The India Power Atlas
Part IX · External Actors
Chapter 40

China

Arena 8.4 · weight 3.60 · reading 34.0 · opposed majority

40.1Scope

The Chinese state: border, trade, supply chains, Pakistan alliance.

Principal evidence: Comprehensive power, Lowy Asia Power Index 2025: India 40.0 vs China 73.7 (low end: GDP, IMF 2026).

40.2Significance

Border security, import dependence, regional influence.

40.3Indicators and weights

Table 40.1 lists the 3 indicators of the arena, the weight of each within the arena, and each indicator’s reading (the Hindutva-aligned share, from 0 to 100).

Table 40.1. Indicators of arena 8.4

IndicatorWeightReading
Economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints)10.4523.3
Security (Lowy military, defence networks)20.3543.5
Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)20.2041.7
Arena reading1.0034.0

40.4Reading

The arena reads 34.0, 16.0 points below parity, and is classified as opposed majority (a reading below 45). With a weight of 3.60 of a total 107.7, it contributes 1.14 points to the composite reading of 45.7.

The indicators diverge: the highest reading is for security (Lowy military, defence networks) (43.5), the lowest for economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints) (23.3).

Figure 40.1. Readings of arena 8.4 by indicator
050100
Economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints)23.3
Security (Lowy military, defence networks)43.5
Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)41.7
Arena reading34.0
Hindutva-alignedOpposed

Each bar divides the indicator between Hindutva-aligned (left) and opposed (right) holdings. The vertical rule marks parity.

40.5Measures and exhibits

The exhibits below are the Atlas’s own views of the data behind each measure: shares by side, the largest units, breakdowns by source, recipient and country, money-flow diagrams and time series. Full row-level ledgers are in the data file (Appendix D).

Measure 1. Economic (Lowy relationships, supply chokepoints)

