flows. Of the units and flows, 423 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 158 opposed and 2 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 551 grade A, 30 grade B, 2 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Union Budget 2026-27; PRS.

Chapter 31

Police and Central Agencies

Arena 7.3 · weight 1 · reading **84.7** · aligned majority

31.1 Scope

Enforcement capacity.[1]

The arena is measured by police personnel commanded (state police, Union-run police, central armed police and agencies) and police budgets controlled.

Principal evidence: Agencies, police and executive control (M8).

31.2 Significance

Law and order, investigations, protest policing. Borrowed power that leaves when the BJP leaves office.

31.3 Indicators and weights

Table 31.1 lists the 2 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 31.1. Indicators of arena 7.3

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Personnel commanded (state police, CAPF, agencies)	0.80	84.5
Police budget controlled, 2026-27	0.20	85.3
Arena reading	**1.00**	**84.7**

31.4 Reading

The arena reads **84.7**, 34.7 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.79 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 31.1. Readings of arena 7.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

31.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Personnel commanded (state police, CAPF, agencies)

Reading **84.6%**

State police in NDA-run states + Union-run police, CAPF and RPF (10.2 lakh; NSG and NDRF, which are deputationists, left out) and CBI/NIA staff while the Union is held.

Figure 31.2. Indians by who governs their state, % of people




Figure 31.3. States by population, % of Indians




Figure 31.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (persons (thousand))




Figure 31.5. The 15 biggest of 36 (persons (thousand))




Figure 31.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (personnel)





Figure 31.7. The 15 biggest of 46 (personnel)



Measure 2. Police budget controlled, 2026-27


Reading **85.3%**

MHA police demand ₹1.70 lakh cr (less police modernisation grants, counted in state budgets) + police budgets of NDA states.

Figure 31.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 31.9. The 15 biggest of 43 (₹ crore)



31.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 145 coded units. Of the units and flows, 113 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 31 opposed and 1 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 129 grade A, 15 grade C, 1 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. MHA; Atlas M8.

Chapter 32

The Civil Services

Arena 7.4 · weight 1 · reading **56.5** · contested

32.1 Scope

The officers who run the State.[1]

The arena is measured by control of postings (by the Union, and by state governments over IAS and IPS officers in their cadres), discounted by the documented lean of the senior service against Hindutva-aligned positions.

32.2 Significance

Speed of implementation, leaks, obstruction. Borrowed power that leaves when the BJP leaves office.

32.3 Indicators and weights

Table 32.1 lists the 1 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).


Table 32.1. Indicators of arena 7.4

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Control of postings × (1 − opposing actors drag)	1.00	56.5
Arena reading	**1.00**	**56.5**

32.4 Reading

The arena reads **56.5**, 6.5 points above parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.52 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

Figure 32.1. Readings of arena 7.4 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

32.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Control of postings × (1 − Opposed drag)

Reading **56.5%**

0.5 × Union postings (100) + 0.5 × IAS/IPS officers in NDA-run cadres, × (1 − drag 35.5%). Drag = 0.5 (share of decisions left to officers, assumed) × 71% Opposed lean of documented acts.

Figure 32.2. Indians by who governs their state, % of people




Figure 32.3. States by population, % of Indians




Figure 32.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (officers in position)




Figure 32.5. The 15 biggest of 50 (officers in position)




Figure 32.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of appointments)




Figure 32.7. The 15 biggest of 67 (number of appointments)




Figure 32.8. The 15 biggest of 23 (number of records)




Figure 32.9. The 3 biggest of 3 (transfers in career)



Figure 32.10. The 10 biggest of 10 (letters)




Figure 32.11. The 4 biggest of 4 (signatories)





Figure 32.12. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (officer)



Figure 32.13. The 15 biggest of 55 (officer)



32.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 221 coded units. Of the units and flows, 128 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 63 opposed and 30 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 64 grade A, 4 grade B, 148 grade C, 1 grade D, 4 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. CCG letters; DoPT.

Chapter 33

Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies

Arena 7.5 · weight 1 · reading **65.7** · aligned majority

33.1 Scope

Regulators, commissions, universities and cultural bodies.[1]

The arena is measured by 103 central appointed bodies and 97 state bodies, each coded by who controls its leadership.

Principal evidence: Control of 103 appointed Union bodies (M8).

33.2 Significance

Rulings, reports, curricula, licences. Borrowed power that leaves when the BJP leaves office.

33.3 Indicators and weights

Table 33.1 lists the 2 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 33.1. Indicators of arena 7.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Central appointed bodies (102)[2]	0.75	76.5
State bodies (97, in 12 states)[3]	0.25	45.4
Arena reading	**1.00**	**65.7**

33.4 Reading

The arena reads **65.7**, 15.7 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.61 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for central appointed bodies (102) (76.5), the lowest for state bodies (97, in 12 states) (45.4).

Figure 33.1. Readings of arena 7.5 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

33.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Central appointed bodies (102)

Reading **76.5%**

69 of 103 central bodies held under strict labels.

Figure 33.2. Who controls the appointed Union bodies, % of bodies by year
98 central bodies in 2026 (Atlas M8 institution census).




Table 33.2. The most powerful bodies (tier 1-2 first)

Body	Type	Control
Law Commission of India (18th-23rd)	executive (non-statutory) comm	Technocratic
Chief Economic Adviser (Ministry of Finance)	executive advisory office	Technocratic
NITI Aayog (Vice-Chairperson, CEO, full-time members)	executive think tank (resoluti	Technocratic
National Statistical Commission (Chair + part-time members)	executive (non-statutory; 2005	Technocratic
National School of Drama	cultural_academy	Contested
National Gallery of Modern Art	cultural_academy	Technocratic
Film and Television Institute of India	film_body	Technocratic
Satyajit Ray Film and Television Institute	film_body	Contested
National Film Development Corporation	film_body	Contested
Sangeet Natak Akademi	cultural_academy	Technocratic
Indian Council of Social Science Research	research_council	Technocratic
Indian Council of Historical Research	research_council	Contested
Nehru Memorial Museum & Library / Prime Ministers Museum & L	cultural_academy	Contested
Archaeological Survey of India (Director General)	cultural_academy	Technocratic
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla	research_council	Technocratic
Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts	cultural_academy	Contested
Lalit Kala Akademi	cultural_academy	Technocratic
Sahitya Akademi	cultural_academy	Contested
National Book Trust	cultural_academy	Technocratic
Pondicherry University - Vice-Chancellor	university	Technocratic
University of Allahabad - Vice-Chancellor	university	Technocratic
Maulana Azad National Urdu University - Vice-Chancellor	university	Technocratic
Central University of Kerala - Vice-Chancellor	university	Technocratic
Central University of Kashmir - Vice-Chancellor	university	Technocratic
Tezpur University - Vice-Chancellor	university	Contested
North-Eastern Hill University - Vice-Chancellor	university	Technocratic
Indian Council of Agricultural Research (DG = Secretary DARE	research_council	Technocratic

Body	Type	Control
Jawaharlal Nehru University - Vice-Chancellor	university	Hindutva-aligned
Jamia Millia Islamia - Vice-Chancellor	university	Contested
Aligarh Muslim University - Vice-Chancellor	university	Contested

First 30 of 40 rows; all rows are in the data file (Appendix D).

Figure 33.3. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of bodies)





Figure 33.4. The 15 biggest of 102 (number of bodies)



Measure 2. State bodies (97, in 12 states)

Reading **45.4%**

Minorities, women's, information and public service commissions, akademis and chancellors in 12 states.

Figure 33.5. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of bodies)





Figure 33.6. The 15 biggest of 100 (number of bodies)




Measure 3. Trust in the vote: elections seen as free and fair, and the court record on “vote chori”

Reading **53.5%**

Trust the vote 53 vs Do not 47

Measure 4. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 33.7. Trust in the vote: elections seen as free and fair, and the court record on “vote chori”



33.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 213 coded units. Of the units and flows, 117 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 92 opposed and 4 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 114 grade A, 99 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Atlas M8.
2. 68 of 102 under strict labels (defunct and pre-2024 bodies and the 16th Finance Commission left out; audit D57-024).
3. 44 of 97 (probability-weighted 59.9).

Chapter 34

Parliament

Arena 7.6 · weight 4 · reading **63.8** · aligned majority

34.1 Scope

Law-making power.[1]

The arena is measured by Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha strength now, and how the key contested votes of 2024-26 went.

34.2 Significance

Laws, amendments, budgets.

34.3 Indicators and weights

Table 34.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 34.1. Indicators of arena 7.6


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Lok Sabha strength now (NDA incl. the 20 NCPI MPs)	0.55	58.7
Rajya Sabha strength now	0.25	62.1
Key contested votes 2024-26 (ayes share for the NDA position)[2]	0.20	80.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**63.8**

34.4 Reading

The arena reads **63.8**, 13.8 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 4 of a total 107.7, it contributes 2.37 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for key contested votes 2024-26 (ayes share for the NDA position) (80.0), the lowest for Lok Sabha strength now (NDA incl. the 20 NCPI MPs) (58.7).

Figure 34.1. Readings of arena 7.6 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

34.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Lok Sabha strength now (NDA incl. the 20 NCPI MPs)

Reading **58.7%**

NDA 293 seats won in 2024 + 26 since (20 NCPI MPs who left AITC, 6 Shiv Sena (UBT) MPs who joined Shinde's Shiv Sena and the Nagaon bypoll, less UPPL, which left the NDA) of 543.

Figure 34.2. Lok Sabha now (Oct 2026): seats by party

Hindutva-aligned camp 319 (NDA plus the 20 NCPI MPs who left AITC in June 2026 and back the NDA) vs 224 for everyone else. AITC is down to 8; the source table sums to 541, and 2 unidentified seats count against.




Figure 34.3. For reference: Lok Sabha seats won in the 2024 election

The 2024 result, before the AITC split and other realignments. The legislative-heft reading uses the House as it is now (chart above).




Figure 34.4. NDA Lok Sabha seats under a uniform swing (points to NDA)

Each point re-runs all 543 seats; state swings set in Reshape Power are kept.





Figure 34.5. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats)



Figure 34.6. The 15 biggest of 47 (seats)



Measure 2. Rajya Sabha strength now

Reading **62.1%**

NDA 151 vs INDIA and others (2 vacancies left out) 92

Figure 34.7. Rajya Sabha strength now





Figure 34.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (seats)



Figure 34.9. The 15 biggest of 39 (seats)




Measure 3. Key contested votes 2024-26 (ayes share for the NDA position)

Reading **80.0%**

Waqf LS 55.4, Waqf RS 57.4, ONOE 57.6, VP 60.1, 131st Amendment 56.4

Figure 34.10. Each counted row (% ayes of ayes+noes)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



34.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 156 coded units. Of the units and flows, 70 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 81 opposed and 5 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 147 grade C, 1 grade D, 8 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Lok Sabha / Rajya Sabha records.
2. Waqf LS 55.4, Waqf RS 57.4, ONOE 57.6, VP 60.1, 131st Amendment 56.4.

Chapter 35

The Judiciary

Arena 7.7 · weight 3 · reading **43.5** · opposed majority

35.1 Scope

The final veto.[1]

The arena is measured by high-significance rulings on contested issues (significance-weighted), the 2024-26 trend, and judges' post-retirement posts.

Principal evidence: Supreme Court and High Court rulings on contested issues (220 coded, decided 2004-26, most since 2019): the Hindutva position prevailed in 38 of the 85 high-significance rulings that had a clear winner (47 went the other way; 18 more were mixed or consensus). Across all 171 rulings with a clear winner: 88 vs 83 (Atlas M8).

35.2 Significance

Outlasts governments; not won at elections.

35.3 Indicators and weights

Table 35.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 35.1. Indicators of arena 7.7


Indicator	Weight	Reading
High-significance rulings, all years (significance-weighted)[2]	0.60	46.2
Recent window 2024-26[3]	0.30	34.6
Judges' post-retirement posts (NDA vs others)[4]	0.10	53.7
Arena reading	**1.00**	**43.5**

35.4 Reading

The arena reads **43.5**, 6.5 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.21 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for judges' post-retirement posts (NDA vs others) (53.7), the lowest for recent window 2024-26 (34.6).

Figure 35.1. Readings of arena 7.7 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

35.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. High-significance rulings, all years (significance-weighted)

Reading **46.2%**

significance >= 4, weighted: H 169 vs R 197 (courts_units.csv); Chinthada Anand (2026) coded Hindutva-favourable (owner, round 2 D11)

Figure 35.2. High-significance rulings (4-5 of 5) by issue

109 rulings: 38 Hindutva, 47 Opposed, the rest mixed or consensus.





Table 35.2. The most significant rulings (5 of 5)

Case	Year	Issue	Prevailed
Association for Democratic Reforms v Election Commission of India (Bih	2026	Electoral administration	Hindutva-aligned
Gulfisha Fatima / Umar Khalid & ors v State (NCT of Delhi)	2026	UAPA bail	Mixed
In Re: Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025 (interim judgment)	2025	Waqf	Mixed
In Re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and	2025	Federalism / governors / LGs	Hindutva-aligned
State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu	2025	Federalism / governors / LGs	Opposed
Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India (Electoral Bonds)	2024	Electoral bonds	Opposed
In Re: Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 (Ashwini Kumar	2024	Places of Worship Act / site dispu	Opposed
In Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures	2024	Demolitions	Opposed
Bilkis Yakub Rasool v Union of India	2024	2002 Gujarat / riot & encounter ca	Opposed
In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution	2023	Art. 370 / J&K	Hindutva-aligned
Subhash Desai v Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra	2023	Floor tests / anti-defection	Mixed
Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v Union of India (marriage equality)	2023	Section 377 / marriage equality	Hindutva-aligned
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v Union of India	2022	Enforcement vs politicians (PMLA/C	Hindutva-aligned
Zakia Ahsan Jafri v State of Gujarat	2022	2002 Gujarat / riot & encounter ca	Hindutva-aligned
S.G. Vombatkere v Union of India (sedition kept in abeyance)	2022	Sedition / BNS 152	Opposed
Union of India v K.A. Najeeb	2021	UAPA bail	Opposed
National Investigation Agency v Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali	2019	UAPA bail	Hindutva-aligned
M. Siddiq (D) thr LRs v Mahant Suresh Das & ors (Ayodhya title)	2019	Ayodhya	Hindutva-aligned
Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala (Sabarimala)	2018	Sabarimala	Opposed
Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India	2018	Section 377 / marriage equality	Opposed
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (Aadhaar)	2018	Pegasus / surveillance	Mixed
Shayara Bano v Union of India	2017	Triple talaq	Mixed
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (NJAC c	2015	Other institutional / economic (NJ	Consensus
Centre for Public Interest Litigation v Union of India (2G licences)	2012	Other institutional / economic (NJ	Hindutva-aligned
Indian Union Muslim League v Union of India (constitutionality of CAA		CAA / citizenship	
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India (constitutionality of Places o		Places of Worship Act / site dispu	
Kantaru Rajeevaru v IYLA (9-judge reference, 2026 hearing)		Sabarimala	

Figure 35.3. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 212 (rulings weighted by significance (1-5))

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Measure 2. Recent window 2024-26

Reading **34.6%**

H 9 vs R 17

Figure 35.4. Rulings on contested issues by year: whose position prevailed

220 Supreme Court and High Court rulings coded, decided 2004-2026 (Atlas M8).



Measure 3. Judges' post-retirement posts (NDA vs others)

Reading **53.7%**

courts_judges.csv: 36 vs 31 (one post per judge per tenure)

Table 35.3. Judges
190 rows

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
Surya Kant (CJI since 24 Nov 2025)	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-1 (Modi I, 2014-19)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2019	Punjab and Haryana High Court
Vikram Nath	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2021	Allahabad High Court
B. V. Nagarathna	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2021	Karnataka High Court
M. M. Sundresh	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2021	Madras High Court
P. S. Narasimha	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2021	Bar Council of India

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
J. B. Pardiwala	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2022	Gujarat High Court
Dipankar Datta	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2022	Calcutta High Court
P. V. Sanjay Kumar	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Telangana High Court
Ahsanuddin Amanullah	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Patna High Court
Manoj Misra	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Allahabad High Court

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
Aravind Kumar	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Karnataka High Court
Prashant Kumar Mishra	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Chhattisgarh High Court
K. V. Viswanathan	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Bar Council of India
Ujjal Bhuyan	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Gauhati High Court
Sarasa Venkatanarayana Bhatti	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Andhra Pradesh High Court

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
Satish Chandra Sharma	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Madhya Pradesh High Court
Augustine George Masih	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Punjab and Haryana High Court
Sandeep Mehta	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2023	Rajasthan High Court
Prasanna B. Varale	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-2 (Modi II, 2019-24)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2024	Bombay High Court
N. Kotiswar Singh	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2024	Manipur High Court

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
R. Mahadevan	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2024	Madras High Court
Manmohan	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2024	Delhi High Court
K. Vinod Chandran	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Kerala High Court
Joymalya Bagchi	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Calcutta High Court
Nilay Anjaria	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Gujarat High Court

unit	category	subcategory	measure	measure_unit	side	side_basis	year	state
Vijay Bishnoi	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Rajasthan High Court
A. S. Chandurkar	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Bombay High Court
Alok Aradhe	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Madhya Pradesh High Court
Vipul Pancholi	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2025	Gujarat High Court
Sheel Nagu	sitting_sc_judge	NDA-3 (Modi III, 2024-)	1	judge	N	Judges are N unless a documented marker exists; appointing government recorded but not used as a side marker (collegium	2026	Madhya Pradesh High Court

First 30 of 190 rows; all rows are in the data file (Appendix D).

35.6 **Evidence base**

The arena rests on 229 coded units. Of the units and flows, 89 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 83 opposed and 57 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 150 grade A, 49 grade B, 30 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Atlas M8; research D.
2. significance >= 4, weighted: H 169 vs R 197 (courts_units.csv); Chinthada Anand (2026) coded Hindutva-favourable (owner, round 2 D11).
3. H 9 vs R 17.
4. courts_judges.csv: 36 vs 31 (one post per judge per tenure).

Chapter 36

Internal Security

Arena 7.8 · weight 1 · reading **69.7** · aligned majority

36.1 Scope

Who holds the ground by force inside India, against armed groups other than Islamist ones.[1]

The arena is measured by the State's lawful security forces against CPI (Maoist), the North-East insurgents (ULFA-I, NSCN factions, the Manipur valley and hill groups) and Khalistani networks. Ground freed, who pays in blood, armed organisations settled, Maoist ranks left. Islamist threats are counted in Global Islam.

36.2 Significance

Sovereignty on the ground, and investment and roads where the gun ruled. Borrowed power: the forces leave with office, the ground already won stays.

36.3 Indicators and weights

Table 36.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 36.1. Indicators of arena 7.8

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Ground held: the peak insurgent footprint now free of violence[2]	0.30	78.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Who pays in blood, 2024-26: insurgents killed vs security forces and civilians killed[3]	0.35	73.0
Armed organisations: settled since 2019 vs still armed[4]	0.25	45.0
Maoist ranks: cadres arrested or surrendered since 2024 vs still under arms[5]	0.10	93.9
Arena reading	**1.00**	**69.7**

36.4 Reading

The arena reads **69.7**, 19.7 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 1 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.65 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Maoist ranks: cadres arrested or surrendered since 2024 vs still under arms (93.9), the lowest for armed organisations: settled since 2019 vs still armed (45.0).

Figure 36.1. Readings of arena 7.8 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

36.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Ground held: the peak insurgent footprint now free of violence

Reading **78.6%**

Freed 79 vs Still contested 21

Figure 36.2. Over time: Maoist districts (LWE activity districts, LWE affected districts, Most affected districts and 1 more) · districts




Figure 36.3. Over time: Maoist districts (Police stations LWE violence, Police stations LWE violence first half) · police stations




Figure 36.4. Over time: Maoist ground (Fortified police stations) · stations




Figure 36.5. Over time: Maoist ground (New security camps cumulative) · camps




Figure 36.6. Over time: Maoist ground (LWE influence area) · sq km




Figure 36.7. Over time: North-East ground (AFSPA Manipur police stations excluded) · police stations




Figure 36.8. Over time: North-East ground (Accord cadres Tripura, Accord cadres Assam) · cadres





Figure 36.9. Over time: North-East ground (AFSPA Arunachal districts full, AFSPA Assam districts full) · districts



Measure 2. Who pays in blood, 2024-26: insurgents killed vs security forces and civilians killed

Reading **73.0%**

Insurgents killed 845 vs Security forces and civilians killed 313

Figure 36.10. Over time: Maoist violence, SATP (Maoists killed, Civilians killed, Security forces killed) · deaths




Figure 36.11. Over time: Maoist violence, SATP (Exchange ratio maoists per security forces) · ratio




Figure 36.12. Over time: Maoist violence, MHA (Maoists killed, Deaths civilians security forces, Civilians killed and 1 more) · deaths




Figure 36.13. Over time: Maoist violence, MHA (Exchange ratio maoists per security forces) · ratio




Figure 36.14. Over time: Maoist violence, MHA (LWE violent incidents total) · incidents




Figure 36.15. Over time: Maoist violence (LWE violent incidents)




Figure 36.16. Over time: North-East violence (North-East incidents decline vs 2014) · percent




Figure 36.17. Over time: North-East violence (North-East militants killed, North-East militants arrested, North-East militants surrendered and 2 more) · persons




Figure 36.18. Over time: North-East violence (North-East arms recovered) · weapons




Figure 36.19. Over time: North-East violence (North-East insurgency incidents) · incidents




Figure 36.20. Over time: North-East violence (Manipur militants killed, Manipur militants arrested, Manipur security forces civilians killed) · persons




Figure 36.21. Over time: North-East violence (Manipur insurgency incidents) · incidents




Figure 36.22. Over time: North-East violence, SATP (Manipur insurgency fatalities) · persons




Figure 36.23. Over time: North-East violence (Rest of North-East insurgency incidents, Assam insurgency incidents) · incidents





Figure 36.24. Over time: Punjab: Terrorists killed, Punjab, SATP: Terror arrests, Punjab: Civilians killed and 1 more (persons)



Measure 3. Armed organisations: settled since 2019 vs still armed

Reading **45.0%**

Settled 9 vs Still armed (ceasefire groups included) 11

Figure 36.25. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (organisations)





Figure 36.26. The 15 biggest of 20 (organisations)




Measure 4. Maoist ranks: cadres arrested or surrendered since 2024 vs still under arms

Reading **93.9%**

Arrested or surrendered 6,145 vs Still under arms 400

Figure 36.27. Over time: Maoist ranks (Maoists arrested, Maoists surrendered, Maoists neutralised) (persons)



Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 36.28. Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam), MHA (Terrorists killed, Security forces killed, Civilians killed) · persons




Figure 36.29. Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam), MHA (Terrorist incidents) · incidents




Figure 36.30. Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam) (Terrorists killed, Security forces killed, Civilians killed and 3 more) (persons)




Figure 36.31. Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam) (Encounters CT operations) · operations




Figure 36.32. Over time: J&K (counted in Global Islam) (Terrorist initiated incidents, Organised stone pelting, Stone pelting incidents) · incidents




Figure 36.33. Over time: Bans and prosecutions (NIA conviction rate) · percent



Figure 36.34. Over time: Bans and prosecutions, NCRB: UAPA arrests, Hinterland terror: Hinterland civilians killed, Hinterland terror: Hinterland security forces k… · persons




Figure 36.35. Over time: Hinterland terror (Hinterland terror attacks) · attacks




Figure 36.36. Ground held: the peak insurgent footprint now free of violence




Figure 36.37. Who pays in blood, 2024-26: insurgents killed vs security forces and civilians killed




Figure 36.38. Armed organisations: settled since 2019 vs still armed





Figure 36.39. Maoist ranks: cadres arrested or surrendered since 2024 vs still under arms



36.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 128 coded units and 390 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 70 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 42 opposed and 16 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 62 grade A, 55 grade B, 11 grade C.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes


1. MHA, PIB, Parliament answers; SATP; Punjab and Manipur Police; atlas/research10/internal_security/.
2. Mean of two: police stations reporting Maoist violence, 465 in 2010 → 60 in Mar 2026 (87.1% freed, MHA); North-East area under AFSPA cut by 70% since 2014 (MHA, Mar 2025)..
3. Maoist, North-East and Khalistani theatres, 1 Jan 2024 to Oct 2026: LWE 761 vs 196; PUNJAB 6 vs 6; NE 78 vs 111. SATP for the Maoist and Punjab theatres; MHA (2024-25) and SATP Manipur (2026) for the North-East. J&K and other Islamist terror sit in Global Islam..
4. 20 non-Islamist organisations or networks, each counted once (armed_groups.csv, scope "arena"). 3 armed groups in ceasefire without a settlement (NSCN-IM, the KNO and UPF groups, NSCN-K factions) count against, as unclassified actors do (decision 1a); counted as half, it reads 52.5..
5. 6145 arrested or surrendered (Jan 2024-Mar 2026, PIB; Shah gives 4,839 surrenders) vs about 400 armed cadres left (300-500). North-East and Khalistani strengths are not published..

PART IX

External Actors

This part turns outward. It assesses seven external actors and the Indian diaspora, each as a contest between India's capacity and that actor's reach into Indian politics, economy and discourse. External actors are weighted by their reach and by the divergence of their positions from those of Hindutva-aligned actors, on the same scale as the domestic arenas.

The domain reads **32.7**. Its arenas, with their weights and readings:



37	Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies
38	Global Technology Platforms
39	The United States
40	China
41	Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks
42	Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States
43	Transnational Christian Organisations
44	The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad

Chapter 37

Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies

Arena 8.1 · weight 4.23 · reading **18.1** · opposed majority

37.1 Scope

Western news media, Western academia, private foundations, ratings agencies and index producers, the UN human-rights system and allied networks.

Principal evidence: Mean of three contests: how India is judged abroad (Hindutva 11%; indices, UN, foreign media, M12/M6), whose experts are cited (11%, M7) and where Western philanthropic money goes (₹1 cr Hindutva-coded vs ₹15,413 cr subversive-coded, 2015-26, M1).

37.2 Significance

How India is assessed abroad; investor and diplomatic sentiment; and the funding and framing available to domestic actors who oppose Hindutva-aligned positions.

37.3 Indicators and weights

Table 37.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 37.1. Indicators of arena 8.1


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Narrative: foreign media, index sourcing, UN[1]	0.30	18.3
Western philanthropy (funder-level expected value)[2]	0.25	3.2
Whose experts are cited	0.25	7.2
Gatekeeping: share of the foreign-money channel the State has shut[3]	0.20	50.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**18.1**

37.4 Reading

The arena reads **18.1**, 31.9 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 4.23 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.71 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for gatekeeping: share of the foreign-money channel the State has shut (50.2), the lowest for Western philanthropy (funder-level expected value) (3.2).

Figure 37.1. Readings of arena 8.1 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

37.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by

source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Narrative: foreign media, index sourcing, UN

Reading **18.3%**

g_left_units.csv

Figure 37.2. How the index makers score India (all on a 0-100 scale)

Freedom House (0-100), V-Dem liberal democracy (0-1, ×100), EIU Democracy Index (0-10, ×10). Their sources are 92% Opposed-camp (Atlas M12).




Figure 37.3. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (citations (of 545))




Figure 37.4. The 12 biggest of 12 (citations (of 545))




Figure 37.5. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (submissions (of 72))




Figure 37.6. The 13 biggest of 13 (submissions (of 72))




Figure 37.7. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (submissions (of 70))




Figure 37.8. The 12 biggest of 12 (submissions (of 70))




Figure 37.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (mentions (of 269))




Figure 37.10. The 14 biggest of 14 (mentions (of 269))




Figure 37.11. The 15 biggest of 234 (communication (count))




Figure 37.12. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (endnote citations in OHCHR summary)




Figure 37.13. The 15 biggest of 138 (endnote citations in OHCHR summary)




Figure 37.14. Over time: CIVICUS civic-space rating · 1 closed .. 5 open




Figure 37.15. Over time: EIU democracy score · score 0-10




Figure 37.16. Over time: Freedom House: Kashmir, Freedom House: Freedom in the World, Freedom House: Freedom on the Net and 1 more · score 0-100




Figure 37.17. Over time: Global Hunger Index score · score




Figure 37.18. Over time: ghi_score_as_published · score as published in each year's report




Figure 37.19. Over time: Hostile acts recorded · events




Figure 37.20. Over time: RSF press-freedom rank · rank




Figure 37.21. Over time: Scholars at Risk incidents · count




Figure 37.22. Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A · URLs/accounts blocked by MeitY under s.69A




Figure 37.23. Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A · URLs blocked




Figure 37.24. Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A · blocking orders



Figure 37.25. Over time: UN special-procedure letters · letters




Figure 37.26. Over time: Share India replied to · % replied by GoI




Figure 37.27. Over time: USCIRF status for India · 2 = CPC recommended, 1 = Tier 2, 0 = none




Figure 37.28. Over time: V-Dem academic freedom, V-Dem electoral democracy, V-Dem liberal democracy and 1 more · index 0-1





Figure 37.29. Over time: V-Dem academic-freedom coders · coders



Measure 2. Western philanthropy (funder-level expected value)

Reading **3.2%**

₹591 cr H vs ₹17,736 cr R, 2015-26; grant level 20.6

Figure 37.30. Western foundations: money to Opposed-coded work in India, 2015-26, ₹ crore

Expected-value coding of each grant (Atlas M1).




Figure 37.31. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 37.32. The 15 biggest of 45 (₹ crore)





Figure 37.33. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

2977 flows counted, ₹44,616 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹974 cr · 2.2%
Opposed ₹30,222 cr · 67.7%
Neutral / not counted ₹13,420 cr · 30.1%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 37.34. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 37.35. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 37.36. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 3. Whose experts are cited

Reading **7.2%**

Same reading as 4.3 Whose Experts the State Believes.

Measure 4. Gatekeeping: share of the foreign-money channel the State has shut

Reading **50.2%**

Active FCRA registrations 29,022 (2015) → 14,466 (Sep 2026, MHA)

Figure 37.37. The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore)




Figure 37.38. The 2 biggest of 2 (associations)



Figure 37.39. The 10 biggest of 10 (USD million)




Figure 37.40. Each counted row (percent (avg CY2017-24))

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.





Figure 37.41. The 3 biggest of 3 (/100)



Figure 37.42. Each counted row (percent)


Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 37.43. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.



37.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 705 coded units, 3,017 money flows and 266 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 44 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 3,066 opposed and 612 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 3,611 grade A, 63 grade B, 37 grade C, 9 grade D, 2 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. g_left_units.csv.
2. ₹591 cr H vs ₹17,736 cr R, 2015-26; grant level 20.6.
3. Active FCRA registrations 29,022 (2015) → 14,466 (Sep 2026, MHA).

Chapter 38

Global Technology Platforms

Arena 8.2 · weight 2.65 · reading **31.0** · opposed majority

38.1 Scope

Alphabet (Google, YouTube), Meta (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp), X, Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and the AI labs: the stack most Indians live on.

The actor's reach into India is assessed across eight channels, scored from 0 to 10: Trade (iPhone exports $22 bn, 5% of exports) (2.2); Energy (0.0); Capital ($14.4 bn a year pledged 2026-30, 29% of FDI equity) (5.4); Defence (0.0); Technology (OS, search, ads, cloud, payment apps, AI) (9.1); Diplomatic (digital taxes withdrawn under US pressure) (5.6); Diaspora (11% of H-1B cap) (3.3); Domestic reach (WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram reach ~half of internet users) (7.3). Its overall reach is 6.6 of 10.

38.2 Significance

What 1.4 billion people see and search, which accounts are suspended or amplified, where ad money goes, and how AI assistants answer questions about India.

38.3 Indicators and weights

Table 38.1 lists the 6 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 38.1. Indicators of arena 8.2

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Technological dependence (OS, search, ads, cloud, payment apps, AI)[1]	0.15	13.4
Economic exposure: IT-services exports, jobs and tax tied to Big Tech[2]	0.15	9.9
Control of discourse: who prevails when the State and the platforms contest content[3]	0.10	58.7
Narrative machinery (AI answers, Meta-funded fact-checking)[4]	0.20	26.7
Big Tech money into Indian discourse (creator payouts, news funds)[5]	0.25	21.9


Indicator	Weight	Reading
India's regulatory counter-leverage (IT Rules, CCI, UPI rails)[6]	0.15	72.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**31.0**

38.4 Reading

The arena reads **31.0**, 19.0 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 2.65 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.76 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for India's regulatory counter-leverage (IT Rules, CCI, UPI rails) (72.2), the lowest for economic exposure: IT-services exports, jobs and tax tied to Big Tech (9.9).

Figure 38.1. Readings of arena 8.2 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

38.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Technological dependence (OS, search, ads, cloud, payment apps, AI)

Reading **13.4%**

Android/iOS 100% foreign, Google 97% of search, Google + Meta about 68% of digital ads (FY25 billing vs CY25 market; bases differ)

Figure 38.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million)



Figure 38.3. The 9 biggest of 9 (million)




Figure 38.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 38.5. The 3 biggest of 3 (₹ crore)




Figure 38.6. Each counted row (% (derived))

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 38.7. Each counted row (% of market)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 38.8. Each counted row (% of UPI volume)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 38.9. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (hours/user/month)



Figure 38.10. The 6 biggest of 6 (hours/user/month)




Figure 38.11. Over time: PhonePe's share of UPI, Google Pay's share of UPI · % of UPI volume




Figure 38.12. Over time: Facebook users in India, Instagram users in India, YouTube users in India · million





Figure 38.13. Over time: Indian apps' share of downloads, Gemini's share of AI-app time · %



Measure 2. Economic exposure: IT-services exports, jobs and tax tied to Big Tech

Reading **9.9%**

Revenue at stake, relative: Big Tech earns 1.1% of its revenue in India; India earns 8.9% of tech exports ($21.8 bn of $246 bn) from Big Tech (own GCCs $13.7 bn + client work $8.1 bn) → 11.1 (8.5–16.0). Tax at stake: ₹2,356 cr from Big Tech vs ₹24,833 cr India collects on the Big-Tech-linked IT economy → 8.7 (6.5–20.6). g_tech_IT_exports_jobs_and_tax_at_stake.csv

Table 38.2. IT exports jobs and tax at stake

76 rows

item	metric	value	unit	year	side	grade	note
NASSCOM SR2025	India tech industry revenue	282.6	USD bn	FY2024-25	context	C	NASSCOM Strategic Review 2025 estimate (PTI); later revised to 297 in SR2026
NASSCOM SR2025	India tech exports	224.4	USD bn	FY2024-25	india	C	domestic 58.2; export revenue 'evenly split' between Indian firms and global MNCs (incl. GCCs)
NASSCOM SR2025	India tech employment	5.8	million	FY2024-25	context	C	58 lakh; 1.26 lakh added; India share of global sourcing 58%
NASSCOM SR2026	India tech industry revenue	315	USD bn	FY2025-26	context	C	FY25 revised to 297; IT services 149, BPM 59, ER&D 63, products 23, hardware 21 (YourStory)
NASSCOM SR2026	India tech exports	246	USD bn	FY2025-26	india	C	FY25 revised 233; exports ~83% of revenue
NASSCOM SR2026	India tech employment	5.95	million	FY2025-26	context	C	net +135k (FY25 +133k); 5.82m FY25 revised
NASSCOM SR2026	AI revenue	11	USD bn (mid of 10-12)	FY2025-26	context	C	5-6% of average company revenue
RBI software exports survey	Software services exports	221.4	USD bn	FY2025-26	india	A	RBI annual survey via press; FY25 204.7; IT services 147, ITES 68 (BPO 56, engineering 12), Mode-3 17.9
RBI software exports survey	US share of software exports	54.1	%	FY2025-26	context	A	52.9% in FY25; US+Europe ~86%
NASSCOM-Zinnov GCC 2026	Number of GCCs	2117	count	FY2025-26E	context	B	3,728 units; 'GCC Value Orbit' report, May 2026
NASSCOM-Zinnov GCC 2026	GCC revenue	98.4	USD bn	FY2025-26E	india	B	all parents, all sectors
NASSCOM-Zinnov GCC 2026	GCC headcount	2.36	million	FY2025-26E	context	B	~40% of NASSCOM 5.95m

item	metric	value	unit	year	side	grade	note
NASSCOM-Zinnov GCC 2024	GCC revenue	64.6	USD bn	FY2023-24	context	B	1,700+ GCCs, 1.9m staff
Microsoft India (R&D) Pvt Ltd	Revenue (Big Tech captive)	18821.3	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	D	RoC data via Tracxn (search extract, page blocked); PAT 1,890.5 cr
Microsoft India	India headcount	23000	employees	2026-10	india	C	all India entities; voluntary exit offer Oct 2026
Google IT Services India Pvt Ltd	Revenue (Big Tech captive)	15830.1	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	D	search-engine extract only, conflicting (another extract says '>1,000 cr'); range 12,000-15,830 used
Google IT Services India Pvt Ltd	Headcount	12346	employees	2025-08	india	D	Tracxn; Google says >10,000 in India (India Today Feb 2025, C)
Google India Pvt Ltd	IT-enabled services to group (captive) revenue	2459.2	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	C	RoC via Tofler; segment profit ~330 cr (Inc42)
Amazon Development Centre (India) Pvt Ltd	Revenue (Big Tech captive)	25125	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	D	search extract of Tofler/Tracxn; FY26 30,282.3 cr
Salesforce India	Revenue from operations	13140.6	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	C	mix of GCC exports and domestic sales (split NO DATA; 50-85% export assumed); PAT 1,292.3; employee cost 9,120.4
Salesforce India	Headcount	17000	employees	2026-05	india	C	headline (ET/Business Standard 19 May 2026); article URL not resolved
IBM India Pvt Ltd	Revenue from operations	32804	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	D	aggregator; PAT 3,968 cr; export/domestic split NO DATA (40-70% export assumed)

item	metric	value	unit	year	side	grade	note
Oracle India Pvt Ltd	Revenue (implied)	23000	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	D	DERIVED: PAT 1,701.6 cr at 7.4% net margin (search extract); split NO DATA (40-70% export assumed)
Oracle India	Headcount (implied)	30000	employees	2026-09	india	D	DERIVED: '10% of India workforce, roughly 3,000'
Apple India	Software development revenue	650	INR crore	FY2025-26	india	C	Apple India headcount ~3,000 (TOI Jan 2024 headline)
Big Tech captives	Export revenue, sum (central / conservative-high)	118275	INR crore	FY2024-25	india	D	DERIVED: MS R&D + Google ITS 15,830 + Google ITeS + ADCI FY26 30,282 + Apple 650 + export shares of Salesforce 85%, IBM
TCS	Technology & Services share of revenue	8.4	%	Q4 FY2025-26	india	C	official fact sheet seen only via search extract (PDF 403)
Infosys	Hi-Tech share of revenue	7.8	%	FY2025-26	india	A	13,928 / 1,78,650 cr; FY25 13,090/1,62,990 = 8.03%
HCLTech	Technology & Services share of services revenue	14.8	%	FY2025-26	india	A	Annual Report p.92; vertical grew 15% YoY; Telecom/Media 12.1% separate
Wipro	Technology & Communications share	16.0	%	FY2025-26	india	A	Q4 16.8%; top client 4.6%

First 30 of 76 rows; all rows are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 3. Control of discourse: who prevails when the State and the platforms contest content

Reading **58.7%**

State won 2 of 3 cases (X Corp ×2); Google removed 68% of demanded items; 41% of platform-initiated sanctions hit the Opposed side

Figure 38.14. The 2 biggest of 2 (accounts)



Figure 38.15. The 2 biggest of 2 (case (1 = State won))



Figure 38.16. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (act)




Figure 38.17. The 15 biggest of 54 (act)





Figure 38.18. Over time: URLs blocked under s.69A



Measure 4. Narrative machinery (AI answers, Meta-funded fact-checking)

Reading **26.7%**

AI answers 17.3; fact-check direction 36.0

Figure 38.19. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (number of answers)





Figure 38.20. The 15 biggest of 205 (number of answers)



Measure 5. Big Tech money into Indian discourse (creator payouts, news funds)

Reading **21.9%**

g_tech_flows.csv

Figure 38.21. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 38.22. The 12 biggest of 12 (₹ crore)





Figure 38.23. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

20 flows counted, ₹92,233 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹10,553 cr · 11.4% Opposed ₹80,901 cr · 87.7% Neutral / not counted ₹779 cr · 0.8%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 38.24. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 38.25. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 38.26. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 6. India's regulatory counter-leverage (IT Rules, CCI, UPI rails)

Reading **72.2%**

10 of 17 levers held; UPI rails 85.5% of digital payments

Figure 38.27. The 12 biggest of 12 (lever outcome (1 held, 0.5 partial, 0 lost))




Figure 38.28. The 2 biggest of 2 (₹ crore)



Measure 7. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 38.29. Over time: meta_items_restricted_india · items restricted on local-law grounds




Figure 38.30. Over time: google_govt_removal_requests_india · requests




Figure 38.31. Over time: google_items_removed_india · items removed





Figure 38.32. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.