Reading 23.3%

Electronics 44%, APIs 74%, Li-ion 84%, magnets 80% from China

Figure 40.2. The 15 biggest of 53 (US$ million)
China: India merchandise imports from CHINA P RP1,31,620
China: India merchandise imports from CHINA P RP1,13,447
China: India imports of Chapter 85 electrical machinery & electronics (HS 85) from China46,365
China: India imports of Chapter 85 electrical machinery & electronics (HS 85) from China38,027
China: India imports of Chapter 84 machinery (HS 84) from China29,446
China: India imports of Chapter 84 machinery (HS 84) from China25,925
China-HongKong: India merchandise imports from HONG KONG24,324
China-HongKong: India merchandise imports from HONG KONG19,729
China: India merchandise exports to CHINA P RP19,471
China: India merchandise exports to CHINA P RP14,252
China: India imports of telephone sets/telecom apparatus (HS 8517) from China11,791
China: India imports of Chapter 29 organic chemicals (incl. many APIs/KSMs/intermediates) (HS 29) from China11,522
China: India imports of Chapter 29 organic chemicals (incl. many APIs/KSMs/intermediates) (HS 29) from China11,476
China: India imports of integrated circuits (HS 8542) from China8,936
China: India imports of telephone sets/telecom apparatus (HS 8517) from China8,605
Data table
US$ millionSide
China: India merchandise imports from CHINA P RP1,31,620Opposed
China: India merchandise imports from CHINA P RP1,13,447Opposed
China: India imports of Chapter 85 electrical machinery & electronics (HS 85) from China46,365Opposed
China: India imports of Chapter 85 electrical machinery & electronics (HS 85) from China38,027Opposed
China: India imports of Chapter 84 machinery (HS 84) from China29,446Opposed
China: India imports of Chapter 84 machinery (HS 84) from China25,925Opposed
China-HongKong: India merchandise imports from HONG KONG24,324Opposed
China-HongKong: India merchandise imports from HONG KONG19,729Opposed
China: India merchandise exports to CHINA P RP19,471Opposed
China: India merchandise exports to CHINA P RP14,252Opposed
China: India imports of telephone sets/telecom apparatus (HS 8517) from China11,791Opposed
China: India imports of Chapter 29 organic chemicals (incl. many APIs/KSMs/intermediates) (HS 29) from China11,522Opposed
China: India imports of Chapter 29 organic chemicals (incl. many APIs/KSMs/intermediates) (HS 29) from China11,476Opposed
China: India imports of integrated circuits (HS 8542) from China8,936Opposed
China: India imports of telephone sets/telecom apparatus (HS 8517) from China8,605Opposed
Figure 40.3. Each counted row (percent)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.
China: China share of India imports of APIs, KSMs and drug intermediates73.7
China: China share of India semiconductor imports48.9
China: growth of India exports to CHINA P RP36.6
China-HongKong: growth of India exports to HONG KONG33.2
China-HongKong: growth of India imports from HONG KONG23.3
China: China share of India total merchandise imports17.0
China: growth of India imports from CHINA P RP16.0
China: China share of India total merchandise imports15.7
0100%
OpposedNeutral / not counted
Data table
percentSide
China: China share of India imports of APIs, KSMs and drug intermediates73.7Opposed
China: China share of India semiconductor imports48.9Opposed
China: growth of India exports to CHINA P RP36.6Neutral / not counted
China-HongKong: growth of India exports to HONG KONG33.2Neutral / not counted
China-HongKong: growth of India imports from HONG KONG23.3Neutral / not counted
China: China share of India total merchandise imports17.0Opposed
China: growth of India imports from CHINA P RP16.0Neutral / not counted
China: China share of India total merchandise imports15.7Opposed
Figure 40.4. Each counted row (percent (approx))Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.
China: China share of India specialty fertiliser imports95
China: China share of India rare-earth magnet sourcing85
0100%
Data table
percent (approx)Side
China: China share of India specialty fertiliser imports95Opposed
China: China share of India rare-earth magnet sourcing85Opposed
Figure 40.5. The 7 biggest of 7 (event (1 = occurred; date in notes))
China: China licensing on 7 medium/heavy rare earths and magnets1
China: China expanded rare-earth export controls (extraterritorial, midstream/downstream)1
China: Expiry of suspension of China Oct-2025 rare-earth curbs1
China: China suspended exports of urea, DAP and specialty fertilisers (TMAP, AdBlue)1
China: China banned exports of NK blends and certain phosphates; urea under bans/quotas1
China: China export controls on tunnel boring machines (MOFCOM/GAC Announcement No. 50)1
China: China reportedly agreed to address India concerns on fertilisers, rare earths, TBMs1
Data table
event (1 = occurred; date in notes)Side
China: China licensing on 7 medium/heavy rare earths and magnets1Opposed
China: China expanded rare-earth export controls (extraterritorial, midstream/downstream)1Opposed
China: Expiry of suspension of China Oct-2025 rare-earth curbs1Opposed
China: China suspended exports of urea, DAP and specialty fertilisers (TMAP, AdBlue)1Opposed
China: China banned exports of NK blends and certain phosphates; urea under bans/quotas1Opposed
China: China export controls on tunnel boring machines (MOFCOM/GAC Announcement No. 50)1Opposed
China: China reportedly agreed to address India concerns on fertilisers, rare earths, TBMs1Opposed
Figure 40.6. The 4 biggest of 4 (USD mn)
Hong Kong: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20264,911
China: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20262,513
Hong Kong: FDI equity inflow calendar 202561.4
China: FDI equity inflow calendar 20256.49
Data table
USD mnSide
Hong Kong: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20264,911Opposed
China: Cumulative FDI equity inflow Apr 2000-Mar 20262,513Opposed