38.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 157 coded units, 20 money flows and 87 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 75 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 87 opposed and 15 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 38 grade A, 28 grade B, 101 grade C, 10 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Android/iOS 100% foreign, Google 97% of search, Google + Meta about 68% of digital ads (FY25 billing vs CY25 market; bases differ).
2. Revenue at stake, relative: Big Tech earns 1.1% of its revenue in India; India earns 8.9% of tech exports ($21.8 bn of $246 bn) from Big Tech (own GCCs $13.7 bn + client work $8.1 bn) → 11.1 (8.5–16.0). Tax at stake: ₹2,356 cr from Big Tech vs ₹24,833 cr India collects on the Big-Tech-linked IT economy → 8.7 (6.5–20.6). g_tech_IT_exports_jobs_and_tax_at_stake.csv.
3. State won 2 of 3 cases (X Corp ×2); Google removed 68% of demanded items; 41% of platform-initiated sanctions hit the opposing side.
4. AI answers 17.3; fact-check direction 36.0.
5. g_tech_flows.csv.
6. 10 of 17 levers held; UPI rails 85.5% of digital payments.

Chapter 39

The United States

Arena 8.3 · weight 3.60 · reading **24.4** · opposed majority

39.1 Scope

The American state: tariffs, sanctions, visas, capital, defence technology, the dollar.

Principal evidence: Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs USA 80.5 (low end: GDP).

39.2 Significance

Trade, H-1B visas, sanctions and access to technology; the United States also hosts most of the institutions assessed in the preceding chapter.

39.3 Indicators and weights

Table 39.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 39.1. Indicators of arena 8.3


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Economic (Lowy relationships and capability)[1]	0.35	24.7
Security (Lowy military, defence networks)[1]	0.20	25.9
Narrative (Lowy diplomatic and cultural)[2]	0.25	39.6
US foundation money[3]	0.20	3.2
Arena reading	**1.00**	**24.4**

39.4 Reading

The arena reads **24.4**, 25.6 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3.60 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.81 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for narrative (Lowy diplomatic and cultural) (39.6), the lowest for US foundation money (3.2).

Figure 39.1. Readings of arena 8.3 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

39.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Economic (Lowy relationships and capability)

Reading **24.7%**

g_usa_units.csv

Figure 39.2. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 39.3. Over time: H-1B petitions approved for Indians · approved petitions




Figure 39.4. Over time: Indians' share of H-1B approvals · % of approved H-1B petitions




Figure 39.5. Over time: USA's share of India's exports · % of India total exports




Figure 39.6. Over time: India's exports to USA, India's imports from USA, Trade balance with USA · $ billion





Figure 39.7. Over time: USA's share of India's imports · % of India total imports



Measure 2. Security (Lowy military, defence networks)

Reading **25.9%**

g_usa_units.csv

Measure 3. Narrative (Lowy diplomatic and cultural)

Reading **39.6%**

Mean of Lowy diplomatic 46.1 and cultural 33.0. Washington lobbying moved to India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power.

Figure 39.8. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)



Figure 39.9. The 12 biggest of 12 (₹ crore)




Figure 39.10. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ (LDA filings mentioning India; amount…)



Figure 39.11. The 15 biggest of 38 (US$ (LDA filings mentioning India; amount...)





Figure 39.12. Over time: FARA (Government of India and BJP, other India principals) (US$)




Measure 4. US foundation money

Reading **3.2%**

Grant level 29.8

Figure 39.13. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

1803 flows counted, ₹31,630 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹954 cr · 3.0% Opposed ₹18,580 cr · 58.7%

Neutral / not counted ₹12,096 cr · 38.2%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 39.14. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)





Figure 39.15. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)



Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 39.16. Over time: Hostile acts recorded (events)





Figure 39.17. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.



39.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 217 coded units and 108 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 27 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 108 opposed and 82 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 118 grade A, 18 grade B, 77 grade C, 4 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. g_usa_units.csv.
2. Mean of Lowy diplomatic 46.1 and cultural 33.0. Washington lobbying moved to India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power..
3. Grant level 29.8.

Chapter 40

China

Arena 8.4 · weight 3.60 · reading **34.0** · opposed majority

40.1 Scope

The Chinese state: border, trade, supply chains, Pakistan alliance.

Principal evidence: Comprehensive power, Lowy Asia Power Index 2025: India 40.0 vs China 73.7 (low end: GDP, IMF 2026).

40.2 Significance

Border security, import dependence, regional influence.

40.3 Indicators and weights

Table 40.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 40.1. Indicators of arena 8.4


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints)[1]	0.45	23.3
Security (Lowy military, defence networks)[2]	0.35	43.5
Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)[2]	0.20	41.7
Arena reading	**1.00**	**34.0**

40.4 Reading

The arena reads **34.0**, 16.0 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3.60 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.14 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for security (Lowy military, defence networks) (43.5), the lowest for economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints) (23.3).

Figure 40.1. Readings of arena 8.4 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

40.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints)

Reading **23.3%**

Electronics 44%, APIs 74%, Li-ion 84%, magnets 80% from China

Figure 40.2. The 15 biggest of 53 (US$ million)




Figure 40.3. Each counted row (percent)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 40.4. Each counted row (percent (approx))

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 40.5. The 7 biggest of 7 (event (1 = occurred; date in notes))




Figure 40.6. The 4 biggest of 4 (USD mn)




Figure 40.7. Each counted row (%)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 40.8. Over time: China's share of India's exports · % of India total exports




Figure 40.9. Over time: India's exports to China, India's imports from China, Trade balance with China · $ billion





Figure 40.10. Over time: China's share of India's imports · % of India total imports



Measure 2. Security (Lowy military, defence networks)

Reading **43.5%**

g_china_units.csv

Figure 40.11. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.





Figure 40.12. The 5 biggest of 5 (places renamed)



Measure 3. Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)

Reading **41.7%**

g_china_units.csv

Measure 4. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 40.13. Over time: Hostile acts recorded (events)





Figure 40.14. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.



40.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 147 coded units and 73 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 13 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 119 opposed and 15 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 77 grade A, 18 grade B, 46 grade C, 4 grade D, 2 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Electronics 44%, APIs 74%, Li-ion 84%, magnets 80% from China.
2. g_china_units.csv.

Chapter 41

Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks

Arena 8.5 · weight 2.35 · reading **61.5** · aligned majority

41.1 Scope

Islamist networks and the OIC bloc; Pakistan (its state, army and armed groups) and Bangladesh; and domestic networks they fund or inspire, such as the banned PFI.

Principal evidence: Mean of two contests. Abroad: India's counter-leverage 6/10 (Operation Sindoor, NIA, PFI ban, FATF, Gulf partners) vs the networks' external reach (65%). At home: the Hindutva core (18.8% of voters) vs the consolidated Muslim political bloc (12.8% of voters: 14.2% of Indians, ~90% voting against the NDA in 2024; Muslims are 20%+ of the population in 96 of 543 Lok Sabha seats) = 60%.

41.2 Significance

Oil and gas, Gulf remittances, terror and war on the western front, the eastern border and infiltration, Kashmir and OIC diplomacy, and street mobilisation at home.

41.3 Indicators and weights

Table 41.1 lists the 10 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 41.1. Indicators of arena 8.5


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)	0.14	59.5
Islamist networks & OIC: Security: J&K exchange ratio 2014-23[1]	0.06	64.8
Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)[2]	0.06	52.2
Pakistan: Security: Lowy military and J&K exchange ratio[3]	0.25	65.6
Pakistan: Economic (Lowy)	0.06	87.1
Pakistan: Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)	0.11	78.8
Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)[4]	0.04	14.0
Bangladesh: Comprehensive power (Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs Bangladesh 9.0)[5]	0.10	81.6
Bangladesh: Contest of documented acts since Aug 2024[6]	0.07	16.7
Bangladesh: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)[4]	0.01	14.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**61.5**

41.4 Reading

The arena reads **61.5**, 11.5 points above parity, and is classified as *aligned majority* (a reading of 60 or above). With a weight of 2.35 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.34 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Pakistan: Economic (Lowy) (87.1), the lowest for Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together) (14.0).

Figure 41.1. Readings of arena 8.5 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

41.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)

Reading **59.5%**

Hindutva core 19 vs Muslim bloc 13

Figure 41.2. Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)




Figure 41.3. The 6 biggest of 6 (seats)





Figure 41.4. Each counted row (% of Muslim voters)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 2. Islamist networks & OIC: Security: J&K exchange ratio 2014-23

Reading **64.9%**

Terrorists killed 1753 vs security forces and civilians 950 (SATP)

Measure 3. Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)

Reading **52.2%**

Terrorists killed 132 vs Security forces and civilians killed 121

Measure 4. Islamist networks & OIC: Abroad: counter-leverage vs external reach (judgement, not measured)

Reading **65.3%**

Replaced by the measured arena India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power.

Figure 41.5. The 15 biggest of 44 (US$ million)




Figure 41.6. Each counted row (percent)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 41.7. Each counted row (%)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 41.8. The 13 biggest of 13 (USD mn)




Figure 41.9. The 6 biggest of 6 (persons)





Figure 41.10. Each counted row (% of value)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 5. Islamist networks & OIC: Formal religious money (FCRA)

Reading **94.5%**

Hindu ₹328 cr vs Muslim ₹19 cr; informal Gulf money NO DATA, so weight 0

Figure 41.11. The 2 biggest of 2 (₹ crore)



Figure 41.12. The 3 biggest of 3 ($ billion)





Figure 41.13. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

30 flows counted, ₹488 crore.



Opposed ₹487 cr · 99.8% Neutral / not counted ₹1 cr · 0.2%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 41.14. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 41.15. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 41.16. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 6. Pakistan: Security: Lowy military and J&K exchange ratio

Reading **65.6%**

g_pak_series.csv

Figure 41.17. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 41.18. The 5 biggest of 5 (persons)




Figure 41.19. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event)




Figure 41.20. The 2 biggest of 2 (event)



Figure 41.21. Each counted row (% of the pair)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 41.22. Over time: Pakistan (Ceasefire violations on the LoC and IB) · CFVs




Figure 41.23. Over time: Pakistan (J&K encounters) · encounters




Figure 41.24. Over time: Pakistan (Security forces killed in J&K, Civilians killed in J&K, All fatalities in J&K and 1 more) · persons





Figure 41.25. Over time: Pakistan (Terrorist-initiated incidents in J&K, Major terror incidents in J&K) · incidents



Measure 7. Pakistan: Economic (Lowy)

Reading **87.1%**

Figure 41.26. Each counted row (0-10)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Figure 41.27. Over time: Pakistan (Pakistan's share of India's exports) · % of India total exports




Figure 41.28. Over time: Pakistan (India's exports to Pakistan, India's imports from Pakistan, Trade balance with Pakistan) · $ billion





Figure 41.29. Over time: Pakistan (Pakistan's share of India's imports) · % of India total imports



Measure 8. Pakistan: Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)

Reading **78.8%**

Figure 41.30. Each counted row (%)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 41.31. Each counted row (0-10)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 9. Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)

Reading **14.0%**

Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Indirect: Pakistan and Bangladesh use India's own opposing voices (opposition leaders, Left creators) to push their agenda. The analysis (Instagram reel) ↗

Figure 41.32. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (million followers)





Figure 41.33. The 15 biggest of 413 (million followers)




Measure 10. Bangladesh: Comprehensive power (Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs Bangladesh 9.0)

Reading **81.6%**

Lowy Asia Power Index 2025

Figure 41.34. Each counted row (score /100)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 11. Bangladesh: Contest of documented acts since Aug 2024

Reading **16.7%**

By government: Yunus interim government (Aug 2024–Feb 2026) 2 Indian counter-moves (transshipment withdrawn, land-port curbs) vs 7 opposing acts (attacks on Hindus, 76 incidents in 26 Nov 2024–25 Jan 2025 per MEA; Chinmoy Das arrest; Hasina extradition note; Yunus "landlocked" remark; Hasina death sentence …); BNP government (PM Tarique Rahman, since 17 Feb 2026) 0 vs 3 (PM visit refused until Hasina is extradited, push-in clashes, Farakka renewal pressure). Total 2 vs 10 (g_others_units.csv; owner, round 2 D20)

Figure 41.35. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million)




Figure 41.36. The 6 biggest of 6 (US$ million)




Figure 41.37. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event (1 = occurred; date in notes))




Figure 41.38. The 4 biggest of 4 (event (1 = occurred; date in notes))




Figure 41.39. The 2 biggest of 2 (USD mn)




Figure 41.40. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (event (count))





Figure 41.41. The 14 biggest of 14 (event (count))



Measure 12. Bangladesh: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)

Reading **14.0%**

Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Indirect: Pakistan and Bangladesh use India's own opposing voices (opposition leaders, Left creators) to push their agenda. The analysis (Instagram reel) ↗

Measure 13. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 41.42. Over time: Hostile acts recorded, Pakistan: Hostile acts recorded · events




Figure 41.43. Over time: OIC statements on India · OIC statements/resolutions on India recorded




Figure 41.44. Over time: Saudi Arabia's share of India's exports, UAE's share of India's exports · % of India total exports




Figure 41.45. Over time: India's exports to Saudi Arabia, India's imports from Saudi Arabia, Trade balance with Saudi Arabia and 3 more · $ billion




Figure 41.46. Over time: Saudi Arabia's share of India's imports, UAE's share of India's imports · % of India total imports




Figure 41.47. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.





Figure 41.48. Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)



41.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 308 coded units, 30 money flows and 302 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 39 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 264 opposed and 35 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 199 grade A, 37 grade B, 73 grade C, 11 grade D, 2 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Terrorists killed 1753 vs security forces and civilians 950 (SATP).
2. J&K 132 vs 106 (SATP, Pahalgam included) plus the Red Fort car bomb, 10 Nov 2025 (15 killed).
3. g_pak_series.csv.
4. Hindutva's share of the followers that come from Pakistan and Bangladesh: 17.5% of the opposing accounts' followers (owner's estimate, 15-20%, from a social-media analysis), 2% of the Hindutva accounts' (owner's default). Live from the follower rows. Grade E: an estimate, to be replaced by measured audience-country data. Indirect: Pakistan and Bangladesh use India's own opposing voices (opposition leaders, Left creators) to push their agenda..
5. Lowy Asia Power Index 2025.
6. By government: Yunus interim government (Aug 2024–Feb 2026) 2 Indian counter-moves (transshipment withdrawn, land-port curbs) vs 7 opposing acts (attacks on Hindus, 76 incidents in 26 Nov 2024–25 Jan 2025 per MEA; Chinmoy Das arrest; Hasina extradition note; Yunus “landlocked” remark; Hasina death sentence ...); BNP government (PM Tarique Rahman, since 17 Feb 2026) 0 vs 3 (PM visit refused until Hasina is extradited, push-in clashes, Farakka renewal pressure). Total 2 vs 10 (g_others_units.csv; owner, round 2 D20).

Chapter 42

Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States

Arena 8.6 · weight 0.82 · reading **38.2** · opposed majority

42.1 Scope

Europe (EU and UK), Russia, the Gulf governments, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Iran, the UN system, Khalistan networks and India's other neighbours.

Principal evidence: Threat-weighted India share against each member: Lowy 2025 where covered (Russia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), else GDP.

42.2 Significance

Trade and carbon rules, energy, arms, remittances, and diplomatic pressure.

42.3 Indicators and weights

Table 42.1 lists the 5 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 42.1. Indicators of arena 8.6

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Member-weighted share (Lowy or GDP: Russia, Gulf, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Iran ...)[1]	0.38	69.8


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Energy security (100 − crude import share)[2]	0.25	11.3
Europe: Economic interdependence[3]	0.18	16.8
Europe: Defence interdependence[4]	0.11	45.3
Europe: European-origin grants[5]	0.07	9.4
Arena reading	**1.00**	**38.2**

42.4 Reading

The arena reads **38.2**, 11.8 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 0.82 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.29 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Member-weighted share (Lowy or GDP: Russia, Gulf, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Iran …) (69.8), the lowest for Europe: European-origin grants (9.4).

Figure 42.1. Readings of arena 8.6 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

42.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).


Measure 1. Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Member-weighted share (Lowy or GDP: Russia, Gulf, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Iran ...)

Reading **69.8%**

Bangladesh moved to Global Islam

Figure 42.2. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 27 (score /100)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 2. Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Energy security (100 – crude import share)

Reading **11.3%**

88.7% of crude imported

Figure 42.3. Over time: Russia's share of India's exports · % of India total exports




Figure 42.4. Over time: India's exports to Russia, India's imports from Russia, Trade balance with Russia · $ billion





Figure 42.5. Over time: Russia's share of India's imports · % of India total imports



Measure 3. Europe: Economic interdependence

Reading **16.8%**

India 2.3% of EU trade in goods (DG Trade, 2025) vs EU 11.4% of India's

Figure 42.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million)




Figure 42.7. The 15 biggest of 26 (US$ million)




Figure 42.8. Each counted row (percent)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.




Figure 42.9. The 15 biggest of 20 (USD mn)




Figure 42.10. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)




Figure 42.11. The 6 biggest of 6 (₹ crore)




Figure 42.12. Each counted row (%)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.





Figure 42.13. The 15 biggest of 19 (exclusion (count))



Measure 4. Europe: Defence interdependence

Reading **45.3%**

SIPRI 2021-25


Measure 5. Europe: European-origin grants

Reading **9.4%**

₹485 cr H vs ₹4,660 cr R

Figure 42.14. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

1043 flows counted, ₹11,723 crore.



Hindutva-aligned ₹11 cr · 0.1% Opposed ₹10,413 cr · 88.8%

Neutral / not counted ₹1,299 cr · 11.1%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 42.15. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 42.16. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 42.17. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 6. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 42.18. Over time: Hostile acts recorded, Europe: Hostile acts recorded (events)





Figure 42.19. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.



42.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 510 coded units and 79 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 71 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 312 opposed and 127 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 334 grade A, 28 grade B, 129 grade C, 8 grade D, 11 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Bangladesh moved to Global Islam.
2. 88.7% of crude imported.
3. India 2.3% of EU trade in goods (DG Trade, 2025) vs EU 11.4% of India's.
4. SIPRI 2021-25.
5. ₹485 cr H vs ₹4,660 cr R.

Chapter 43

Transnational Christian Organisations

Arena 8.7 · weight 0.45 · reading **48.6** · contested

43.1 Scope

Mission agencies, FCRA funding, USCIRF and Congress lobbying, persecution indices.

Principal evidence: Demography counted twice: Hindus 79.8% vs Christians 2.3% (Census; 2.6% after switching, Pew). Plus India's counter-leverage (FCRA, anti-conversion laws in 13 states) vs mission reach, and foreign religious money (Hindu ₹328 cr vs Christian ₹1,345 cr, 2024-25).

43.2 Significance

Conversion activity, foreign pressure on religious-freedom laws.

43.3 Indicators and weights

Table 43.1 lists the 4 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 43.1. Indicators of arena 8.7

Indicator	Weight	Reading
Demography (Hindus 79.8 vs Christians 2.3, counted once)	0.35	97.2
Foreign religious money (FCRA)[1]	0.25	19.6


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Gatekeeping: anti-conversion laws and FCRA channel shut[2]	0.20	48.3
Persecution-index sources[3]	0.20	0.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**48.6**

43.4 Reading

The arena reads **48.6**, 1.4 points below parity, and is classified as *contested* (a reading from 45 to below 60). With a weight of 0.45 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.20 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for demography (Hindus 79.8 vs Christians 2.3, counted once) (97.2), the lowest for persecution-index sources (0.0).

Figure 43.1. Readings of arena 8.7 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

43.5 Measures and exhibits


The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Demography (Hindus 79.8 vs Christians 2.3, counted once)

Reading **97.2%**

Figure 43.2. Each counted row (%)

Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.



Measure 2. Foreign religious money (FCRA)

Reading **19.6%**

Hindu ₹328 cr vs Christian ₹1,345 cr

Figure 43.3. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore)




Figure 43.4. The 8 biggest of 8 (₹ crore)




Figure 43.5. The 9 biggest of 9 (₹ crore)





Figure 43.6. The money flow: from whom, through which camp, to where

85 flows counted, ₹3,320 crore.



Opposed ₹3,320 cr · 100.0%

Left: where the money comes from · Middle: the camp it strengthens · Right: where it goes

Figure 43.7. The biggest sources, by the camp their money strengthens (₹ crore)




Figure 43.8. The biggest recipients (₹ crore)





Figure 43.9. By country of origin (₹ crore)



Measure 3. Gatekeeping: anti-conversion laws and FCRA channel shut

Reading **48.3%**

13 of 28 states; FCRA 50.2

Measure 4. Persecution-index sources

Reading **0.0%**

USCIRF citations RW 0

Figure 43.10. Over time: Open Doors World Watch List rank · rank






Figure 43.11. Over time: USCIRF status for India · 2 = CPC recommended, 1 = Tier 2, 0 = none



Measure 5. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 43.12. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.



43.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 30 coded units, 85 money flows and 21 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 6 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 107 opposed and 2 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 106 grade A, 8 grade C, 1 grade D.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. Hindu ₹328 cr vs Christian ₹1,345 cr.
2. 13 of 28 states; FCRA 50.2.
3. USCIRF citations RW 0.

Chapter 44

The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad

Arena 8.8 · weight 2 · reading **38.5** · opposed majority

44.1 Scope

Hindu and pro-government diaspora organisations abroad, compared with diaspora and advocacy organisations that oppose them: Hindus for Human Rights, IAMC, Equality Labs, the "Dismantling Global Hindutva" network, Khalistani groups such as SFJ, and related lobbying in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

The actor's reach into India is assessed across eight channels, scored from 0 to 10: Trade (0.0); Energy (0.0); Capital (0.0); Defence and armed groups (Khalistani groups abroad; UK asset freeze over alleged Babbar Khalsa support, Dec 2025) (2.0); Technology (0.0); Diplomatic (USCIRF CPC recommendation 7 years running; Canada rupture 2023-24; caste laws) (5.0); Diaspora (5.2m Indian Americans, 1.9m British Indians: the contested ground) (6.0); Domestic mobilisation (money and narrative for domestic opposing actors) (3.0). Its overall reach is 4.0 of 10.

44.2 Significance

India's image abroad, the votes and money of the diaspora, legislation on caste and on anti-Hindu bias, and the information on which the US Congress, USCIRF and Western governments act.

44.3 Indicators and weights

Table 44.1 lists the 5 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator's reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 44.1. Indicators of arena 8.8


Indicator	Weight	Reading
Organisations abroad: Hindu and pro-India vs opposing (revenue, ₹ cr a year)[1]	0.25	23.3
Lobbying and political money (FARA, LDA, PACs, 2020-26)[2]	0.20	50.9
Resolutions and laws won abroad (caste, Hinduphobia, CAA, Khalistan), 2019-26[3]	0.20	42.0
Diaspora opinion: approve of Modi, share of all (US, UK)[4]	0.20	39.6
India's image abroad (Pew: favourable view of India, confidence in Modi)[5]	0.15	41.0
Arena reading	**1.00**	**38.5**

44.4 Reading

The arena reads **38.5**, 11.5 points below parity, and is classified as *opposed majority* (a reading below 45). With a weight of 2 of a total 107.7, it contributes 0.71 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for lobbying and political money (FARA, LDA, PACs, 2020-26) (50.9), the lowest for organisations abroad: Hindu and pro-India vs opposing (revenue, ₹ cr a year) (23.3).

Figure 44.1. Readings of arena 8.8 by indicator



Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

44.5 Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas's own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Organisations abroad: Hindu and pro-India vs opposing (revenue, ₹ cr a year)

Reading **23.3%**

Hindu and pro-India 152 vs Hostile 500

Figure 44.2. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (₹ crore a year)





Figure 44.3. The 15 biggest of 38 (₹ crore a year)



Measure 2. Lobbying and political money (FARA, LDA, PACs, 2020-26)

Reading **50.9%**

India, BJP, RSS, Hindu-American 18 vs Hostile 18

Figure 44.4. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (US$ million)





Figure 44.5. The 15 biggest of 408 (US$ million)



Measure 3. Resolutions and laws won abroad (caste, Hinduphobia, CAA, Khalistan), 2019-26


Reading **42.0%**

Won 21 vs Lost 29

Figure 44.6. Hindutva-aligned vs opposed, counted rows (decisions won)



Figure 44.7. The 15 biggest of 50 (decisions won)



Measure 4. Diaspora opinion: approve of Modi, share of all (US, UK)

Reading **39.6%**

Carnegie IAAS 2024 47% (US), BIAS 2021 19% (UK), weighted by population; no opinion counts against (1a)

Measure 5. India's image abroad (Pew: favourable view of India, confidence in Modi)

Reading **41.0%**

Pew 2026 36-country median favourable 45%; 2023 confidence in Modi 37%; share of all (1a)

Figure 44.8. Over time: Pew: favourable view of India, Pew: unfavourable view of India (score or %)





Figure 44.9. Over time: Lowy Institute Asia Power Index: overall compre..., Lowy Institute Asia Power Index: diplomatic inf..., Lowy Institute Asia Power Index: cultural influ... and 1 more (score or %)



Measure 6. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 44.10. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)

Each player's weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.




Figure 44.11. Organisations abroad: Hindu and pro-India vs opposing (revenue, ₹ cr a year)




Figure 44.12. Lobbying and political money (FARA, LDA, PACs, 2020-26)





Figure 44.13. Resolutions and laws won abroad (caste, Hinduphobia, CAA, Khalistan), 2019-26



44.6 Evidence base

The arena rests on 735 coded units and 18 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 133 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 149 opposed and 453 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 679 grade A, 41 grade B.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

1. 18 vs 21 organisations; IRS 990, Charity Commission, CRA, ACNC (organisations.csv). Moved from 2.4 Global allies.
2. US$ m; India govt $16.1m of $18.4m is borrowed power; Pakistan FARA 2025, SFJ, Impact Fund (lobbying.csv). Moved from 8.6 Narrative.
3. 21 won vs 29 lost; since 2023: 17 vs 14 (resolutions.csv).
4. Carnegie IAAS 2024 47% (US), BIAS 2021 19% (UK), weighted by population; no opinion counts against (1a).
5. Pew 2026 36-country median favourable 45%; 2023 confidence in Modi 37%; share of all (1a).

PART X

The Underlying Studies

The arena readings rest on thirteen research modules and a master dataset of money flows. Part X reproduces the studies' own figures: the flow of money from source to recipient, the power index, natural experiments and scenarios, foreign and domestic funding, political money, social media, discourse, the media, knowledge, the State, the economy, religion and demography, organised interests and international opinion, and finally the calibration of the classification itself.

45	The Flow of Money: An Overview
46	Power Index, Dynamics and Scenarios
47	Foreign and Diaspora Money
48	Domestic Giving, CSR and the Religious Economy
49	Political Money and Government Advertising
50	Social Media and Information Infrastructure
51	Whole-of-Population Discourse
52	News Media, Entertainment and Culture
53	Knowledge, Education and Expertise

54	Control of State Institutions
55	Economic Power, Welfare and Patronage
56	Religion, Demography, Identity and Memory
57	Law, Labour, Science and Corporate Bodies
58	International Opinion, Foreign Influence and Elite Networks
59	Calibration and Classification


Chapter 45

The Flow of Money: An Overview

The master flow dataset of the Atlas follows money from its source, through the bloc it strengthens, to its function and recipient. This chapter brings together the headline visuals built on it: the master and domain flow diagrams, the treemap of recipients, the time series by module and the networks of funders and recipients.

The 15 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the Atlas report and its synthesis, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).


Figure 45.1. RW leads non-state money, mass exposure and Union institutions; the state moves the most money



Source: synthesis/out (HEADLINE_flows, MC, T20); M5 discourse share; M8 institution census; S-A T56/T57.

Headline KPIs with confidence tag and classification basis (interactive version in the HTML report). Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0) unless stated.


Figure 45.2. Political, welfare and religious money dominate; most of it reaches GOV or unattributed recipients



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Source type → Bloc → Function → Recipient; raw ₹ crore. n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.3. Political, welfare and religious money dominate; most of it reaches GOV or unattributed recipients (influence-adjusted)



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Source type → Bloc → Function → Recipient; influence-adjusted ₹ crore-equivalent. n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.4. Each domain draws on a few source types; bloc money concentrates in religion, politics and education



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Source type → Domain → Bloc; raw ₹ crore. n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).

Figure 45.5. Each domain draws on a few source types; bloc money concentrates in religion, politics and education (influence-adjusted)



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Source type → Domain → Bloc; influence-adjusted ₹ crore-equivalent. n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.6. GOV and unattributed money fill most of the map; LW and RW money is fragmented across many recipients



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Bloc → domain → function → recipient; raw ₹ crore. n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.7. Non-state money: LW is 24% of LW+RW raw and 34% after evidence-derived multipliers (Lens 1); state and market money lean further RW



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv); MC_lw_rw_adjusted_quantiles.csv; synthesis/multipliers.md.

Panel A: share of all headline ₹ by bloc under three weightings. Panel B: LW share of LW+RW by sector, lens and weighting. n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1) and Ensemble.


Figure 45.8. RW leads 8 of 11 layers (<45% LW); LW leads 1; near parity: L5 Legitimacy, L6 Identity



Source: synthesis/out/powerindex/T57_layer_balance.csv.

LW share of LW+RW power per hegemony layer L1–L11 (RW = 1 − LW); band = low–high range. n = 11 layers. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0), expected value — S-A T57.


Figure 45.9. The 2015 jump is coverage, not change: religious-giving series (M2) begin; political money (M3) swung RW after 2014



Source: synthesis/out/T4_module_fy_x_family_raw.csv.

Raw ₹ crore per fiscal year (FY end), module time series; breakpoints annotated. n = 9 modules. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.10. GOV money is service delivery and institutions; RW money is mostly religious upkeep, party and ads; LW money is spread wider



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Headline ₹ crore by function (cause) × bloc; shading is log scale; raw (left) vs adjusted (right). n = 5,216 flows. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.11. Religion, state promotion, knowledge and corporate money lean RW; education, ESG, law and media money lean LW



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

LW share of LW+RW ₹ by domain, raw (●) vs influence-adjusted (○); right margin: LW+RW ₹ cr. n = 18 domains. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).


Figure 45.12. RW-mapped parties ran 7 of these states in 2013 and 22 in 2026



Source: data/companion/M8_state_ruling_party_panel.csv; codebook/party_bloc_mapping.csv (T66).


Ruling party's bloc by state and year (T66 mapping); GOV = President's Rule. LW-mapped in 2026: Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana. n = 31 states/UTs × 23 years. Classification basis: T66 party mapping (Lens 2 per period).

Figure 45.13. Heatmap: state × layer balance



Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 45.14. Money networks are hub-and-spoke: governments and aggregate private giving feed most large recipients



Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Top 90 funder → recipient edges by headline ₹; node area ∝ ₹; edge width ∝ ₹; colour/pattern = recipient bloc. n = 126 nodes, 90 edges. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0, v1.1).

Figure 45.15. Influence per rupee is set by function, not bloc: the diagonals are the multipliers

Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv); S-A T55 durability.

Recipients: raw ₹ vs influence-adjusted ₹ (log–log); diagonals mark multipliers ×0.75–×7.5. n = 828 recipients ≥ ₹5 cr. Classification basis: Lens 1 (S0); user multipliers (U mid).


Chapter 46

Power Index, Dynamics and Scenarios

The synthesis of the studies: natural experiments (FCRA cancellations, the end of electoral bonds, changes of government, the election cycle, platform events), the power vector matrix and index, the balance of each layer over time, causal loops, chokepoints, resilience and scenarios to 2036.


The 14 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the Atlas report and its synthesis, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

Figure 46.1. Natural experiments: FCRA cancellations (synthesis)




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.2. Natural experiments: electoral bonds strike-down




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.3. Natural experiments: changes of government




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.4. Natural experiments: election cycle




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.5. Natural experiments: platform events




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.6. Power Vector Matrix explorer




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.7. India Power Index: top 50 with sub-index breakdown




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.8. Aggregate balance per layer over time with bands




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.9. Causal loop diagrams




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.10. Chokepoint map




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.11. Resilience / vulnerability radar per side




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.12. Scenario fan charts




Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.13. Scenario layer balance in 2036



Source: Atlas synthesis.

Figure 46.14. State-by-state small multiples of layer balance



Source: Atlas synthesis.

Chapter 47


Foreign and Diaspora Money

FCRA receipts, foreign foundations, governments and multilaterals, foreign religious bodies, diaspora giving, universities and scholarships, and technology platforms.

The 8 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M1, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

47.1 1. Source A: FCRA receipts, FY2004-05 to FY2025-26


Figure 47.1. FCRA totals



Source: Atlas research module M1, "1. Source A: FCRA receipts, FY2004-05 to FY2025-26".

47.2 1.3 Top recipients (MHA lists) by Lens 1 label

Figure 47.2. FCRA top recipients




Source: Atlas research module M1, "1.3 Top recipients (MHA lists) by Lens 1 label".

Earlier years. The MHA annual reports for FY05–FY11 carry full state, purpose and donor-country annexes, parsed in raw/fcra/work/. They include OCR of AR 2010-11, reconciled to ±0.02% of the printed totals. Two caveats:

47.3 2. Source B: foreign foundations; funder portfolio labels (T67)


Figure 47.3. T67 portfolios



Source: Atlas research module M1, "2. Source B: foreign foundations; funder portfolio labels (T67)".

47.4 3. Source C: foreign governments and multilaterals


Figure 47.4. ODA by channel



Source: Atlas research module M1, "3. Source C: foreign governments and multilaterals".

47.5 4. Source D: foreign religious money


Figure 47.5. Religious funders



Source: Atlas research module M1, "4. Source D: foreign religious money".

47.6 5. Source E: diaspora, all sides


Figure 47.6. Diaspora funders



Source: Atlas research module M1, “5. Source E: diaspora, all sides”.

47.7 8. Source AG: FARA, and T53 (money side)


Figure 47.7. FARA



Source: Atlas research module M1, “8. Source AG: FARA, and T53 (money side)”.

47.8 9. T10: FCRA natural experiments (§9C)

Figure 47.8. T10



Source: Atlas research module M1, “9. T10: FCRA natural experiments (§9C)”.

Chapter 48


Domestic Giving, CSR and the Religious Economy

Private domestic philanthropy, corporate social responsibility spending, and the money of temples, churches, mosques and other religious bodies.

The 6 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M2, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).


48.1 1. Corporate CSR (source H), with PSU CSR reported separately

Figure 48.1. Fig H1



Source: Atlas research module M2, "1. Corporate CSR (source H), with PSU CSR reported separately".

Figure 48.2. Fig H2




Source: Atlas research module M2, "1. Corporate CSR (source H), with PSU CSR reported separately".

Headline.

48.2 2. Domestic foundations and HNIs (source K)


Figure 48.3. Fig K1



Source: Atlas research module M2, "2. Domestic foundations and HNIs (source K)".

48.3 4. Private religious giving (source M)


Figure 48.4. Fig M1



Source: Atlas research module M2, “4. Private religious giving (source M)”.

48.4 5. State funding of religion (source J)


Figure 48.5. Fig J1



Source: Atlas research module M2, “5. State funding of religion (source J)”.

48.5 6. Stocks: religious land and treasuries (T48-religious), institution networks and endowments (T15)

Figure 48.6. Fig S1



Source: Atlas research module M2, “6. Stocks: religious land and treasuries (T48-religious), institution networks and endowments (T15)”.

Chapter 49


Political Money and Government Advertising

Party income and spending, electoral bonds and trusts, and Union and state government advertising and promotion.

The 10 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M3, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

49.1 1. Party income, FY2004-05 to FY2024-25 (D19; sources P, AF)

Figure 49.1. Party income




Source: Atlas research module M3, "1. Party income, FY2004-05 to FY2024-25 (D19; sources P, AF)".

Data.

49.2 2. Electoral bonds: the donor → party matrix (D19; source P)

Figure 49.2. Bonds Sankey




Source: Atlas research module M3, “2. Electoral bonds: the donor → party matrix (D19; source P)”.

Checks.

49.3 3. Electoral trusts and pre-2013 trusts (D19; sources P, AF)

Figure 49.3. Trusts




Source: Atlas research module M3, "3. Electoral trusts and pre-2013 trusts (D19; sources P, AF)".

Allegations (ALLEGED/INFERRED, not documented).

49.4 4. Election and candidate spending; offline mass communication (D19, D18; sources P, Y)

Figure 49.4. Election spend




Source: Atlas research module M3, "4. Election and candidate spending; offline mass communication (D19, D18; sources P, Y)".

Coverage. Trust receipts are 91% donor-attributed. The unattributed ₹752.65 cr is AB General FY25 plus General ET FY15.

49.5 5. Digital political ads and influence-for-hire (D19, D21; sources P, W)

Figure 49.5. Digital ads




Source: Atlas research module M3, "5. Digital political ads and influence-for-hire (D19, D21; sources P, W)".

Boundary with M4. M3 owns the ₹ flows for party, surrogate-page and consultancy-run ads, and for government digital ads and influencer schemes. M4 records platform-level copies of these rows flagged overlap-M3. M3 file and row IDs: F-M3-DA- *and F-M3-IS-*.

49.6 7. State government advertising: DIPR spend, out-of-state ads and election spikes (D18; source Q)


Figure 49.6. Per-capita govt ads



Source: Atlas research module M3, "7. State government advertising: DIPR spend, out-of-state ads and election spikes (D18; source Q)".

Every source is a lower bound with a different scope, because departments, boards and off-budget bodies also advertise. So each **primary** flow row takes the largest documented total at the highest source rank, and every alternative is kept in M3_T14_govt_ads_all_sources.csv. Multi-year totals with no annual split are allocated evenly (F-M3-RA-*, EST). Each FY takes the bloc of that FY's ruling party (scripts/ruling_parties.csv, 31 jurisdictions FY05–FY27, 2026 changes verified in the press).


Figure 49.7. Election spikes



Source: Atlas research module M3, "7. State government advertising: DIPR spend, out-of-state ads and election spikes (D18; source Q)".

Exceptions where spending had already peaked: Union FY19 0.91×; AP (TDP) FY19 0.98×; Jharkhand (JMM) FY25 0.98×; Delhi (AAP) FY25 0.62×.

Figure 49.8. Out-of-state




Source: Atlas research module M3, "7. State government advertising: DIPR spend, out-of-state ads and election spikes (D18; source Q)".

Five out-of-state campaigns have dates but no amounts: Karnataka (INC) in Telangana, Nov 2023, stopped by the ECI; Telangana in Maharashtra (Nov 2024) and in Kerala papers (2026); Delhi (AAP) in other states (CAG noted campaigns "outside NCT"); BRS national papers before the party's national launch.

49.7 9. Discretionary funds (D27, D19; source AB)

Figure 49.9. Funds




Source: Atlas research module M3, “9. Discretionary funds (D27, D19; source AB)”.

Other central items.

49.8 10. T66 verification against roll-call and voting records

Figure 49.10. T66 votes



Source: Atlas research module M3, “10. T66 verification against roll-call and voting records”.

Limits. Indian divisions publish totals; member-wise lists exist only for recorded divisions, and no official party-wise tally exists. Positions come from ≥2 independent press or official sources per party-vote (136 records, notes/t66_votes.csv), graded C.

Chapter 50


Social Media and Information Infrastructure

The creator economy, platform money, moderation and fact-checking, internet shutdowns and the infrastructure of online discourse.