Hong Kong: FDI equity inflow calendar 202561.4Opposed
China: FDI equity inflow calendar 20256.49Opposed
Figure 40.7. Each counted row (%)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.
China: China share of Pakistan arms imports80
China: Pakistan share of Chinese arms exports61
China: China share of India semiconductor imports (study)48.9
China: China share of India integrated circuit imports30
Hong Kong: Hong Kong share of India IC imports18.5
Hong Kong: Share of India inward remittances (banks)1.3
0100%
Data table
%Side
China: China share of Pakistan arms imports80Opposed
China: Pakistan share of Chinese arms exports61Opposed
China: China share of India semiconductor imports (study)48.9Opposed
China: China share of India integrated circuit imports30Opposed
Hong Kong: Hong Kong share of India IC imports18.5Opposed
Hong Kong: Share of India inward remittances (banks)1.3Opposed
Figure 40.8. Over time: China’s share of India’s exports · % of India total exports
02.557.5102014201620182020202220242026China’s share of India’s exports 2014: 4.72% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2015: 3.85% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2016: 3.44% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2017: 3.69% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2018: 4.39% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2019: 5.08% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2020: 5.3% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2021: 7.26% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2022: 5.04% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2023: 3.39% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2024: 3.81% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2025: 3.26% of India total exportsChina’s share of India’s exports 2026: 4.41% of India total exports4.41
Data table
China’s share of India’s exports
20144.72
20153.85
20163.44
20173.69
20184.39
20195.08
20205.3
20217.26
20225.04
20233.39
20243.81
20253.26
20264.41
Figure 40.9. Over time: India’s exports to China, India’s imports from China, Trade balance with China · $ billion
-10001002014201620182020202220242026India’s exports to China 2014: 14.8$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2015: 11.9$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2016: 9.01$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2017: 10.2$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2018: 13.3$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2019: 16.8$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2020: 16.6$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2021: 21.2$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2022: 21.3$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2023: 15.3$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2024: 16.7$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2025: 14.3$ billionIndia’s exports to China 2026: 19.5$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2014: 51.0$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2015: 60.4$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2016: 61.7$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2017: 61.3$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2018: 76.4$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2019: 70.3$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2020: 65.3$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2021: 65.2$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2022: 94.6$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2023: 98.5$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2024: 102$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2025: 113$ billionIndia’s imports from China 2026: 132$ billionTrade balance with China 2014: -36.2$ billionTrade balance with China 2015: -48.5$ billionTrade balance with China 2016: -52.7$ billionTrade balance with China 2017: -51.1$ billionTrade balance with China 2018: -63.0$ billionTrade balance with China 2019: -53.6$ billionTrade balance with China 2020: -48.6$ billionTrade balance with China 2021: -44.0$ billionTrade balance with China 2022: -73.3$ billionTrade balance with China 2023: -83.2$ billionTrade balance with China 2024: -85.1$ billionTrade balance with China 2025: -99.2$ billionTrade balance with China 2026: -112$ billion13219.5-112
India’s exports to ChinaIndia’s imports from ChinaTrade balance with China
Data table
India’s exports to ChinaIndia’s imports from ChinaTrade balance with China
201414.851.0-36.2
201511.960.4-48.5
20169.0161.7-52.7
201710.261.3-51.1
201813.376.4-63.0
201916.870.3-53.6
202016.665.3-48.6
202121.265.2-44.0
202221.394.6-73.3
202315.398.5-83.2
202416.7102-85.1
202514.3113-99.2
202619.5132-112
Figure 40.10. Over time: China’s share of India’s imports · % of India total imports
051015202014201620182020202220242026China’s share of India’s imports 2014: 11.3% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2015: 13.5% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2016: 16.2% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2017: 15.9% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2018: 16.4% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2019: 13.7% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2020: 13.8% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2021: 16.5% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2022: 15.4% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2023: 13.8% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2024: 15.1% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2025: 15.7% of India total importsChina’s share of India’s imports 2026: 17.0% of India total imports17.0
Data table
China’s share of India’s imports
201411.3
201513.5
201616.2
201715.9
201816.4
201913.7
202013.8
202116.5
202215.4
202313.8
202415.1
202515.7
202617.0