The 13 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M4, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

50.1 T22 headline table

Figure 50.1. Indian users by platform, latest best-graded figure




Source: Atlas research module M4, "T22 headline table".

[1] Reuters Institute DNR: share of an English-speaking online sample using the platform for news weekly. This is not the share of all

Indians.

50.2 Platform payouts: who gets paid for political attention

Figure 50.2. Social-media money Sankey




Source: Atlas research module M4, "Platform payouts: who gets paid for political attention".

X, Meta, ShareChat/Moj, Josh, Snap and Spotify payouts are NO-DATA. None publishes India-level creator payouts (pull: platform annual reports or a court or parliamentary disclosure; see COVERAGE.md).

50.3 T24 top units (YouTube, India audience; by 12-month political views)


Figure 50.3. Creator universe



Source: Atlas research module M4, "T24 top units (YouTube, India audience; by 12-month political views)".

The full list, per platform × language, is in tables/census_T24_top.csv. Totals by platform × language × family × tier × creator type are in tables/census_T25_totals.csv.

Figure 50.4. X amplification network




Source: Atlas research module M4, "T24 top units (YouTube, India audience; by 12-month political views)".

Figure V22. The political YouTube universe is dominated by a few dozen TV-news channels. Most of the very largest are mixed or regional; RW channels outnumber LW channels among those above 1 bn political views. Unit: 12-month political views (bubble area) by family and language. Source: M4_creator_census.csv. n = 916 units with ≥10% political items. Classification basis: Lens 1 unit label after adjudication. The raw positions are shown.

50.4 Paid vs organic, and over time

Figure 50.5. Discourse share over time




Source: Atlas research module M4, “Paid vs organic, and over time”.

Across the 230 fixed queries, search results lean LW in English (LW 0.26 vs RW 0.21) and Hindi (0.21 vs 0.18). They lean RW in Bhojpuri (0.64), Bengali (0.18 vs 0.04), Assamese (0.31 vs 0.16) and Gujarati (0.17 vs 0.11). In Tamil (0.54) and Urdu (0.52), government-official results dominate. Query-cluster bootstrap bands are wide (tables/pool_share_by_lang.csv). **Search exposure is not engagement exposure.** Queries about contested issues pull up explainer and opposition commentary that the census's high-volume TV channels do not carry.

50.5 T27 summary by origin alignment


Figure 50.6. V25



Source: Atlas research module M4, "T27 summary by origin alignment".

Source: tables/T27_by_alignment.csv, DERIVED from case rows graded A–C.


Figure 50.7. V35



Source: Atlas research module M4, "T27 summary by origin alignment".

Source: tables/T27_by_alignment.csv, DERIVED from case rows graded A–C.


Figure 50.8. V36



Source: Atlas research module M4, “T27 summary by origin alignment”.

50.6 T28 documented cases by initiator and target alignment

Figure 50.9. Documented actions against named accounts by initiator and target alignment




Source: Atlas research module M4, “T28 documented cases by initiator and target alignment”.

Source: tables/T28_platform_actions.csv. Some label/limited rows were notice-only. MOD-008, the Vice-President's personal handle, is RW on prior party role and is NEU in sensitivity.

50.7 T28b Fact-check asymmetry: whose circulating claims get checked, and who pays the checkers

Figure 50.10. Fact-check direction by checker




Source: Atlas research module M4, "T28b Fact-check asymmetry: whose circulating claims get checked, and who pays the checkers".

Source: tables/fc_direction_by_org.csv and atlas/data/companion/M4_factcheck_asymmetry.csv (DERIVED from org-blind codes; B-grade sample). Rows with fewer than 20 political items (BOOM, First Check, THIP, Medical Dialogues, EastMojo) are in the CSV only; health-focused checkers carry almost no political content.

50.8 Within-state comparison (state fixed effects)

Figure 50.11. Shutdown events per year and rate per governed state-year



Source: Atlas research module M4, “Within-state comparison (state fixed effects)”.

Rajasthan events are frequent under both INC (42) and BJP (73), and a large share are exam-related (35 of 115). Rajasthan therefore shows that shutdowns as an exam-integrity tool are used across blocs, more than it shows a bloc effect.

50.9 Summary table

Figure 50.12. Natural experiments

Source: Atlas research module M4, “Summary table”.

Figure V37. Koo rose after the Feb 2021 MeitY–Twitter standoff, peaked at about 9–10 mn users in 2022 and decayed to 2.7 mn before closing in Jul 2024; Twitter India had about 69 mn MAU. After the TikTok ban, company claims for Moj and Josh (115–160 mn MAU) were 3–8× third-party panel estimates (14–48 mn). Unit: users in millions. Source: raw/desk/natural_experiments.csv (company releases via press, HARD C; App Annie / SimilarWeb, EST C). n = 11 points. Classification basis: none (reach only).

50.10 D30 Information infrastructure, surveillance and AI

Figure 50.13. Left: share of the largest and top-2 firms in four infrastructure markets. Right: share of AI answers framed toward each bloc pole, by model

Source: Atlas research module M4, “D30 Information infrastructure, surveillance and AI”.

Headline.

Chapter 51


Whole-of-Population Discourse

What all 1.48 billion residents hear, from whom and with how much trust, across 171 population segments and 85 channels.

The 10 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M5, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

51.1 Contents

Figure 51.1. V28




Source: Atlas research module M5, "Contents".

M5 maps **how all ~1.48 billion Indians encounter political and ideological content**, not just the online, English-speaking or urban population. It covers every channel in mandate §11B and every segment dimension in §11A. The unit of account is the **trust-weighted person-hour of exposure** (mandate §11C; pre-registration §2):

51.2 3.4 T32 excerpt: segment × channel


Figure 51.2. V29



Source: Atlas research module M5, "3.4 T32 excerpt: segment × channel".

Each cell gives reach % · political exposure (mn trust-weighted person-hours per week). Full matrix in the CSV.

Figure 51.3. V34




Source: Atlas research module M5, “3.4 T32 excerpt: segment × channel”.

Reading.

51.3 4.1 National

Figure 51.4. T33 national




Source: Atlas research module M5, “4.1 National”.

Reading.

51.4 4.2 What drives each side's share

Figure 51.5. drivers




Source: Atlas research module M5, “4.2 What drives each side's share”.

Sources of the RW lead:

51.5 5.1 National trends, mapped to α–μ


Figure 51.6. T34



Source: Atlas research module M5, “5.1 National trends, mapped to α–μ”.

51.6 6. Elite vs mass split (T36; mandate 11F)

Figure 51.7. V31




Source: Atlas research module M5, “6. Elite vs mass split (T36; mandate 11F)”.

Result.

51.7 7. Contested segments (11H, T35)

Figure 51.8. V33




Source: Atlas research module M5, “7. Contested segments (11H, T35)”.

Pattern.

51.8 8. Stock-flow model (11G)

Figure 51.9. V32




Source: Atlas research module M5, “8. Stock-flow model (11G)”.

> discourse exposure (flow) → belief stock → identity stock → behaviour (vote, mobilise, donate, convert) → institutional power

51.9 9. Swing and stronghold map (T35; mandate 11I)

Figure 51.10. V30



Source: Atlas research module M5, “9. Swing and stronghold map (T35; mandate 11I)”.

Counts.

Chapter 52


News Media, Entertainment and Culture

News television and print, cinema and streaming, culture and awards.

The 6 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M6, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

52.1 1.4 Content audit (Lens 4, §8H)

Figure 52.1. D4 outlet framing




Source: Atlas research module M6, “1.4 Content audit (Lens 4, §8H)”.

Mirror test (training-bias control, §12). 200 headline pairs were coded with the parties and communities swapped. Coders detected LW-favouring framing 95.9% of the time but RW-favouring framing only 75.3%, an asymmetry of −0.165 (90% CI −0.24 to

−0.10). This is the predicted training bias: RW framing is read as "normal".

Figure 52.2. Debates




Source: Atlas research module M6, “1.4 Content audit (Lens 4, §8H)”.

Prime-time debates (lens4/show_metrics.csv; figure D4-2):

52.2 2. T16 Narrative share by medium and language

Figure 52.3. T16




Source: M6 Lens-4 audit (atlas/data/companion/MIL_TNL_narrative_share.csv); reach weights: IRS-2019 AIR (print, HARO), YouTube subscribers (TVdigital, EST) · Classification: Lens 4 headline/episode framing, A+B adjudicated · n = 127 outlet editions, 23 debate shows · DERIVED; mirror adjustment + sensitivity

Source: Atlas research module M6, "2. T16 Narrative share by medium and language".

V15, trend. On the 47-outlet historical panel (Google News archive windows 2014–2023), the bloc-favouring slice stays small, under 15% of bloc-coded headlines in every medium-year, and noisy, with n ≈ 100–250 per cell. The data do not support a claim of a monotonic shift in headline framing after 2014. The structural change we *can* document is in ownership (Network18 2014, NDTV 2022, IANS 2024) and in the rise of the debate format. Historical debate and TV-website samples are NO-DATA before 2023: YouTube archives are incomplete and Google News coverage of TV sites is thin.

Figure 52.4. V15




Source: M6 Lens-4 historical sample (Google News archive windows 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021, 2023) + current S1 · Classification: Lens 4, A+B adjudicated · n = 3,140 historical + 6,604 current headlines · DERIVED; small n per window - see labels

Source: Atlas research module M6, "2. T16 Narrative share by medium and language".

V15, trend. On the 47-outlet historical panel (Google News archive windows 2014–2023), the bloc-favouring slice stays small, under 15% of bloc-coded headlines in every medium-year, and noisy, with n ≈ 100–250 per cell. The data do not support a claim of a monotonic shift in headline framing after 2014. The structural change we *can* document is in ownership (Network18 2014, NDTV 2022, IANS 2024) and in the rise of the debate format. Historical debate and TV-website samples are NO-DATA before 2023: YouTube archives are incomplete and Google News coverage of TV sites is thin.

52.3 3.2 Film content audit (Lens 4 for cultural products)

Figure 52.5. Films




Source: Atlas research module M6, "3.2 Film content audit (Lens 4 for cultural products)".

Reading.

52.4 4. D17 Awards and honours: T18

Figure 52.6. V17



Source: Atlas research module M6, “4. D17 Awards and honours: T18”.

Reading.

Chapter 53


Knowledge, Education and Expertise

Universities, research councils, think tanks, school networks and the expert establishment.

The 11 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M7, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

53.1 1. Universities, departments, law and journalism schools, and foreign university India programmes

Figure 53.1. Union grants to UGC + central universities doubled in a decade; private liberal-arts universities run at a fraction of a large central university



Source: Atlas research module M7, "1. Universities, departments, law and journalism schools, and foreign university India programmes".


> **Key findings** > - **Union money to universities doubled in nominal terms in a decade.** Grant to UGC + Grants to Central

Universities rose from ₹9,786 cr (FY16 actual) to ₹19,721 cr (FY25 actual), +102%; BE FY27 is ₹21,149 cr (DERIVED from HARD, A) [UNI-0001..0130]. The CU line alone grew ×2.86, partly by relabelling: money shifted off the UGC line in FY25, and the CU line has carried HEFA loan repayment since FY18. No deflator is in the evidence base. > - **Private universities enrol a third of students; their money is mostly undisclosed.** They are 546 of 1,289 universities and hold 31.9% of university enrolment (AISHE 2023-24, A) [UNI-0508..0510]. Only OPJGU has an audited-derived income figure: ₹598.47 cr in FY24, of which ₹132 cr (22.1%, DERIVED) was donations and CSR, including JSPL CSR (CARE, A) [UNI-0451, 0455]. Ashoka reports ₹2,606 cr of cumulative *commitments* (a stock, not receipts; C) [UNI-0487]. > - **Per-university grants track size, but growth rates differ.** AMU received ₹1,575.48 cr in FY24, 2.65× JNU's ₹594.50 cr, close to their enrolment ratio of 2.8× (HARD, A) [UNI-0405, 0411, 0517]. From FY21 to FY25, JNU's grant rose 72% and AMU's 6.4% (DERIVED). NIRF operating spend per student is higher at Ashoka (₹13.1 lakh, FY23) than at JNU (₹7.9 lakh) or AMU (₹6.0 lakh) (DERIVED). > - **Governor–state fights over VC appointments are documented only in non-BJP-ruled states; police action against academics occurs under both.** Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Punjab and Karnataka legislated or litigated, and six opposition-ruled states resolved against the UGC Draft Regulations 2025. No such dispute was found in a BJP-ruled state (E, absence). Police and criminal action against academics: Haryana (BJP) arrested Mahmudabad in 2025; Delhi Police acted at JNU in 2016 and against a DU teacher in 2022; MP's EOW under the INC opened a fraud case against an ex-VC in 2019 (§1.5). > - **India-linked private money abroad dwarfs Indian state money for Indian studies abroad.** US universities reported USD 434.9 m (₹2,767 cr) in India-attributed gifts, 1992–2025 (Section 117, DERIVED, A) [FP-110], including the ₹162.8 cr Mittal gift to Harvard [FP-053]. ICCR's chairs line is ₹12 cr (BE FY27), and its operational chairs fell from 64 (2016) to 12 (2026) [FP-085, 086, 088].

US Title VI money for South Asia centres (₹36.7 cr in FY23) ended in 2025-26 [FP-049, 052].

53.2 2. Research councils (ICSSR, ICHR, ICPR, IIAS, IGNCA, NMML/PMML), journals, publishers and Indic-knowledge bodies

Figure 53.2. Council money fell 35% in 2016-21, then rose to a record ₹309 cr in 2024-25; ICHR, IGNCA and ICSSR heads were replaced within three years of 2014




Source: Union Budget Notes on Demands (DHE, Culture); CAG Separate Audit Reports in ICSSR/ICHR Annual Reports; LS AU2829 (2023), AU3248; leadership from MZ_research_councils.csv · Classification: none (government bodies; capture probabilities are M8) · n = 4 series, 18 FYs · gaps = NO-DATA, not zero

Source: Atlas research module M7, "2. Research councils (ICSSR, ICHR, ICPR, IIAS, IGNCA, NMML/PMML), journals, publishers and Indic-knowledge bodies".

> > Compared with the ABISY standard (offices documented by the organisation or the press): **five post-2014 ICHR posts were held by ABISY office-bearers, against one documented party-committee office among UPA-era council heads.** > - **Publisher withdrawals and pressure run in every direction.** Of 21 book and publisher episodes (1988–2026): > - governments or public bodies acted in 10 (INC, Left Front, INC-NCP, BJP and J&K administrations); > - private litigants or protesters acted in 9; > - publishers or owners acted on their own in 2. > > Penguin pulped Doniger's *The Hindus* after a civil suit (2014). Bloomsbury withdrew *Delhi Riots 2020*, which Garuda then published (2020) [PUB-064, 066..068]. > - **Indic-knowledge schemes spend a fraction of their approvals.** > - IKS: ₹405.78 cr approved for 2025-30 (₹81 cr/yr)

[PUB-247]; ₹8.35 cr spent in 2024-25 [BUD-IKS-*]. > - Gyan Bharatam: ₹482.85 cr approved for 2024-31; ₹2.63 cr spent in 2024-25 [PUB-112, 248]. > - Private presses for comparison: Gita Press sold ₹138 cr (FY26, C) [PUB-202]; Garuda Prakashan's revenue was ₹2.23 cr (FY25) [PUB-266].

Figure 53.3. Awards tagged "Indian knowledge traditions" rose from 3.6% to 9.9% of ICSSR awards; caste and gender shares slipped




Source: Atlas research module M7, "2. Research councils (ICSSR, ICHR, ICPR, IIAS, IGNCA, NMML/PMML), journals, publishers and Indic-knowledge bodies".

Figure 2.1 notes.

53.3 3. Think tanks (all sides): funding, staff and citation reach

Figure 53.4. Income does not track Parliamentary reach, and the bodies led by ruling-party office-bearers publish no income




Source: Atlas research module M7, "3. Think tanks (all sides): funding, staff and citation reach".

> - CPR's receipts fell from ₹30.48 cr (FY23) to ₹10.98 cr (FY24): −64%, DERIVED [TT-CPR-106, 107]. > - Zero comparable actions were found against VIF, India Foundation, SPMRF, PPRC, RMP or the LRO/GIA/Prajna Pravah group. > - The only action in the other direction came from a state: Karnataka's INC government against a Prajna Pravah conference (2026) [TTB-0354]. > - ORF, CEEW, WRI India and TERI also faced none, despite FC receipts of ₹29–91 cr/yr (ORF 47.4% foreign; CEEW ≈87%, EST). Motive is not established. > - **Citation reach favours older, government-funded economic institutes.** All counts HARD, grade A. > - Parliament-library items naming the body: NCAER 2,036, NIPFP 668, ICWA 594, CPR 330; ORF 38, VIF 9, SPMRF 1, PPRC 0. > - Mentions in 11 Economic Surveys: NCAER 22, NIPFP 20, CEEW 18, ORF 5, India Foundation 3, CPR 2, VIF 1; CSDS, ADR, CBGA and SPMRF 0. > - Media is the reverse: ORF appears in 22,285 GDELT articles. > - **Lens-4 (source-blind title audit): 13 of 57 bodies scored.** The rest had fewer than 5 directional items. > - Composites run from SPMRF +0.70, India

Foundation +0.37 and VIF +0.31 to IFF −0.46, ADR −0.44, Vidhi −0.44, CHRI −0.40 and CBGA −0.40. > - ORF (−0.08) and Gateway House (−0.02) are near zero. > - These are content-lens inputs on the codebook §3 scale (−2…+2), not labels.

53.4 4. School networks and textbooks (NCERT/SCERT 2014–26)

Figure 53.5. Faith-linked school networks rival the central government school systems: Catholic schools and Vidya Bharati each teach about 33 lakh children, roughly 2.5x Kendriya Vidyalayas



Source: Atlas research module M7, "4. School networks and textbooks (NCERT/SCERT 2014–26)".

> **Key findings** > - **Two faith-linked networks are each about 2.5× the size of Kendriya Vidyalayas.** Vidya Bharati reports 12,068 formal schools and 33.3 lakh students (2025-26; self-reported, D, HARD as a stated figure) [SCH-056..068]. CBCI EduBase lists 11,442 Catholic "academic schools" and 33.5 lakh students (c.2023; D, an undercount by CBCI's own statement) [SCH-097, 098]. Kendriya Vidyalayas have 13.49 lakh students (UDISE+ 2024-25, A) [SCH-007]. Ratio 33.3 / 13.49 = 2.47 (DERIVED). > - **Fee-funded and state-funded networks moved in opposite directions on the record.** Ekal Abhiyan's consolidated income rose from ₹184.66 cr (2018-19)

to ₹269.99 cr (2025-26), +46% (DERIVED from HARD, D). Of the 2025-26 figure, ₹77.62 cr (28.7%) is FCRA money [SCH-082..085]. Central madrasa-modernisation spending (SPEMM) fell from ₹295.83 cr (2015-16) to ₹0.01 cr (2023-24) (HARD, A) [SCH-035..045], while the number of recognised madrasas rose slightly, from 19,354 to 19,690 (A) [SCH-006, 032]. > - **The 261 coded textbook changes split 121 RW-direction, 25 LW-direction, 99 NEU, 14 UNC and 2 other** (DERIVED; double-coded A/B, Krippendorff α = 0.69 on net direction, then adjudicated). NCERT accounts for 187 rows: 84 RW, 1 LW. In the 2022 "rationalisation", 70 of 114 rows code NEU (no α–ζ content), 34 RW and 0 LW. > - **State changes follow the party in power in both directions.** Changes by RW-bloc state governments code RW in 37 of 44 rows; changes by LW-bloc state governments code LW in 22 of 27 rows (DERIVED). Karnataka (2022 BJP → 2023 INC) and Rajasthan (2017 BJP → 2019 INC → 2024-25 BJP) show item-by-item reversals. > - **New Sainik Schools:** at least 62% of the 40 MoAs signed by Dec 2023 went to schools tied to BJP politicians, RSS affiliates or other Hindu organisations. This is The Reporters' Collective's RTI-based count (C) [SCH-055]. The MoD's rebuttal (C) [SCH-071] says affiliation "does not influence the selection process". The allegation is unadjudicated.

53.5 5. UPSC coaching content, and elite fellowships and scholarships (T17)

Figure 53.6. International scholarships mostly place notable alumni in academia and media; the direct routes into government run through mirror-image think-tank and advisory pipelines

Source: Atlas research module M7, "5. UPSC coaching content, and elite fellowships and scholarships (T17)".

> **Key findings** > - **The coaching market is sized only from the top.** GST paid in cash by commercial coaching (SAC 9992) was ₹4,792.4 cr in FY24 (C), implying **≥₹26,600 cr/yr** of taxable turnover across all coaching (DERIVED: ÷ 0.18) [COA-027, 028]. The

UPSC-only market is NO-DATA. The largest documented UPSC specialist, Drishti IAS, earned ₹364 cr (FY25; HARD, C) [COA-018]; Drishti plus Vision IAS (₹195 cr, E) are 2.1% of the all-coaching floor (DERIVED). > - **Central minority coaching ended; the SC/OBC scheme is underspent.** Naya Savera paid ₹367.20 cr for 1,19,273 students to March 2022 and was discontinued from 2022-23 because NEP 2020 "does not support coaching programs" (HARD, A) [COA-038, 160]. MoSJE free coaching spent ₹7.76 cr of a ₹47 cr BE in 2023-24 and coached 223 of 3,500 targeted (HARD, A) [COA-157]. > - **The content audit (108 items, 8 providers) finds one-sided items in both directions, mostly copied from single op-eds.** Statute items present both sides in ForumIAS 5/6, INSIGHTS 4/7, Drishti 10/18 [COA-173]; all 4 Operation Sindoor items give only the Indian government's account [COA-172]. Booklists: Bipan Chandra on 17 of 17 pages; Sanyal, Jain and Sampath on 0 [COA-097, 115..117] (DERIVED, C). > - **Documented fellowship and scholarship spending is ₹375.1 cr/yr across 14 programmes** (DERIVED, mixed years; no top-down total): Indian NGO/corporate/university ₹137.9 cr, UK/US-government and bi-national ₹114.7 cr, Indian governments ₹112.6 cr, Rhodes ₹10 cr. CM fellowships run under BJP, INC, AAP, DMK, LDF and NDPP governments; the largest is MP's (BJP) ₹190 cr over 3 years for 4,865 interns [FEL-0102]. > - **T17: of 220 coded notable alumni, 76 (35%) are in academia/think tanks, 42 (19%) in government/judiciary, 17 (8%) in politics** (DERIVED, D-heavy). Half the government placements (21 of 42) come from two mirror pipelines that are not fellowships: the UPA NAC (17, 2004-14) and VIF/India Foundation (4, post-2014). The 17 politicians map (codebook T66) to RW 6 + 2, LW 4 + 2, X-REG 1, X-MIX 1 + 1 ("+" = grade-E IVLP rows).

53.6 5.6 T17: Elite placement by sector and ideology (required table)

Figure 53.7. Notable scholarship alumni flow mostly into academia; half of all government placements come from two mirror-image advisory pipelines

Source: Atlas research module M7, "5.6 T17: Elite placement by sector and ideology (required table)".

Notability bias, stated. 202 of 220 rows are Wikipedia frames (D), which favour older cohorts, academics and public figures. The FCDO's own 2023 list adds 4 Chevening rows (A: Goyal, A. Patel, Narendran, Vaidyanathan): two sitting ministers, a former chief secretary and a CEO, which adds incumbent-party politicians. The IVLP frame is biased to politicians and its heads-of-state table is unreferenced (E). TFI's 5 rows are its own showcase (it self-reports "98% of placed Alumni" in education/social work). Domestic fellowships (YIF, LAMP, CMGGA, CM fellowships) publish no destinations: NO-DATA, not zero. The bloc column applies the party table mechanically; programmes take no positions [notes_fellowships §6].

53.7 6. Consultancies, embedded fellows and the policy-advisory market in government (D8)

Figure 53.8. Consultancies serve governments of every bloc; most documented money is Union (NDA-era) contracts

Source: Atlas research module M7, "6. Consultancies, embedded fellows and the policy-advisory market in government (D8)".

> **Key findings** > - **Union: ≥1,499 agency consultants in 44 departments cost ₹302 cr/yr** (DoE compilation, Oct 2023, via IE RTI; HARD, C) [CONS-0111]; 23,787 further contract staff are uncosted (NO-DATA). The Big Five took **308 assignments worth ₹492.73 cr from 16 ministries, Apr 2017–Jun 2022** (DERIVED, C): PwC 156, Deloitte 130.13, EY 88.05, KPMG 68.46, McKinsey 50.09 [CONS-0136..0142]. No CAG paragraph on these fees was found. > - **The same firms serve every party.** BCG has clients in governments

led by BJP, INC, AAP, DMK, BRS and YSRCP. Of 46 government engagements in Fig. 6.2, 25 have RW-mapped clients (13 the Union), 13 LW-mapped, 4 X-REG/X-MIX, 4 unmapped (DERIVED). Largest state figure: **Deloitte's ₹120 cr bid to UP (BJP, 2022)** (HARD as reported, C) [CONS-0149]. > - **BMGF funds the largest embedded teams: ≈₹1,044.78 cr for Bihar (22 grants, 2011–25) and ≈₹469.16 cr for UP (10 grants, 2015–24)** (DERIVED, A) [CONS-0061..0072], across JD(U)–BJP, JD(U)–RJD–INC, SP and BJP governments. No BMGF grant to a Big Four or strategy firm exists in its database [CONS-0088]. > - **Unreserved hiring drew three different outcomes:** the LG voided Delhi (AAP)'s 437 fellows and advisers (2023) [CONS-0134]; the Union withdrew its own 45-post lateral-entry advertisement in 3 days (2024) [CONS-0052]; NITI's YPs (95 in 2023) continue under GFR rule 178 [CONS-0119]. Lateral entry made **63 appointments (35 private sector)**, with no impact study (A) [CONS-0043..0049]. > - **Political consultancy ≈ ₹1,500 cr/yr** (EST-MAJOR, D) [CONS-0167]. Single-party outfits: BJP 4 (ABM, Varahe, Jarvis, Abhishta), INC 1 (Inclusive Minds), DMK in-house 1; cross-party 3 (I-PAC, ShowTime, DesignBoxed). Cabinet-rank strategists are documented only under INC/allied governments (Bihar 2015–17, Punjab 2021, Karnataka 2023–) [CONS-0143, 0144, 0163]; the ₹274 cr AP–I-PAC claim is ALLEGED (D) [CONS-0145].

Figure 53.9. The same firms and strategists work for governments and parties of every bloc

Source: Atlas research module M7, "6. Consultancies, embedded fellows and the policy-advisory market in government (D8)".

Figure 6.1 notes. D8 flows by T66 bloc of the client's ruling party (not a firm label). The figure was regenerated after the 27 Oct flows corrections: the Union bar now carries the full ₹302 cr DoE figure, and the UP–Deloitte ₹120 cr bid is excluded as contract-total. Bars rank disclosure as much as spending.

53.8 7. The expert establishment: science academies, IITs/IISc, ICMR, DRDO, ISRO and whose expertise policy and courts cite (D40)

Figure 53.10. The Economic Survey's authorities are the state itself and multilaterals; Indian think tanks get 0–6% of named mentions

Source: Atlas research module M7, "7. The expert establishment: science academies, IITs/IISc, ICMR, DRDO, ISRO and whose expertise policy and courts cite (D40)".

> **Key findings** > - **The apparatus budgets ₹1,34,912 cr in BE 2026-27** across 12 departments (DERIVED, A); entity flow rows cover 99.4%. Defence R&D (₹29,100 cr) [EXP-0450], DST (₹28,049 cr, of which ₹20,000 cr is the RDI capital line) [EXP-0075] and DAE (₹24,124 cr) [EXP-0213] are 60% of it. > - **Growth is uneven, and the fastest-growing line is AYUSH.** Actuals 2014-15 → 2024-25 (HARD, A; ratios DERIVED): AYUSH ×6.67 (₹496 → ₹3,312 cr) [EXP-0288, 0318]; DHR/ICMR ×3.72; DAE ×2.79; DOS ×1.89; DST ×1.74; DBT ×1.46. Eight science departments: ×2.36 (₹25,139 → ₹59,307 cr), only +16.7% after 2019-20. DST spent ₹4,003 cr in 2023-24 vs ₹5,407 cr in 2019-20 (BE ₹7,931 cr) [EXP-0057, 0067, 0069]. > - **The Economic Survey's authorities are the state and multilaterals.** Across 11 Surveys, 4,824 named-entity mentions: Indian government bodies 59.5%, multilaterals 31.3%, Indian think tanks 1.8%, Indian science bodies (ISRO, ICMR, CSIR, DRDO, IITs, IISc, academies) 3.0% (DERIVED, A). Zero mentions in 12 years of V-Dem, Freedom House, Amnesty, HRW, Pew, CSDS, ADR, CBGA, SPMRF, Swarajya or Organiser. > - **Courts name the Law Commission and the state's own bodies; science academies are invisible.** In Supreme Court documents 2014-26 (Indian Kanoon, n = 25,941): Law Commission 190 (7.3 per 1,000), AIIMS 55, WHO 39, IITs 32 (mostly as party), ICMR 12, ISRO 4; INSA, IASc and NASI 0. No SC judgment verifiably cites V-Dem, Freedom House or Pew (HARD, A). > - **Collisions run both ways, but the state holds the levers.** NSC members resigned over a withheld jobs survey (2019) [EXP-0455]; the 2017-18 consumption survey was withheld [EXP-0457]; DST left

the Science Congress, whose grant fell 68.5% (₹12.73 → ₹4.01 cr) [EXP-0406, 0412]; GoI called external excess-death estimates "purely speculative" [EXP-0499]; the NSC spent ₹0.70 cr of a ₹1.37–1.44 cr BE (A) [EXP-0502]. Opposition leaders attacked an IIT director (2026) and VC appointments (2024); 215 and ~180 academics objected [EXP-0474, 0491, 0513].

53.9 7.4 Whose expertise is cited (required table b)

Figure 53.11. The Supreme Court names state expert bodies and multilaterals; science academies and index-makers get zero verified mentions

Source: Atlas research module M7, "7.4 Whose expertise is cited (required table b)".

In-text sources in 22 landmark SC judgments (sc_bodies.json; mentions / judgments): RBI 501 / 6 (demonetisation 417); law reviews 239 / 16; UN human-rights system 200 / 11; NITI/Planning Commission 45 / 4; WHO 22 / 2; Law Commission 20 / 4; Census 15 / 3; CSDS-Lokniti 11 / 1; ASI report 102 and the 1991 Historians' Report 9 (Ayodhya only); Quran/Hadith 525 / 9 and Vedas/Smritis/Gita 244 / 9. Science academies, ICMR and Indian policy think tanks are essentially absent. Foreign academic and UN sources cluster in the rights judgments (Puttaswamy, Navtej, marriage equality).

Chapter 54


Control of State Institutions

Appointments, the judiciary, enforcement agencies, electoral machinery and federal relations, computed for whoever controls each instrument: the UPA, the NDA and every state government.

The 8 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M8, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

54.1 D23.2 Institution census and capture probabilities (T37; V37)

Figure 54.1. V37




Source: Atlas research module M8, “D23.2 Institution census and capture probabilities (T37; V37)”.

Robustness.

54.2 D23.3 Appointment flows and revolving doors (T38; V38)


Figure 54.2. F_D23 governors



Source: Atlas research module M8, "D23.3 Appointment flows and revolving doors (T38; V38)".

T38b. Rajya Sabha nominations (Art. 80(1)(a)).

Figure 54.3. V38




Source: Atlas research module M8, "D23.3 Appointment flows and revolving doors (T38; V38)".

T38e. State-level appointment heads (M8_state_capture_heads.csv, 38 coded cases; high-signal, not a census).

54.3 D24.1 Judicial outcomes on contested issues (T39)

Figure 54.4. V39




Source: Atlas research module M8, “D24.1 Judicial outcomes on contested issues (T39)”.

Companions: M8_sc_judges.csv (157 judges serving 2004–Oct 2026), M8_collegium_disputes.csv (41 episodes), M8_vacancies_pendency.csv (372 dated figures, mostly LS/RS answers, grade A), M8_judicial_pendency_salient.csv (73 salient matters) and raw/collegium/judicial_speeches.csv (22 remarks).

54.4 D25.2 Enforcement asymmetry (T40)

Figure 54.5. V40




Source: Atlas research module M8, “D25.2 Enforcement asymmetry (T40)”.

State samples are small, curated and not a census. They show the *direction* is the same for every party that controls an agency; the *scale* differs because the Union agencies have national jurisdiction and the PMLA's bail and burden-of-proof provisions (upheld in *Vijay Madanlal Choudhary*, 2022).

54.5 D25.3 Coercive instruments: UAPA, sedition/BNS 152, NSA/PSA, demolitions, speech FIRs, protest policing

Figure 54.6. D25 trend




Source: Atlas research module M8, "D25.3 Coercive instruments: UAPA, sedition/BNS 152, NSA/PSA, demolitions, speech FIRs, protest policing".

Mirror cases recorded (coding identical for every government):

54.6 D26.1 Federal power (T41)

Figure 54.7. V41




Source: Atlas research module M8, "D26.1 Federal power (T41)".

CBI general consent has been withdrawn by 13 states, all under the NDA: Mizoram (INC, 2015, first), WB (AITC), AP (TDP, after

leaving the NDA), Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Punjab and Karnataka (INC), Maharashtra (MVA), Kerala (LDF), Jharkhand (JMM), Telangana (BRS), TN (DMK) and Meghalaya (NPP, an NDA ally). No UPA-era withdrawal was found. In 2010 a Constitution Bench held that courts can direct CBI probes without state consent. On 2 Jan 2025 the SC held that the CBI does not need state consent to register cases in some categories (M8_cbi_consent.csv).

54.7 D26.3 Electoral administration (T43)

Figure 54.8. F_D26



Source: Atlas research module M8, “D26.3 Electoral administration (T43)”.

Did deletions track which party governs the state? No (F_D26).

Chapter 55


Economic Power, Welfare and Patronage

Business groups, welfare and cash transfers, land and the rural and urban economy.

The 9 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M9, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

55.1 2.1 Money flows and stocks

Figure 55.1. V42a




Source: Atlas research module M9, "2.1 Money flows and stocks".

MPLADS is owned by M3 (overlap-M3). It is MP-directed rather than party-directed, and M9 has no party-wise MPLADS release data (NO-DATA; see COVERAGE).

55.2 2.3 Election-cycle timing (V42b)

Figure 55.2. V42b




Source: Atlas research module M9, "2.3 Election-cycle timing (V42b)".

V42b. Direct cash transfers per resident, FY2018-19 to FY2025-26, in the 16 highest per-capita states, with assembly-poll lines (16th Finance Commission state tables). The 79% vs 16% poll-year growth contrast includes post-poll launches by new governments. It is descriptive only.

55.3 3.1 Business-group map (T45)


Figure 55.3. F45



Source: Atlas research module M9, “3.1 Business-group map (T45)”.

Party totals are identical in the two modules, and the lead should count the bond money once (M9 bond rows carry overlap-M3).

Figure 55.4. V43




Source: Atlas research module M9, "3.1 Business-group map (T45)".

"No entry" means NO-DATA or "none found". For media, contracts and regulatory actions, "none found" is a finding after search, not a gap. Revenue NO-DATA marks unlisted groups whose MCA AOC-4 filings were not reachable (pull #3).

55.4 3.6 Credit (AC; T46; F46)

Figure 55.5. F46




Source: Atlas research module M9, "3.6 Credit (AC; T46; F46)".

F46. SCB write-offs by borrower category (left); GeM GMV and central share (right).

55.5 4. Community economic power and livelihood dependence (§13D–E; T47; F47) — aggregate only

Figure 55.6. F47




Source: Atlas research module M9, "4. Community economic power and livelihood dependence (§13D–E; T47; F47) — aggregate only".

How dependence relates to alignment. Identified evidence links excludable benefits to the incumbent's vote, conditionally (§2.5). Survey evidence links beneficiaries to whoever delivers and

claims the credit, whichever party that is. Trader and business networks lean to the BJP in Lokniti surveys, but those surveys were not fetched (R, unverified), so no figure is reported.

55.6 5. D29 Land and property (T48; F48)

Figure 55.7. F48




Source: Atlas research module M9, "5. D29 Land and property (T48; F48)".

F48. FRA claim rejection by state (left); land owned against share of households, rural India (right).

55.7 6. D36 Agriculture and rural power (F36)

Figure 55.8. F36




Source: Atlas research module M9, "6. D36 Agriculture and rural power (F36)".

F36. MSP paid for paddy and wheat by state (left); farm-loan waivers by paying party, with ◆ marking those within 12 months before a poll (right).

55.8 7. D37 Urban power (F37)

Figure 55.9. F37



Source: Atlas research module M9, "7. D37 Urban power (F37)".

F37. Municipal corporation budgets and years without elected councils.

Chapter 56


Religion, Demography, Identity and Memory

Religious demography, personal law, conversion law, language, and the politics of memory and symbols.

The 8 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M10, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

56.1 1.1 The physical footprint: Census places of worship (HARD)


Figure 56.1. Religious institutions



Source: Atlas research module M10, "1.1 The physical footprint: Census places of worship (HARD)".

56.2 3.1 Census 2011 religion: national and district picture (HARD, Census C-01)


Figure 56.2. District religion maps



Source: Atlas research module M10, "3.1 Census 2011 religion: national and district picture (HARD, Census C-01)".

District change, 2001→2011. This uses the 476 districts whose boundaries did not change.

Figure 56.3. Religion growth 2001-11




Source: Atlas research module M10, "3.1 Census 2011 religion: national and district picture (HARD, Census C-01)".

District change, 2001→2011. This uses the 476 districts whose boundaries did not change.

56.3 3.2 Fertility (NFHS-1 to NFHS-6, SRS 2024)

Figure 56.4. TFR by religion




Source: Atlas research module M10, "3.2 Fertility (NFHS-1 to NFHS-6, SRS 2024)".

See chapter 4 for the status of the Census and caste enumeration. Seat projection: M10_delimitation_projection.csv, model scripts/delimitation_model.py. M8 cites this as T43's canonical projection.

56.4 3.4 Census 2027, caste enumeration and delimitation (T43 seat projection: canonical file)

Figure 56.5. Delimitation seat change




Source: Atlas research module M10, "3.4 Census 2027, caste enumeration and delimitation (T43 seat projection: canonical file)".

Identification and limits. Population projections carry error, and the RGI projection predates the Census 2027 count. The model also makes three assumptions:

56.5 5.1 Anti-conversion ("freedom of religion") laws: every state

Figure 56.6. Anti-conversion laws




Source: Atlas research module M10, “5.1 Anti-conversion ("freedom of religion") laws: every state”.

Data. Five files feed this chapter:

56.6 6.1 The language base (Census 2011, HARD)

Figure 56.7. Language reach




Source: Atlas research module M10, “6.1 The language base (Census 2011, HARD)”.

Identity movements in the ledger (KRV, ABSU, TIPRA Motha, NSCN-IM, Leh Apex Body, Sarna bodies and others) are coded in chapter 8. θ-only units fall mechanically into LW (codebook issue 1).

56.7 7.1 T51 summary: acts by category, bloc and period

Figure 56.8. V46 memory timeline



Source: Atlas research module M10, "7.1 T51 summary: acts by category, bloc and period".

Content direction by actor bloc (the mirror test for symbolic acts):

Chapter 57


Law, Labour, Science and Corporate Bodies

The legal ecosystem, labour, farmer and student organisations, health and science, sport and youth, and corporate bodies.

The 9 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M11, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

57.1 2. D7 Law and judiciary ecosystem

Figure 57.1. Litigation direction




Source: Atlas research module M11, "2. D7 Law and judiciary ecosystem".

Enforcement amounts (ALLEGED, not flows):

57.2 2.4 Legal media (Lens 4 content audit; raw/lens4/)

Figure 57.2. US foundation money




Source: Atlas research module M11, “2.4 Legal media (Lens 4 content audit; raw/lens4/)”.

Reading.