Measure 2. Security (Lowy military, defence networks)

Reading 43.5%

g_china_units.csv

Figure 40.11. Each counted row: the 15 highest of 18 (score /100)Rates and shares are not added up: each row is its own reading.
Lowy API 2025: China Diplomatic influence97.7
Lowy API 2025: China Economic relationships95.6
Lowy API 2025: China Economic capability86
Lowy API 2025: China Future resources73.9
Lowy API 2025: China overall73.7
Lowy API 2025: India Diplomatic influence70.8
Lowy API 2025: China Military capability70.6
Lowy API 2025: China Resilience70
Lowy API 2025: China Cultural influence58.7
Lowy API 2025: India Resilience55.5
Lowy API 2025: India Future resources55.1
Lowy API 2025: India Military capability48
Lowy API 2025: India Cultural influence41.5
Lowy API 2025: India overall40
Lowy API 2025: India Economic capability27.1
0100
Hindutva-alignedOpposed
Data table
score /100Side
Lowy API 2025: China Diplomatic influence97.7Opposed
Lowy API 2025: China Economic relationships95.6Opposed
Lowy API 2025: China Economic capability86Opposed
Lowy API 2025: China Future resources73.9Opposed
Lowy API 2025: China overall73.7Opposed
Lowy API 2025: India Diplomatic influence70.8Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: China Military capability70.6Opposed
Lowy API 2025: China Resilience70Opposed
Lowy API 2025: China Cultural influence58.7Opposed
Lowy API 2025: India Resilience55.5Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Future resources55.1Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Military capability48Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Cultural influence41.5Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India overall40Hindutva-aligned
Lowy API 2025: India Economic capability27.1Hindutva-aligned
Figure 40.12. The 5 biggest of 5 (places renamed)
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2024)30
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2025)27
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2021)15
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2023)11
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2017)6
Data table
places renamedSide
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2024)30Opposed
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2025)27Opposed
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2021)15Opposed
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2023)11Opposed
China "standardised names" list for places in Arunachal Pradesh (2017)6Opposed

Measure 3. Narrative (Lowy diplomatic, cultural)

Reading 41.7%

g_china_units.csv

Measure 4. Context: shown for reference, not part of the reading

Figure 40.13. Over time: Hostile acts recorded (events)
02.557.510201620182020202220242026Hostile acts recorded 2016: 1eventsHostile acts recorded 2017: 1eventsHostile acts recorded 2020: 1eventsHostile acts recorded 2022: 2eventsHostile acts recorded 2023: 1eventsHostile acts recorded 2024: 2eventsHostile acts recorded 2025: 6eventsHostile acts recorded 2026: 2events2
Data table
Hostile acts recorded
20161
20171
20201
20222
20231
20242
20256
20262
Figure 40.14. Planning threat of each global player (reach × hostility, out of 100)Each player’s weight out of 5 = threat ÷ 20, unless set by hand.
Western media, academia, philanthropy and rights bodies84.6
USA72
China72
Big Tech53.1
Global Islam47.1
India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power40
Others16.5
Global Christianity9
Data table
ValueSide
Western media, academia, philanthropy and rights bodies84.6Other
USA72Other
China72Opposed
Big Tech53.1Other
Global Islam47.1Other
India Abroad: Diaspora & Soft Power40Other
Others16.5Other
Global Christianity9Other

40.6Evidence base

The arena rests on 147 coded units and 73 time-series points. Of the units and flows, 13 are coded Hindutva-aligned, 119 opposed and 15 neutral, mixed or transactional. By source grade: 77 grade A, 18 grade B, 46 grade C, 4 grade D, 2 grade E.

The full set of rows for this arena, each with its source, is in the Atlas data file (Appendix D).

Notes

  1. Electronics 44%, APIs 74%, Li-ion 84%, magnets 80% from China. ↩
  2. g_china_units.csv. ↩