57.3 3. D10 Capital markets, ESG and climate finance

Figure 57.3. D10 green finance and exclusions




Source: Atlas research module M11, “3. D10 Capital markets, ESG and climate finance”.

On the RW side, the D10 power is state power. The Union government's climate diplomacy rejects conditionality, CBAM and the JETP model (coded RW-CN, C = +1.82). The economic-nationalist bloc (SJM, Organiser) defends targeted Indian firms as national champions under "foreign attack".

57.4 4. D11 Labour, farmers and cooperatives

Figure 57.4. CTUO membership




Source: Atlas research module M11, “4. D11 Labour, farmers and cooperatives”.

Bottom line.

57.5 5. D11 Students, caste associations and khaps

Figure 57.5. Campus unions




Source: Atlas research module M11, “5. D11 Students, caste associations and khaps”.

Bottom line.

57.6 6. D12 Health and science

Figure 57.6. D12 health money by label




Source: Atlas research module M11, "6. D12 Health and science".

Sangh-linked health bodies (Arogya Bharati, NMO, Sewa Bharati health projects) draw PSU CSR. ONGC gave about ₹668 cr in 2015-25 to 20 RSS-linked bodies (TNM, C). Christian health networks (CHAI: 3,626 institutions; CMAI) run on 61-62% foreign grants (audited). Both are coded LGT (E1 service).

57.7 7. D15 Sports and youth

Figure 57.7. RSS shakhas




Source: Atlas research module M11, “7. D15 Sports and youth”.

Bottom line.

57.8 8. D16 Corporate bodies and philanthropy as political capital

Figure 57.8. Lobbying and chambers




Source: Atlas research module M11, “8. D16 Corporate bodies and philanthropy as political capital”.

Bottom line.

57.9 9.1 Money vs organisation vs institutions

Figure 57.9. Raw vs adjusted



Source: Atlas research module M11, “9.1 Money vs organisation vs institutions”.

Sources: raw/influence_summary.csv, atlas/data/ledger/M11_ledger_coderA.csv, §4-§7. The RW raw total

is dominated by an EST-MAJOR item, RSS guru dakshina ≈ ₹500 cr (₹200-2,000 cr). Without it, RW influence money in M11 is ≈ ₹207 cr/yr.

Chapter 58


International Opinion, Foreign Influence and Elite Networks

International opinion and indices, foreign influence, representation, elite networks, and criminal and street power.

The 19 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M12, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

58.1 Results

Figure 58.1. Adjudicated labels by unit group




Source: Atlas research module M12, "Results".

How.

58.2 2. Universal Periodic Review (UPR), cycles 3 and 4


Figure 58.2. UPR stakeholder evidence and recommendations



Source: Atlas research module M12, "2. Universal Periodic Review (UPR), cycles 3 and 4".

58.3 3. UN Special Procedures and OHCHR


Figure 58.3. UN Special Procedures communications and India's reply rate



Source: Atlas research module M12, “3. UN Special Procedures and OHCHR”.

58.4 8a. APPGs: registered benefits (£) by group and funder


Figure 58.4. UK APPG registered benefits



Source: Atlas research module M12, “8a. APPGs: registered benefits (£) by group and funder”.

58.5 11. The Indian sources behind each foreign report

Figure 58.5. Lens-1 sourcing of foreign reports




Source: Atlas research module M12, “11. The Indian sources behind each foreign report”.

The question. Do these bodies rest on a narrow, one-sided source base?

58.6 2. India's scores, 2014–2026

Figure 58.6. India's normalised index trends




Source: Atlas research module M12, “2. India's scores, 2014–2026”.

Figure D9b-1 (SVG). India on eight indices, 2010–2026, one panel per index, each on its own y-scale.

58.7 4. Sourcing test: independent measurements or recycled sources?

Figure 58.7. Indian sources behind each index




Source: Atlas research module M12, "4. Sourcing test: independent measurements or recycled sources?".

The question. Do these indices measure India independently of one another, or do they draw on a narrow, shared set of Indian sources? The answer below rests only on the R2 counts and is stated in both directions.

58.8 4c. Verdict

Figure 58.8. Lens-1 sourcing of foreign reports (reused)




Source: Atlas research module M12, "4c. Verdict".

Reuse and discrepancies in fig_d9_sourcing (all four were fixed by the lead on 27 Oct: source line, missing-product specs removed and documented, title, layout). fig_d9_sourcing.png is still accurate against the R2 data: its FOTN bar (n = 579) and every Lens-1 class count match r2_fotn_citations.csv and the companion CSV when re-run with source_classes.classify. Four discrepancies should be fixed:

58.9 5. Who cites the indices in India (Lens 5)

Figure 58.9. Citer stance by language and actor type




Source: Atlas research module M12, "5. Who cites the indices in India (Lens 5)".

Table D9b-7. By actor type (DERIVED)

58.10 5. T53-d: information operations, by platform, origin, target and side

Figure 58.10. Information operations by origin, target and side




Source: Atlas research module M12, "5. T53-d: information operations, by platform, origin, target and side".

Figure D35-1 (SVG). Information operations by origin → target, stacked by the side the source says the operation favoured. Left: count of operations. Right: accounts and channels removed.

58.11 8.1 Budget series (Rs crore, nominal; HARD / A)

Figure 58.11. India's soft-power budget series



Source: Atlas research module M12, "8.1 Budget series (Rs crore, nominal; HARD / A)".

Trends at the breakpoints.

58.12 9. V47: foreign influence flow map

Figure 58.12. Foreign influence flow map

Source: Atlas research module M12, "9. V47: foreign influence flow map".

58.13 1. Key findings

Figure 58.13. V44: group share in elite institutions vs population share

Source: Atlas research module M12, "1. Key findings".

Figure V44 (SVG). The figure has 59 institution-group points across 23 institutions.

Figure 58.14. Dynastic share by party

Source: Atlas research module M12, "1. Key findings".

Figure: dynastic share by party (SVG).

Figure 58.15. V45: elite network graph

Source: Atlas research module M12, "1. Key findings".

Figure: dynastic share by party (SVG).

58.14 Key findings

Figure 58.16. Declared criminal cases by party and bloc

Source: Atlas research module M12, "Key findings".

Figure D38. Reused from a5_fig_adr.py after review; it carries the required title, unit, source, n, basis and confidence line. Note: its left panel plots the live myneta database (2019: 236/542 = 44%; 2009 serious 89 = 16%). The table below uses the ADR printed report (2019: 233/539 = 43%; 2009 serious 76 = 14%). R5 §1 documents a 1–13-row difference between the two.

58.15 T54-C. Riots and vigilante incidents and outcomes

Figure 58.17. NCRB rioting series

Source: Atlas research module M12, "T54-C. Riots and vigilante incidents and outcomes".

Figure D39-1. NCRB rioting FIRs (A), the two official communal series (B) and the political, caste and agrarian sub-heads (C). The 2014 communal point comes from an MHA reply quoting NCRB, not from the CII table, and is drawn hollow. 2024 combines IPC and BNS.

Figure 58.18. Riot case outcomes

Source: Atlas research module M12, "T54-C. Riots and vigilante incidents and outcomes".

Figure D39-2. Decided-case outcomes only. Units differ by event (cases vs accused persons), so the bars are not pooled.

58.16 T54-D. Enforcement findings with case status

Figure 58.19. Terror-financing pipeline

Source: Atlas research module M12, "T54-D. Enforcement findings with case status".

No-double-count rule: the Hurriyat and PFI TF rows are already counted inside the FATF 1,530. NIA's 2025 figures (66 convictions) cover a later period and every crime category, so they are **not** added to FATF's 89.

Chapter 59


Calibration and Classification

How units were classified and how far the classification can be trusted: anchor accuracy, agreement between lenses, the ideological space of coded units and the sensitivity of results to classification rules.

The 14 figures in this chapter are reproduced from the report of Atlas research module M0, with the passage of the study that explains each. They keep the study's own labels and colours: **RW** denotes the Hindutva-aligned bloc and **LW** the coalition that contests it (see A Note on Terms).

59.1 2. Double coding and accuracy


Figure 59.1. Lens 1 family accuracy by coder



Source: Atlas research module M0, “2. Double coding and accuracy”.

under different ids.

Figure 59.2. Lens 2 accuracy under frozen v1.0 and the proposed rules




Source: Atlas research module M0, "2. Double coding and accuracy".

Ensemble family accuracy on the anchors is therefore 34%–37%, against 100% for LW. The proposed v1.1 rules lift Lens 2 family accuracy to 82%–87% on core anchors, and to 68%–76% on the hold-out anchors. They are not adopted; the lead decides.

59.2 4. Dimension weights (8C)

Figure 59.3. Pre-registered vs evidence-derived weights




Source: Atlas research module M0, “4. Dimension weights (8C)”.

Drift (re-code a random 10%). A fresh coder-B session re-coded 18 earlier packs under new ids: family α 0.847, sub-type α 0.870, family agreement 88.9% (n=18). The two changes are NPCI (NEU → GOV, the GOV/NEU line) and AAP (UNC → X-MIX).

59.3 5. Lead ruling of 26 Oct 2026: re-test

Figure 59.4. Alpha before and after the ruling




Source: Atlas research module M0, “5. Lead ruling of 26 Oct 2026: re-test”.

(raw/coding/ruling_retest.json).

59.4 6. Tooling

Figure 59.5. Lens 4 held-out accuracy




Source: Atlas research module M0, “6. Tooling”.

Total 619 items. Target ≥50 per family per language.

59.5 Confidence map: HARD vs EST vs per total

Figure 59.6. 13% of headline money rests on major estimates, concentrated in politics and religion




Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Share of each domain total by confidence tag (headline year); right: domain total. n = 5,216 flows, 26 domains. Classification basis: all blocs.

59.6 Classification audit: Lens 1 vs Ensemble agreement matrix

Figure 59.7. Lens 1 and the Ensemble agree on 72% of units; disagreements are bloc ↔ UNC, almost never LW ↔ RW (6 units)




Source: synthesis/out/classification/T20a_lens1_x_ensemble.csv.

Units by Lens 1 family (rows) × Ensemble label (columns); row shares. n = 11,780 units. Classification basis: Lens 1 vs Ensemble.

59.7 Ideological space map (PCA of α–μ)


Figure 59.8. Ideological space map (PCA of α–μ)



Source: Atlas synthesis.

59.8 Dimension profiles (parallel coordinates)


Figure 59.9. Dimension profiles (parallel coordinates)



Source: Atlas synthesis.

59.9 Lens agreement per unit

Figure 59.10. 6 of the 30 largest recipients are contested: mostly aggregates whose bloc rests on Lens 1 defaults alone




Source: Atlas master flow dataset, headline year (synthesis/out/HEADLINE_flows.csv).

Ensemble probabilities P(LW), P(RW), P(GOV), P(X), P(NEU) for the 30 largest recipients; right: Lens 1 family. n = 30 recipients. Classification basis: Ensemble vs Lens 1 (S0).

59.10 Classification sensitivity tornado S0–S7


Figure 59.11. Classification sensitivity tornado S0–S7



Source: Atlas synthesis.

59.11 Label probability distributions by domain

Figure 59.12. Most domains are clear-cut; in D1, D2, D8, D22 most units sit near 0.475 (thin evidence, not mixture)



Source: synthesis/out/MASTER_ledger_coderA_v11.csv.

Histogram of unit-level P(LW) and P(RW) by domain (16 largest domains by unit count). n = 4,191 units. Classification basis:

Ensemble probabilities (v1.1).

59.12 Bloc-transition timeline

Figure 59.13. Party bloc transitions follow alliance switches, in both directions

Source: data/companion/M3_T66_verified.csv.

Bloc mapping by period for parties whose label changed (T66, verified by M3). n = 18 parties. Classification basis: T66 party mapping (Lens 2 + alliance + votes).

59.13 Funder portfolio dumbbell

Figure 59.14. 13 funders with a non-bloc own label fund LW-labelled portfolios; 6 LW-labelled funders fund mostly non-bloc work

Source: synthesis/out/classification/T67_funder_own_vs_portfolio.csv.

Own label (○) vs ₹-weighted grantee-portfolio label (● / ■ RW) for foundations, multilaterals and CSR funders. n = 40 of 85 funders shown. Classification basis: Codebook §9.1 (own vs portfolio).

PART XI

Synthesis

Part XI brings the readings together, separates durable from office-dependent power, and sets out directions for further research.

60	The Composite Reading
61	Durable and Office-Dependent Power
62	Limits and Further Research

Chapter 60

The Composite Reading

Table 60.1 brings the 40 arena readings together, ordered from highest to lowest, with each arena's weight and its contribution to the composite (its weight multiplied by its reading, divided by the total weight). Figure 60.1 shows the eight domains.

Three patterns are visible. First, the arenas of the State read highest and are mostly office-dependent. Second, the arenas of knowledge, the elite press and the committed core electorate read lowest. Third, mass-audience media and the electoral arenas sit in the contested band, close to the composite itself.

Figure 60.1. Readings by domain




Table 60.1. All arenas, ordered by reading

Arena	Title	Weight	Reading	Contribution	Class
7.1	Executive Office	5.00	89.5	4.15	Aligned majority
7.3	Police and Central Agencies	1.00	84.7	0.79	Aligned majority

Arena	Title	Weight	Reading	Contribution	Class
1.1	Religious Demography and Electoral Geography	3.00	81.9	2.28	Aligned majority
7.2	Public Expenditure	3.00	81.1	2.26	Aligned majority
7.8	Internal Security	1.00	69.7	0.65	Aligned majority
2.3	Religious Leadership and Institutions	3.00	68.8	1.92	Aligned majority
7.5	Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies	1.00	65.7	0.61	Aligned majority
7.6	Parliament	4.00	63.8	2.37	Aligned majority
8.5	Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks	2.35	61.5	1.34	Aligned majority
6.3	Leadership Popularity	3.00	60.0	1.67	Aligned majority
6.4	Party Finance	3.00	58.4	1.63	Contested
5.1	Television News	3.00	58.2	1.62	Contested
7.4	The Civil Services	1.00	56.5	0.52	Contested
5.6	Cinema and Streaming	2.00	56.3	1.05	Contested
5.2	Interpersonal Political Communication	3.00	53.7	1.50	Contested
2.1	Party and Movement Cadres	3.00	51.3	1.43	Contested
2.2	Public Opinion on Contested Questions	3.00	50.7	1.41	Contested
6.2	The Conversion of Votes into Seats	4.00	50.7	1.88	Contested
8.7	Transnational Christian Organisations	0.45	48.6	0.20	Contested
4.3	Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation	1.00	44.7	0.42	Opposed majority
7.7	The Judiciary	3.00	43.5	1.21	Opposed majority
6.1	Vote Share	4.00	43.2	1.60	Opposed majority
1.2	Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus	4.00	42.4	1.58	Opposed majority
3.2	Private Funding for Ideological Causes	3.00	42.3	1.18	Opposed majority
2.5	Street Mobilisation and Veto Power	3.00	41.5	1.15	Opposed majority
8.8	The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad	2.00	38.5	0.71	Opposed majority
3.1	Large Business Owners	2.00	38.3	0.71	Opposed majority
8.6	Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States	0.82	38.2	0.29	Opposed majority
5.5	Celebrities and Influencers	1.00	37.6	0.35	Opposed majority
8.4	China	3.60	34.0	1.14	Opposed majority
8.2	Global Technology Platforms	2.65	31.0	0.76	Opposed majority
5.3	Digital Platforms	3.00	29.3	0.81	Opposed majority

Arena	Title	Weight	Reading	Contribution	Class
3.3	Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations	1.00	28.2	0.26	Opposed majority
2.4	The NGO and Advocacy Sector	3.00	25.7	0.72	Opposed majority
8.3	The United States	3.60	24.4	0.81	Opposed majority
5.4	Newspapers and the Elite Press	3.00	21.7	0.60	Opposed majority
8.1	Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies	4.23	18.1	0.71	Opposed majority
1.3	The Committed Core Electorate	5.00	15.9	0.74	Opposed majority
4.1	Universities and Think Tanks	3.00	15.7	0.44	Opposed majority
4.2	Expert Authority within the State	3.00	7.2	0.20	Opposed majority
Composite		**107.7**	**45.7**	**45.7**	**Contested**

Chapter 61


Durable and Office-Dependent Power

The distinction between office-dependent and durable power is the most important qualification in the Atlas. The baseline composite of 45.7 includes the readings of executive office, public expenditure, the police and agencies, the civil services and appointed bodies, and the transactional share of business and party money, all of which would change hands with government.

With the BJP out of office at the Union and in every state, the composite falls to **36.7**. The 9.0-point difference measures how far the present distribution of power rests on continued electoral success. The durable component (organisation, belief, religious institutions, committed money, media audiences, and the parts of the State that do not change with government, such as the judiciary) amounts to 36.7 points.

The implication is symmetrical. For Hindutva-aligned actors, the durable reading is well below the contested band. For their opponents, the arenas that do not depend on office, above all knowledge, the elite press and much of organised civil society, remain a substantial base that has not been displaced by a decade of electoral defeat.

Figure 61.1. The composite with and without office



Chapter 62

Limits and Further Research

The Atlas is a first attempt at a comprehensive, comparable measure of power across Indian public life, and it should be read as such. Several directions for further research follow from its limitations.

- **Uncertainty intervals.** Readings are reported as point estimates. A full treatment would propagate source-grade and sampling uncertainty through each indicator to the composite.
- **Sub-national variation.** The national readings average over very different states. State-level atlases for Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and the Hindi heartland would test whether the national pattern holds.
- **Time series.** Most arenas are measured at a single date. Reconstructing the readings for 2004, 2014 and 2019 would show how the distribution has moved.
- **Alternative codings.** The multi-sided coding of opposed actors (as Left, regional, minority and liberal blocs) would test the robustness of the binary.

The data, codebook and engine are published so that others can pursue these questions, and can challenge the present readings with better evidence.

Appendix A

Codebook of Arenas and Indicators

For each arena: its indicators, the weight of each within the arena, and the baseline reading. Notes on sources and construction are in the chapter for each arena.

II. Demography and Identity

1.1 Religious Demography and Electoral Geography · weight 3 · reading 81.9

Projected 2026 faith base (Pew path for Hindus and Muslims; Jain, Christian and Buddhist held at Census 2011)	0.60	81.6
Seat arithmetic: Lok Sabha seats where Muslims are under 20%	0.40	82.3

1.2 Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus · weight 4 · reading 42.4

National: NDA share of ALL Hindu votes, by caste group (NES 2024)	0.50	49.4
States: NDA share of the Hindu vote in the latest assembly election (Hindu-population weighted)	0.30	48.7
Cohesion: share of Hindus in caste groups where the NDA wins a majority	0.20	19.7

1.3 The Committed Core Electorate · weight 5 · reading 15.9

BJP floor vote, Lok Sabha 2009 (% of voters)	0.30	18.8
BJP vote that does not depend on Modi	0.20	27.4
BJP party identification (NES 2024, % feel close)	0.30	19.2
Population-weighted state floor 2000-26 (elections where the BJP contested at least half the seats)	0.20	18.5

III. Society and Organisation

2.1 Party and Movement Cadres · weight 3 · reading 51.3

Active political cadres, adjusted (millions)	0.55	51.0
Cadre intensity: organised units that meet on a fixed cycle	0.30	65.1
Campus elections 2026-27 (ABVP share of central-panel posts, 9 campuses)	0.15	24.8

2.2 Public Opinion on Contested Questions · weight 3 · reading 50.7

Policy positions (9 all-adult items, sample- and recency-weighted)	0.40	59.8
Identity positions (7 items)	0.40	39.3
Intensity and salience	0.20	55.5

2.3 Religious Leadership and Institutions · weight 3 · reading 68.8

YouTube subscribers of religious leaders, ministries and institutions (193 channels)	0.20	54.1
YouTube views in the last 12 months, same channels	0.20	63.3
Organised institutions (temples, mathas vs churches, mosques, madrasas)	0.30	82.3
Money of religious bodies (₹ cr a year)	0.30	68.6

2.4 The NGO and Advocacy Sector · weight 3 · reading 25.7

Money reaching organisations in India (₹ cr a year)	0.25	15.1
Network centrality (out-strength of civil-society nodes)	0.30	30.1
Service footprint (units on the ground)	0.10	69.5
Litigation output (landmark contested cases)	0.15	22.3
UN and rights reporting (UPR submissions)	0.10	0.0

2.5 Street Mobilisation and Veto Power · weight 3 · reading 41.5

Veto points won 2019-26: the State, companies, studios, platforms and venues made to back down	0.60	41.9
Veto points won 1985-2026 (State and institution back-downs, 139 counted episodes)	0.20	36.8
Mobilisation capacity: top three episodes 2019-26 by states covered and duration, mass-contact drives included	0.20	44.8

IV. Economy and Money

3.1 Large Business Owners · weight 2 · reading 38.3

Documented commitment of the top 100 (by wealth; transactional counts against)	0.30	9.5
Party money of the top 100, transactional at 50% (FY2019-20 to FY2024-25)	0.30	51.5
News TV owned by top-100 owners, by content audit	0.20	100.0
Owners' ideological-cause philanthropy	0.20	13.2

3.2 Private Funding for Ideological Causes · weight 3 · reading 42.3

Cause money, cleaned (₹ cr a year)	0.70	35.2
Ideology-producing money only (advocacy, think tanks, media, cadre bodies)	0.30	58.8

3.3 Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations · weight 1 · reading 28.2

Co-operatives: who controls the largest co-ops and co-op banks, by size (elected boards)	0.35	46.5
Union members: BMS share of verified central trade-union membership	0.25	25.0
Shop floor: union recognition polls and bargaining seats in railways, coal, steel and transport	0.20	13.1
Farmer fronts: claimed members, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh vs the Kisan Sabha and farm-workers' union	0.20	15.2

V. Knowledge and Expertise

4.1 Universities and Think Tanks · weight 3 · reading 15.7

Think-tank citation reach (courts, Parliament, news, Wikipedia, OpenAlex)	0.30	7.0
Vice-chancellors (147 universities)	0.25	8.8
Academics' open letters (signatories)	0.15	10.0
Research-council leadership appointed 2014-26	0.15	26.6
Council grants on agenda themes	0.05	6.5
Publishers and journals (revenue)	0.05	37.6
Endowed chairs and foreign South Asia programmes (₹ a year; endowments at a 5% payout)	0.05	73.3

4.2 Expert Authority within the State · weight 3 · reading 7.2

Named expert actors, venue-weighted citations	0.60	8.7
Recent trend: 2023-26 citations	0.20	7.0
State expert bodies with a Hindutva-agenda mandate (budget share)	0.20	3.0

4.3 Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation · weight 1 · reading 44.7

Pupils in ideological school networks	0.35	41.2
Elite schools by management	0.25	28.8
Textbook changes 2014-26 (NCERT and states)	0.20	82.9
UPSC coaching influence (audited items and booklists)	0.15	22.6

Sainik-school PPP allotments	0.05	62.5

VI. Media and Narrative

5.1 Television News · weight 3 · reading 58.2

Broadcast audience by side, weighted by language (91 channels)	0.75	55.0
TV news brands on YouTube (149 channels, 12-month views)	0.25	67.8

5.2 Interpersonal Political Communication · weight 3 · reading 53.7

Family talk	0.33	52.7
Street and workplace talk	0.17	52.7
Temple and congregation (explicitly political content only)	0.46	74.2
WhatsApp forwards	0.04	65.2

5.3 Digital Platforms · weight 3 · reading 29.3

YouTube long-form recent-video views (proxy; 324 independent channels; TV brands counted in TV news)	0.37	22.1
Instagram reel views (mean views per recent reel × accounts; 220 accounts (262 audited; TV-brand and government handles excluded))	0.31	36.2
AI assistants (5 models: 4 Claude, gpt-oss-20b; 205 answers on contested India questions)	0.14	17.3
YouTube subscribers (324 independent channels; TV brands counted in TV news)	0.06	27.1
Instagram followers (same 220 accounts)	0.06	60.3
X followers (193 accounts; TV-brand and government handles excluded)	0.06	57.4
Followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh (X and Instagram)	0.11	14.0

5.4 Newspapers and the Elite Press · weight 3 · reading 21.7

Readership: all papers by average issue readership	0.35	24.8
Readership: English papers (the elite agenda)	0.15	3.3
Elite credibility: brand trust, elite reach and impact investigations (45 outlets)	0.50	25.0

5.5 Celebrities and Influencers · weight 1 · reading 37.6

Documented acts, strength-weighted (incl. NEET/CJP protests 2026)	0.40	34.3
Acts weighted by the actor's followers	0.30	48.6

Followers by net side	0.30	41.6
Followers from Pakistan and Bangladesh	0.11	8.5

5.6 Cinema and Streaming · weight 2 · reading 56.3

Cinema 2024-26 (gross and title share)	0.09	66.6
Cinema 2014-26	0.03	49.3
Streaming (originals and films streamed; count and Ormax viewership)	0.89	55.6

VII. Elections

6.1 Vote Share · weight 4 · reading 43.2

Lok Sabha 2024: NDA share of all votes	0.40	43.8
Latest assembly election in all 31 legislatures (population-weighted NDA share)	0.45	41.7
Bypolls 2024-26 (seats won)	0.15	45.4

6.2 The Conversion of Votes into Seats · weight 4 · reading 50.7

Seats won	0.25	54.0
Seats held after stress swing	0.40	41.3
Battleground seats won (margin < 5)	0.15	52.1
Assembly seats held now (31 legislatures)	0.15	60.2
Big-city corporations (budget-weighted)	0.05	77.2

6.3 Leadership Popularity · weight 3 · reading 60.0

Best PM vs all named rivals (MOTN Aug 2026)	0.45	53.4
PM performance good/outstanding vs poor (MOTN)	0.20	65.4
Lokniti NES 2024 PM choice	0.20	60.3
Morning Consult approval (Mar 2026)	0.15	72.3

6.4 Party Finance · weight 3 · reading 58.4

Income share of all parties, FY2023-25	0.40	59.1
Spending (party expenditure and LS 2024 campaign)	0.30	50.4
Reserves: party assets at 31 Mar 2025	0.30	65.4

VIII. The State

7.1 Executive Office · weight 5 · reading 89.5

Union executive	0.45	100.0
State executives by population (NDA-ally CMs at 0.75)	0.45	76.7
Raj Bhavans: governors and LGs appointed by the Union	0.10	100.0

7.2 Public Expenditure · weight 3 · reading 81.1

Combined spending controlled, 2026-27	0.60	82.9
Cash to citizens (DBT and state cash schemes)	0.25	80.2
State social-sector spending in NDA-run states	0.15	75.2

7.3 Police and Central Agencies · weight 1 · reading 84.7

Personnel commanded (state police, CAPF, agencies)	0.80	84.5
Police budget controlled, 2026-27	0.20	85.3

7.4 The Civil Services · weight 1 · reading 56.5

Control of postings × (1 − opposing actors drag)	1.00	56.5

7.5 Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies · weight 1 · reading 65.7

Central appointed bodies (102)	0.75	76.5
State bodies (97, in 12 states)	0.25	45.4

7.6 Parliament · weight 4 · reading 63.8

Lok Sabha strength now (NDA incl. the 20 NCPI MPs)	0.55	58.7
Rajya Sabha strength now	0.25	62.1
Key contested votes 2024-26 (ayes share for the NDA position)	0.20	80.0

7.7 The Judiciary · weight 3 · reading 43.5

High-significance rulings, all years (significance-weighted)	0.60	46.2
Recent window 2024-26	0.30	34.6
Judges' post-retirement posts (NDA vs others)	0.10	53.7

7.8 Internal Security · weight 1 · reading 69.7

Ground held: the peak insurgent footprint now free of violence	0.30	78.5
Who pays in blood, 2024-26: insurgents killed vs security forces and civilians killed	0.35	73.0
Armed organisations: settled since 2019 vs still armed	0.25	45.0
Maoist ranks: cadres arrested or surrendered since 2024 vs still under arms	0.10	93.9

IX. External Actors

8.1 Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies · weight 4.23 · reading 18.1

Narrative: foreign media, index sourcing, UN	0.30	18.3
Western philanthropy (funder-level expected value)	0.25	3.2
Whose experts are cited	0.25	7.2
Gatekeeping: share of the foreign-money channel the State has shut	0.20	50.2

8.2 Global Technology Platforms · weight 2.65 · reading 31.0

Technological dependence (OS, search, ads, cloud, payment apps, AI)	0.15	13.4
Economic exposure: IT-services exports, jobs and tax tied to Big Tech	0.15	9.9
Control of discourse: who prevails when the State and the platforms contest content	0.10	58.7
Narrative machinery (AI answers, Meta-funded fact-checking)	0.20	26.7
Big Tech money into Indian discourse (creator payouts, news funds)	0.25	21.9
India's regulatory counter-leverage (IT Rules, CCI, UPI rails)	0.15	72.2

8.3 The United States · weight 3.60 · reading 24.4

Economic (Lowy relationships and capability)	0.35	24.7
Security (Lowy military, defence networks)	0.20	25.9
Narrative (Lowy diplomatic and cultural)	0.25	39.6
US foundation money	0.20	3.2

8.4 China · weight 3.60 · reading 34.0

Economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints)	0.45	23.3
Security (Lowy military, defence networks)	0.35	43.5
Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)	0.20	41.7

8.5 Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks · weight 2.35 · reading 61.5

Islamist networks & OIC: At home: Hindutva core vs Muslim political bloc (% of voters)	0.14	59.5
Islamist networks & OIC: Security: J&K exchange ratio 2014-23	0.06	64.8
Islamist networks & OIC: Security now: Islamist terror at home 2024-26 (J&K and the hinterland)	0.06	52.2
Pakistan: Security: Lowy military and J&K exchange ratio	0.25	65.6
Pakistan: Economic (Lowy)	0.06	87.1
Pakistan: Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)	0.11	78.8
Pakistan: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)	0.04	14.0
Bangladesh: Comprehensive power (Lowy 2025: India 40.0 vs Bangladesh 9.0)	0.10	81.6
Bangladesh: Contest of documented acts since Aug 2024	0.07	16.7
Bangladesh: audiences of India-critical voices (Pakistan and Bangladesh together)	0.01	14.0

8.6 Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States · weight 0.82 · reading 38.2

Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Member-weighted share (Lowy or GDP: Russia, Gulf, Japan, Canada, Turkey, Iran ...)	0.38	69.8
Russia, Gulf, Japan & others: Energy security (100 – crude import share)	0.25	11.3
Europe: Economic interdependence	0.18	16.8
Europe: Defence interdependence	0.11	45.3
Europe: European-origin grants	0.07	9.4

8.7 Transnational Christian Organisations · weight 0.45 · reading 48.6

Demography (Hindus 79.8 vs Christians 2.3, counted once)	0.35	97.2
Foreign religious money (FCRA)	0.25	19.6
Gatekeeping: anti-conversion laws and FCRA channel shut	0.20	48.3
Persecution-index sources	0.20	0.0

8.8 The Diaspora and India's Image Abroad · weight 2 · reading 38.5

Organisations abroad: Hindu and pro-India vs opposing (revenue, ₹ cr a year)	0.25	23.3
Lobbying and political money (FARA, LDA, PACs, 2020-26)	0.20	50.9
Resolutions and laws won abroad (caste, Hinduphobia, CAA, Khalistan), 2019-26	0.20	42.0
Diaspora opinion: approve of Modi, share of all (US, UK)	0.20	39.6
India's image abroad (Pew: favourable view of India, confidence in Modi)	0.15	41.0

Appendix B

The Evidence Base

The Atlas rests on 16,303 research rows and 10,089 money flows. Table B.1 gives their distribution by arena and the share of each arena's rows drawn from grade A or B sources (official, filed or audited records, and peer-reviewed or systematic research).

Table B.1. Rows, flows and source quality by arena

Arena	Title	Rows	Flows	Grade A–B
1.1	Religious Demography and Electoral Geography	376	0	74%
1.2	Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus	214	0	43%
1.3	The Committed Core Electorate	379	0	12%
2.1	Party and Movement Cadres	261	0	10%
2.2	Public Opinion on Contested Questions	127	0	31%
2.3	Religious Leadership and Institutions	374	87	79%
2.4	The NGO and Advocacy Sector	868	954	93%
2.5	Street Mobilisation and Veto Power	204	0	2%
3.1	Large Business Owners	107	458	73%
3.2	Private Funding for Ideological Causes	443	3,118	96%
3.3	Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations	235	0	78%
4.1	Universities and Think Tanks	861	0	34%
4.2	Expert Authority within the State	249	0	93%
4.3	Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation	649	0	32%
5.1	Television News	105	0	0%
5.2	Interpersonal Political Communication	696	0	13%
5.3	Digital Platforms	1,162	0	100%
5.4	Newspapers and the Elite Press	136	0	26%
5.5	Celebrities and Influencers	283	0	0%
5.6	Cinema and Streaming	699	0	24%
6.1	Vote Share	680	0	5%
6.2	The Conversion of Votes into Seats	315	0	0%
6.3	Leadership Popularity	148	0	5%

Arena	Title	Rows	Flows	Grade A–B
6.4	Party Finance	909	2,232	98%
7.1	Executive Office	83	0	6%
7.2	Public Expenditure	495	88	100%
7.3	Police and Central Agencies	145	0	89%
7.4	The Civil Services	221	0	31%
7.5	Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies	213	0	54%
7.6	Parliament	156	0	0%
7.7	The Judiciary	229	0	87%
7.8	Internal Security	518	0	23%
8.1	Western Media, Academia, Philanthropy and Rights Bodies	971	3,017	92%
8.2	Global Technology Platforms	244	20	25%
8.3	The United States	325	0	42%
8.4	China	220	0	43%
8.5	Pakistan, Bangladesh and Transnational Islamist Networks	610	30	37%
8.6	Europe, Russia, the Gulf and Other States	589	0	61%
8.7	Transnational Christian Organisations	51	85	78%
8.8	The Diaspora and India’s Image Abroad	753	0	96%

Appendix C

Sources

Part 1 lists the principal sources named for each arena. Part 2 lists the web domains most frequently cited in the research rows, with the number of rows citing each.

1. Principal sources by arena

1.1 Religious Demography and Electoral Geography. Census 2011 C-01; Pew 2021.

1.2 Cross-Caste Voting Cohesion among Hindus. Lokniti-CSDS NES 2024.

1.3 The Committed Core Electorate. ECI 2009, 2024; Lokniti NES 2024.

2.1 Party and Movement Cadres. RSS Prativedan 2026; party reports.

2.2 Public Opinion on Contested Questions. CVoter MOTN; Lokniti; Pew 2021.

2.3 Religious Leadership and Institutions. Platform counts; CBCI; WAMSI; HR&CE.

2.4 The NGO and Advocacy Sector. MHA FCRA; NGO Darpan; Atlas network T58b.

2.5 Street Mobilisation and Veto Power. Episodes from court records, commissions and news (street_units.csv).

3.1 Large Business Owners. Forbes India 2026; SBI bond data; ADR.

3.2 Private Funding for Ideological Causes. Atlas M1/M2; MHA FCRA; CSR portal.

3.3 Trade Unions, Co-operatives and Farmer Organisations. MoLE CTUO verification 2002 (via ILO); Railway Board and press on the Dec 2024 recognition ballot; JBCCI-XI; PIB/NCD; RBI 2024-25; co-op annual reports; union and front statements (atlas/research10/unions_coops_farmers/).

4.1 Universities and Think Tanks. Atlas M7; NIRF; letters.

4.2 Expert Authority within the State. Atlas M7.

4.3 Schools, Textbooks and Civil-Service Preparation. Atlas M7; UDISE+; EWISR 2025-26.

5.1 Television News. BARC 2025; Atlas M6 audit.

5.2 Interpersonal Political Communication. Atlas M5.

5.3 Digital Platforms. YouTube, X platform counts 30 Oct 2026.

5.4 Newspapers and the Elite Press. IRS; Atlas M6.

5.5 Celebrities and Influencers. Platform counts; news records.

5.6 Cinema and Streaming. Ormax; Atlas M6; research H.

6.1 Vote Share. ECI.

6.2 The Conversion of Votes into Seats. ECI GE2024 (543 seats).

6.3 Leadership Popularity. India Today-CVoter; Lokniti.

6.4 Party Finance. ECI audit reports.

7.1 Executive Office. ECI; state records.

7.2 Public Expenditure. Union Budget 2026-27; PRS.

7.3 Police and Central Agencies. MHA; Atlas M8.

7.4 The Civil Services. CCG letters; DoPT.

7.5 Regulators, Commissions and Appointed Bodies. Atlas M8.

7.6 Parliament. Lok Sabha / Rajya Sabha records.

7.7 The Judiciary. Atlas M8; research D.

7.8 Internal Security. MHA, PIB, Parliament answers; SATP; Punjab and Manipur Police; atlas/research10/internal_security/.

2. Most-cited web sources

Domain	Rows
sdmx.oecd.org	2,670
en.wikipedia.org	2,127
csr.gov.in	1,867
eci.gov.in	1,714
adrindia.org	1,705
github.com	1,187
gatesfoundation.org	877
facebook.com	721
youtube.com	653
prsindia.org	586
web.archive.org	389
tradestat.commerce.gov.in	300
open.canada.ca	295
censusindia.gov.in	285
irs.gov	282
projects.propublica.org	264
instagram.com	262
x.com	225
macfound.org	213
vidiq.com	195
ormaxmedia.com	178

Domain	Rows
register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk	170
cms.wellcome.org	160
news.google.com	153
scobserver.in	151
documents.un.org	141
pib.gov.in	136
nsearchives.nseindia.com	135
trendingpunjabi.com	134
thehindu.com	129
forbes.com	99
myneta.info	92
power.lowyinstitute.org	91
indiankanoon.org	83
dpiit.gov.in	73
hewlett.org	65
efile.fara.gov	64
theprint.in	59
carnegieendowment.org	52
ilo.org	51
bprd.nic.in	50
docs.google.com	49
lda.gov	46
reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk	45
drishtiias.com	42
tribuneindia.com	40
indiatoday.in	40
businesstoday.in	39
etvbharat.com	37
results.eci.gov.in	36
fec.gov	36
business-standard.com	34
livemint.com	34
timesofindia.indiatimes.com	33

Domain	Rows
hindustantimes.com	29
indiabudget.gov.in	29
deccanherald.com	27
thequint.com	26
bestmediainfo.com	26
impriindia.com	26
thenewsminute.com	24
livelaw.in	23
m.thewire.in	23
altnews.in	21
indiancooperative.com	21
nbim.no	21
rbi.org.in	20
data-explorer.oecd.org	20
aljazeera.com	19
adstransparency.google.com	19
insightsonindia.com	19
dbtbharat.gov.in	19
indianexpress.com	17
forumias.com	17
theweek.in	16
orfonline.org	16
canada.ca	16
journalofdemocracy.org	16
newindianexpress.com	15
icssr.org	15
peoplesdemocracy.in	15
pewresearch.org	14
theleaflet.in	14
screener.in	14
mea.gov.in	14
newsonair.gov.in	13
scroll.in	13

Domain	Rows
ndtv.com	13
mott.org	13
educationworld.in	13
uscirf.gov	13
static.pib.gov.in	13
ichr.ac.in	12
gradright.com	12
sipri.org	12
reuters.com	12
angusreid.org	12
indiatodayne.in	11
bbc.com	11
outlookindia.com	11
aninews.in	11
ey.com	11
constitutionalconduct.wordpress.com	11
congress.gov	11
medianama.com	10
dasra.org	10
sewainternational.in	10
keralatv.in	10
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cdslindia.com	10
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hrce.tn.gov.in	9
thewire.in	9
indiatvnews.com	8
vidyabharti.net	8
phf.org.uk	8
d-portal.org	8
thehindubusinessline.com	8
m.economictimes.com	8

Appendix D

Data and Replication

Every reading in this book can be reproduced from the published Atlas data.

- **Interactive edition.** thehindutvarebellion.org recomputes every reading as weights and assumptions are changed. Note that the interactive edition is written in the publisher's campaign register; the measurements are the same.
- **Data file.** data.json contains every domain, arena and indicator with its weight, and all 16,303 research rows and 10,089 money flows with their sources, coding and grades.
- **Edition.** This edition reports the baseline of Atlas rev 9.40, as of 2 Nov 2026.

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